Lyle Morris, a senior fellow at the Asia Society's Center for China Analysis, published a report on July 23, 2026, identifying eight variables he says shape Chinese leader Xi Jinping's calculus on whether to use force against Taiwan. The framework arrives as prominent China watchers offer sharply different predictions about how close that risk actually is.
Morris titled the report "The Factors That Matter: A Formula for Understanding China's Use of Force Calculus Over Taiwan." It sets out, in his words, to break down the cost-benefit analysis Chinese leadership would run through before deciding to use force against Taiwan.
PLA Readiness Tops Three Internal Factors
Morris groups three variables under "internal factors" tied to the Chinese Communist Party's own politics. The most significant, he argues, is the readiness of the People's Liberation Army. "The PLA's state of readiness affects not only its capabilities but also the leadership's confidence, the timing of any action, and its tolerance for risk," Morris wrote.
The second internal factor is the stability of domestic Chinese politics, which Morris says underpins the party's legitimacy, its economic goals and its ultimate capacity to control Chinese society. The third is political legacy — how much unifying Taiwan with the mainland during a leader's tenure would cement that leader's place in history.
Five External Forces Add to the Equation
Beyond Beijing's internal calculus, Morris identifies five external variables: whether Taiwan intends to permanently maintain a status distinct from mainland China; the possibility of unplanned external shocks; the role U.S. military intervention would play; whether the United States and its allies would actually get involved in a Taiwan contingency; and Taiwan's own capacity to deter an attack.
Morris cautions that his list is not exhaustive but focuses on the factors he considers most consequential to Beijing's decision-making. He also argues the framework should hold up over time, regardless of who leads China, the United States or Taiwan.
Looking ahead, Morris lays out two competing scenarios. If Chinese leaders become convinced that American and Taiwanese military capabilities are declining and that Washington's resolve to intervene is weakening, he writes, Beijing could adopt a more permissive strategy toward Taiwan. But if Chinese leaders instead conclude that China's relative strength has already peaked, they may see only a limited window to act.
For Taiwan, Morris suggests that if the island becomes convinced the United States is withdrawing from the western Pacific, it might be more willing to compromise with Beijing and enter substantive talks — on Beijing's terms. Alternatively, Taiwan could try to strengthen its own defenses and seek other security partners, though Morris calls that a difficult task "because, at least for now, the United States appears to be the indispensable country."
Rudd and Mitter Split Over Invasion Timing
Morris's formula has stirred debate among China specialists over whether Xi is actually prepared to order an attack — and whether the so-called "Davidson window" is real. The term, coined after retired Admiral Philip Davidson, the former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, refers to his 2021 warning to Congress that China could move against Taiwan by 2027.
Kevin Rudd, Australia's former prime minister and a prominent China scholar, has argued that a fourth consecutive presidential term for Taiwan's governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) could trigger a crisis, and has called 2028 the most dangerous year for the island.
Rana Mitter, a professor at Harvard's Kennedy School who visited Taipei in May 2025 and was interviewed by Storm Media during that trip, has pushed back on that timeline. Speaking at a summit in Paris, Mitter said the probability of a PLA attack on Taiwan within the next three to five years is "extremely low."
Mitter Compares Any Invasion to Normandy
"China may already have, or will soon have, the technical capability to launch this kind of invasion — after all, Xi Jinping has set 2027 as his target for acquiring that capability," Mitter said. "But having the capability and actually pulling it off successfully are two entirely different things."
Mitter argued that the scale of amphibious operations required for a full air-and-sea invasion of Taiwan would make World War II's Normandy landings, the Battle of Iwo Jima or the Incheon landing during the Korean War look like "child's play" by comparison. He said he considers the odds of the PLA attempting such an operation "extremely low," and doubts China would even resort to gray-zone tactics or a naval blockade.
Beijing's Real Target May Be Taiwan's 2028 Vote
Mitter said Beijing is instead pinning its hopes on Taiwan's next presidential election, scheduled for 2028, as an opportunity to reshape the island's domestic politics. He pointed to a recent visit to mainland China by Cheng Li-wun, chair of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), who met and was photographed with Xi Jinping — a move Mitter called "quite interesting, and somewhat unusual," given Taiwan's internal political climate.
He said the rivalry between the governing DPP and the KMT is becoming increasingly polarized, and that Beijing sees an opening to deepen that divide through social media and other means, alongside the threat of economic coercion.
Ultimately, Mitter said, Washington's posture will determine the outcome. "The key factor, I think, is the United States' attitude," he said. If the U.S. keeps its longstanding commitment to helping Taiwan defend itself — "even though the current administration's rhetoric has been tough, the overall direction hasn't changed" — he said Taiwan should be able to withstand Beijing's pressure. But if that changes, he said, Taiwan's democratic politics could shift toward confronting a harder question: what comes next. （Related： China Eases Military Pressure on Taiwan, Shifts Forces Toward Japan ｜ Latest ）
