Exclusive | Rintaro Ogata: Japan's China Hawks Are Cowards, Not Patriots

Rintaro Ogata (緒方林太郎)

​Member of the House of Representatives. Born in 1973 in Kitakyushu, Fukuoka. While at the University of Tokyo's Faculty of Law, he passed the diplomatic service examination — the youngest candidate ever to do so. Joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1994, serving in the Middle East and Africa Bureau and the Treaty Division of the International Legal Affairs Bureau. Left the Ministry in 2005. First elected to the Diet in 2009 as a Democratic Party candidate in Fukuoka's 9th district. After two electoral defeats, returned as an independent in 2021 and has won every election since. Currently in his fifth term; a member of the cross-party caucus Yūshi no Kai(有志の会 ).   

Interview by Takefumi Hayata.​

Q: Japan's picture of Taiwan seems distorted — dominated by the DPP and pro-independence voices, with the rest of Taiwan largely invisible.

A: Those who call themselves "pro-Taiwan" in Japan are essentially in the same category as those who are "pro-Tibet" or "pro-Uyghur." In most cases, it is a reflex reaction — a byproduct of being anti-China. To me, something feels off about that.

I feel genuine affinity for Taiwan. But I have made an absolute decision never to be "pro-Taiwan" as a byproduct of disliking China. Being friendly with Taiwan simply because China is your enemy is, I think, disrespectful to Taiwan itself — and people in Taiwan have noticed.

Taiwan has shown warmth toward Japan. Because of Taiwan's ambiguous international standing, official government-to-government ties aren't possible — which is exactly why we must cherish the relationship in whatever non-governmental form we can. I agree with that entirely. But I sense something unhealthy in how it currently works. The stronger the outrage toward China becomes, the more everyone sides with Taiwan. Taiwan has become a function of the relationship with China. That is not healthy.

The Ohira Line — and the Diet Members Who've Never Heard of It

Q: During the last election you said: "If Taiwan and China agree to unify, that's fine — just not by force." Why say that during a campaign?

A: I have a strong conviction that war must not happen. And it comes partly from my background as a foreign ministry official.

If China and Taiwan were to unify peacefully by mutual consent, that is not something Japan should weigh in on — it is an internal matter. But when the means are not peaceful, that is not acceptable. This is not my own idea. It is the Diet testimony of Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira at the time of Japan-China normalization. Enormous weight rests on the word "fundamentally" — it is fundamentally an internal matter. This is the wisdom of our predecessors.

What worries me lately is that more and more Diet members have never studied this history. On the other hand, when I speak with Chinese diplomats, they are extremely well-prepared. Japan's Diet members shout condemnations at China from a safe distance — but do they really have the depth to sit face to face with Chinese diplomats and argue their case? That is highly doubtful.

Take the "1992 Consensus." (Note: In 1992, Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation and the mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits verbally acknowledged "one China" in Hong Kong talks. The KMT described this as "one China, respective interpretations"; the mainland has never formally accepted that framing but has used the Consensus as a basis for cross-strait exchanges. The DPP rejects it entirely.) For all the professed interest in China and Taiwan, people don't actually know what it means. Appear interested, then sit down for a real conversation — and you find they know very little.

I tell Chinese diplomats directly: it is not acceptable to call something an internal matter when military force is involved. I say the same thing inside Japan and outside Japan. I never shift my position.

Q: What do Chinese diplomats say when you make that argument?

A: Typically: "We absolutely cannot accept the machinations of separatist forces. We want peaceful unification too — but because they are so active, we have no choice but to use every means to stop them."

Japan's position — peaceful unification is fine, but calling it an internal matter when military force is used is not acceptable — is a well-constructed argument. It is hard to say no to. When the Chinese side hears it, they find it difficult to say outright, "We will achieve unification through military force regardless." All Diet members ought to be speaking with one voice on this. It would be understood by Taiwan as well, and it would not amount to inciting separatism. Yet there are Diet members who go to Taiwan and express support for independence. They talk big. I genuinely wonder whether that's all right. This is the most difficult subject in the world.

Q: What exactly does China mean by "separatism"?

A: The phrase "Republic of China" carries a different resonance from "Taiwan," and the people of Taiwan are very skillful at knowing when to use each. As for what constitutes "separatism" — it probably means moves that assert sovereignty more forcefully, but what exactly that entails differs depending on who you ask.

What seems to be required now is to skillfully maintain the current status quo. Can Taiwan truly achieve full independence? It cannot. Can it move closely toward China? Given Taiwan's domestic politics, that is also not feasible. Completely different political systems have existed side by side for nearly eighty years. Even if people share ethnicity, ways of thinking differ, cultures differ, and each region has developed its own distinctiveness. I believe the best outcome is simply for the current state to continue.

But from Beijing's perspective, the continuation of the status quo means established facts are becoming further entrenched. From their side, things progressing as they are looks like the separatists are succeeding and Taiwan is drifting further away. So any concrete action that appears to push toward independence makes the situation look even worse — and that makes the regional security environment highly unstable.

Q: The Takaichi administration's remarks about a Taiwan contingency severely damaged Japan-China relations. What is your view?

A: There is talk it was intentional — I take an entirely different view. At the time, Takaichi had just become Prime Minister, was in high spirits, and, as she still does, goes through all her Diet briefings from around 3:30 in the morning. She barely sleeps. She was probably a bit out of it.

More importantly, while Takaichi has extensive Cabinet experience, she has never served as Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, or Chief Cabinet Secretary. Those posts give you a baseline instinct for what you must never say. The absolute minimum — when it comes to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty or the overall security framework — is never to name a specific country, no matter how hard you are pressed. That instinct was not there. And she was groggy.

In the late 1990s, a Director General at the Ministry was dismissed for saying that Taiwan would be included within the concept of "situations in areas surrounding Japan." That is how seriously the Ministry treats this. For someone with my background, the Takaichi testimony is the kind of statement that would get anyone fired regardless of seniority. Having said it, she cannot easily walk it back — retracting it would foreclose possibilities that must remain open. She did something unnecessary. My personal, blunt reaction at the time: that was a foolish thing to say.

Q: Is there any way to put out this fire?

A: I believe there was — and I had a plan. Japan and China have four landmark bilateral documents: the 1972 Joint Communiqué (Zhou-Tanaka), the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty (Deng-Fukuda), the 1998 Joint Declaration (Jiang-Obuchi), and the 2008 Joint Statement (Hu-Fukuda). The strongest language on Taiwan appears in the 1998 document, where Japan stated it "reiterates its recognition that China is one."

After the Takaichi incident, the right move would have been to arrange a planted question in the Diet as early as possible, getting Takaichi to reaffirm that 1998 declaration. Simply confirming a past document — she would have agreed to that. It would have contained the damage considerably. No matter how far things go, Japan cannot go beyond the Ohira line. The Ohira statement was well crafted. Takaichi simply hadn't done her homework — and the damage control that followed was also handled poorly.

Q: You said during the election that the Takaichi administration has no communication channel with China. What did you mean?

A: In the past, there were layered channels between Japan and China — parliamentary ties, back-channel routes. Twenty years ago, Hiromu Nonaka of the LDP had a close relationship with Zeng Qinghong, then China's Vice President, and when something happened they would talk through that route and quietly resolve it. The decisive breaking point was probably the Senkaku nationalization. Under the Democratic Party administration, channels were thin, and the messenger was poorly chosen — Noda appeared to believe he had Hu Jintao's understanding on the nationalization, and when he said so, Hu reportedly looked grim. That was the beginning of the end.

Under Abe, "conservatives" and "China hawks" rose to prominence in the LDP. Even then, Toshihiro Nikai was one channel. But gradually, any contact with China came to be seen as "China appeasement." It has been particularly serious since Nikai's departure.

From my perspective — and I'll say this plainly — those who call themselves "China hawks" or "conservatives" simply look like cowards who lack the resolve and courage to confront China's arguments face to face.

China has its own logic. I'm not saying it is correct. But you have to be willing to engage with it — "you say that, but here is what I think." My impression is that many of them simply do not have the guts. It's like standing on one bank of a river and shouting "idiots" across to the other side, from a distance where no arrow can reach you. The current "conservatives" are doing exactly that.

There is another, more dangerous dimension. Looking at the history of past wars, an enormous number were triggered by miscommunication — accidental incidents and misreadings of intention that escalated far beyond what anyone intended. The First World War is the classic example. The current state of near-zero communication between Japan and China is genuinely frightening. Say the MSDF and the PLA Navy have an accidental encounter in the East China Sea. China's domestic media frames it as "neo-militarist" Japan and escalates. Japan escalates in response. And there is no mechanism to de-escalate. I wonder if anyone in the Diet feels the danger of that scenario. I feel it very strongly.

Q: What about other parties as a potential channel?

A: Komeito still has — though fading — a sense of pride in having helped open up Japan-China relations. Their role was significant. But it is clearly diminishing, and being in opposition has not helped. As for the other opposition parties, with a few exceptions, the number of sitting Diet members who genuinely want to engage with China is vanishingly small.

Q: Do you have allies in this effort?

A: There are solid people within the LDP and within Komeito. What matters is redundancy — channels operating below the surface through multiple routes, not depending on any single individual. Better to have various connections through various channels than to rely on one thick pipeline.

There is a phrase in diplomacy: "agree to disagree." With China, there are not many things you can simply "agree" on. What matters is how many "agree to disagree" arrangements you can build — and that requires being on talking terms, which requires mutual trust. Right now, that trust is absent. The atmosphere barely exists.

Interestingly, Chinese people are, I think, more tolerant of disagreement than Japanese people. Three thousand years of history have given them an understanding that the world contains all kinds of people. Japan's culture — "harmony is to be valued" — produces a much lower tolerance for disagreement. The Chinese side often has a more natural capacity for "agree to disagree" than the Japanese side does.

Q: You attended the PLA's 98th anniversary reception at the Chinese Embassy. You were criticized heavily for it.

A: Last year I attended that reception — not because I like or dislike the PLA, but to keep the lines of communication open. I asked beforehand how many Self-Defense Force officers would be attending, and was told brigadier general-level officers from all three services would be going. If they were going, I thought, then I would too.

"China appeaser," my critics said. But consider: the person in China reacting most furiously to the Takaichi remarks might be Xi Jinping — but the military is almost certainly reacting with equal fury. So let me ask those critics: do you have any reach to China's military? Are you on speaking terms with Chinese officers? Can you pass Japan's message to Chinese military attachés? No. You cannot. Yet in that situation, the current narrative — that engaging with China equals "China appeasement" — is, I think, quite dangerous.

I am not flattering China. I say what needs to be said. Someone who shouts "China is outrageous" from a safe distance without ever engaging directly — to me, that person is simply a coward.

When you actually engage with Chinese diplomats, they have done their homework. What concerns me most lately is that China is increasingly pushing the line: "We fought together against Japan — let us cherish that legacy." Xi Jinping used this argument with the KMT chairman in cross-strait talks. When China calls Japan "neo-militarist," this is the underlying logic — in the Pacific War, we fought Japan together, and Japan was the enemy. Most people dismiss "neo-militarism" as absurd labeling. It is absurd — but there is a reasonably coherent argument behind it, and it is not easy to dismiss. You can only understand this by talking directly with the other side. The bold talkers have probably never thought about any of it. "Absurd" — and that's the end of it.

Q: What kind of relationship should Japan and China have?

A: You cannot change your neighbors. Japan is fortunate in not sharing a land border with China — I have been near China's land borders with Nepal, Pakistan, India, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, and the pressure is immense. Being separated by sea while still being neighbors is, I think, an ideal positioning. China's population will decline, but it will still have more than ten times Japan's population. The task is simply to make the relationship work.

What Japan must be absolutely careful to avoid is a U.S.-China division of the Pacific into spheres of influence. Xi Jinping floated this to Obama more than a decade ago and it went nowhere — but ironically, the Trump administration is now voluntarily withdrawing American engagement. If that leads to a situation where Japan cannot maintain its political system without China's approval, that absolutely cannot happen. We need to keep the United States engaged in East Asian security — while managing the China relationship well. That is Japan's proper positioning.

Q: And Taiwan's place in all of this?

A: Taiwan is among the most pro-Japanese places in the world, and I feel genuine affinity for it. At a time when the region must stay peaceful, we must respect the will of the people of Taiwan — their right of self-determination. But we must avoid tilting too far toward independence, while also opposing any coercive push toward China.

I sometimes wonder whether Japan is truly responding to Taiwan's affection in a worthy way. As I said at the outset: much of Japan's "pro-Taiwan" sentiment is a byproduct of being anti-China — and I genuinely question whether that constitutes a real answer to what Taiwanese people feel toward Japan.

Setting aside the special factor that is China — deliberately setting it aside — we need to find a path that responds to Taiwan's pro-Japanese feelings on their own terms. I always think that.​

Original Article in Japanese​

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