Taiwan kicked off Han Kuang 42, its largest annual live-force military exercise, on August 5, with the ten-day drill drawing sharply divergent reactions on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
'China's Defense Ministry Brands Han Kuang 42 a 'Political Show''
China's Defense Ministry spokesman Jiang Bin (蔣斌) set the tone before a single soldier had moved. "No matter how the DPP authorities drill, Taiwan independence is doomed to fail," he declared, adding that Taiwan's decision to deliberately slow civilian internet speeds during the exercise amounted to "manufacturing war anxiety" — an attempt, he said, to conscript ordinary Taiwanese into what he called a "Taiwan independence war chariot."
State media and affiliated commentators followed with their standard line: the drills were a "political show," a pre-election stunt by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, and evidence above all of Taiwan's self-delusion in the face of an already overwhelming People's Liberation Army.
On Weibo and Douyin, nationalist users seized on a minor equipment malfunction — a hatch cover falling from an M60A3 tank in eastern Taiwan on the first day of the exercise — as damning proof of military incompetence. "Just acting in a movie again," read one widely circulated post. Others questioned whether Taiwan's deliberate internet throttling served any military purpose or was simply "punishing ordinary people."
Some Chinese university professors went further, arguing that the exercise was timed for Taiwan's year-end local elections. The internet slowdowns, concentrated in central and northern counties generally favorable to the opposition Kuomintang, were characterized as "selective torture" by the ruling party.
Posts that framed Han Kuang 42 more sympathetically — calling it "Taiwan's shield" and a democratic society standing its ground — were deleted. The accounts that posted them were suspended.
An anonymous Beijing scholar working in government public opinion research described the broader dynamic as "crisis fatigue." Cross-strait military news now arrives nearly every month — PLA encirclement drills, US arms sales, circumnavigation flights. The events remain significant, the scholar said, but the Chinese public no longer sustains the emotional investment it once did.
'PLA Scholars Warn Taiwan Is Building a War of Attrition Doctrine'
The official dismissal, however, does not capture the full picture of how China's military establishment is actually reading these exercises.
Several PLA-affiliated military scholars have posted a markedly different assessment on social media. Where past Han Kuang exercises drew routine criticism for being "scripted" and predictable, these analysts note a substantive shift in what Taiwan is now rehearsing.
Han Kuang 42 focuses on urban defense, reserve force mobilization, drone integration into supply logistics, command continuity after communications are severed, and — crucially — how local governments can maintain basic services when central authority is disrupted. "Taiwan is not simply accumulating equipment," one PLA-linked scholar wrote. "It is learning how to extend its resistance time and enhance social resilience."
Several analysts linked this evolution directly to lessons drawn from the Russia-Ukraine war, a conflict that demonstrated the outsized military value of societal staying power.
An unnamed civilian observer drew the implication plainly: by drilling post-blackout social operations, the DPP is signaling that it understands the real scenario it faces. "In an actual conflict," the observer wrote, "command centers, ports, and industrial facilities could all be paralyzed in the first wave."
'US Military Presence at Han Kuang 42 Rattles Chinese Public Discourse'
Of all the features of this year's exercise, none generated sharper attention in Chinese public discourse than the confirmed presence of US military personnel, who observed and participated lightly in the drills throughout their duration.
Taiwan's Defense Minister Wellington Koo (顧立雄) had previously acknowledged that US-Taiwan military cooperation is "closer than the outside world imagines." During Han Kuang 42, that closeness was on display.
Chinese observers archly referred to American advisers as "English teachers" and pointed to what they described as a reverse briefing mechanism — US personnel receiving structured readouts from Taiwan's military — as evidence of deepening American integration into Taiwan's defense architecture. In Chinese public discourse, the arrangement was read not as routine coordination but as a qualitative step toward permanent US military involvement in Taiwan's defense.
'Taiwan Asks Whether Society Can Function After a First Strike'
Taiwan's government has been deliberately reframing what the Han Kuang exercises are meant to demonstrate. Extended in duration last year and expanded in civilian participation, the drills are increasingly presented not as a showcase of firepower but as a test of institutional continuity under sustained pressure.
The central question of this year's exercise, analysts note, is not how many new weapons systems Taiwan has fielded, but whether local governments, military units, and civilian infrastructure can keep functioning even after a first strike degrades or destroys central command.
Test scenarios involving the Danjiang Bridge crossing, cross-island troop movements between eastern and western Taiwan, anti-blockade convoy escorts, and deliberate internet throttling are all designed to answer that question.
Han Kuang 42 is still underway. For Taiwan, it is a high-stakes test of command flexibility and social endurance. For Beijing's more candid military analysts, it is evidence that Taiwan is pursuing something considerably harder to dismiss than an arms buildup: a society preparing to absorb a blow and keep fighting. （Related： Han Kuang 42 | Matsu Garrison Drills Against Infrastructure Sabotage ｜ Latest ）
