Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense released its annual assessment of People's Liberation Army capabilities on August 31, finding that while China's military has significantly broadened its operational scope and threat posture, the PLA still lacks the ability to execute a full-scale joint island landing campaign against Taiwan.
The report — the ministry's most comprehensive public evaluation of PLA developments to date — concludes that Beijing has been steadily sharpening its tools of pressure and coercion, but the sheer complexity of an amphibious assault continues to outpace China's current military readiness.
Gray-Zone Operations and Psychological Pressure Escalate
The ministry describes an intensifying dual-track pressure campaign that blends what it characterizes as "non-military means" with "quasi-military force." Coast guard vessels, maritime militia, surveillance drones, and balloons now operate in parallel with frontline warships and combat aircraft, allowing Beijing to maintain persistent pressure around Taiwan without crossing the threshold into open armed conflict.
PLA aircraft have routinely crossed the Taiwan Strait median line and entered Taiwan's air defense response zones, while naval vessels simultaneously approach contiguous waters for joint combat patrols, the ministry reports. Recent exercises have simulated blockade and isolation scenarios, modeled joint coast guard and military enforcement operations, and included live-fire drills targeting mock representations of Taiwan's critical military infrastructure.
Cyber and Electronic Warfare Extend PLA's Peacetime Reach
Beyond kinetic pressure, the ministry flags a sustained campaign of peacetime infiltration. The PLA treats cyberspace as a core conflict domain, deploying units capable of planting malware, breaching specific targets, and lying dormant within systems until conflict begins — a posture the report describes as "infiltrate in peacetime, lie dormant long-term, strike in wartime."
Electronic warfare mirrors this logic. Electronic reconnaissance ships, electronic reconnaissance aircraft, and drones conduct continuous surveillance along the Taiwan Strait, gathering data on radar parameters, communication frequencies, and electronic signatures. The ministry assesses that the PLA is building toward an integrated electromagnetic warfare capability designed to blind Taiwan's command and control before or during a conflict.
Civilian Ships and Island Chain Drills Compensate for Gaps
The most significant capability gap the report identifies is in amphibious operations. The ministry describes the joint island landing campaign as "one of the most complex military actions" the PLA faces — demanding simultaneous multi-point landings, sustained air superiority and sea control, and continuous logistics throughput, none of which the PLA can yet reliably guarantee.
To bridge the gap, the PLA has incorporated civilian roll-on/roll-off passenger and cargo vessels, along with semi-submersible ships, into its amphibious exercises alongside dedicated landing craft and airborne assault units. New amphibious landing vessels are also under construction to increase transport and logistics capacity over time.
At the same time, the PLA has pushed its power-projection exercises further east, deploying forces to the First and Second Island Chains for long-range drills, carrier training, and joint firepower strike exercises aimed at deterring or delaying foreign military intervention in any Taiwan contingency.
Original Article In Chinese （Related： Exclusive | Taiwan's Counter-Drone Defenses Are Failing, and a Costly American Fix May Not Work ｜ Latest ）
