China has been systematically incorporating large civilian vessels — roll-on/roll-off ferries, bulk freighters, and hospital ships — into contingency planning for a potential military operation across the Taiwan Strait, according to a French defense researcher who presented his findings at an international maritime forum in Taipei on July 9.
Benjamin Blandin, a resident researcher at Taiwan's Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), presented the analysis at the 2026 Taiwan Ocean International Forum, organized by Taiwan's Ocean Affairs Council. The gathering drew regional security scholars to examine the People's Liberation Army's growing reliance on non-traditional maritime assets in the Western Pacific's first island chain — a zone of critical strategic concern for Taiwan.
Civilian Ferries and Freighters Anchor China's Amphibious Drills
Blandin told the forum that the PLA has conducted exercises integrating roll-on/roll-off vessels — large commercial car and truck ferries — as ramps for putting armored forces ashore. Modified cargo ships, he explained, could be reconfigured as forward bases for helicopter assault operations, or secretly fitted with artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS), or missile batteries, concealed under commercial markings until within striking range of a target.
The mobilization pool Beijing could draw from is substantial. China has more than 7,000 deck cargo ships nationwide that can be requisitioned in a conflict. Since 2012, 31 RO-RO vessels — with a combined capacity of 2.4 million tonnes — have been formally integrated into what Chinese planning documents designate as "strategic projection support ship fleets," distributed among the PLA's major theater commands.
China's 17 hospital ships, which operate worldwide and publicly offer free medical services to host nations, present a related concern. Blandin was pointed in his assessment: "Nothing from China is free," he said, arguing that the goodwill generated by those vessels is likely leveraged to pressure recipient states into abandoning diplomatic ties with Taiwan, supporting China at the United Nations, or voting against resolutions contrary to Chinese interests.
China's Research Ships Flout UNCLOS Disclosure Requirements
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), foreign research vessels may legally enter another country's exclusive economic zone — but are obliged to declare their nationality, location, schedule, and future movements in advance, and to share their findings afterward. Blandin said Chinese research ships routinely ignore every one of these obligations.
"We know these ships sometimes operate near undersea cables, deploy hydrophones to collect intelligence, and photograph and film sensitive facilities," he said. Beyond that, they collect signals and electronic intelligence, conduct high-resolution seabed mapping, and measure salinity, dissolved oxygen levels, and current speeds — data with direct applications to submarine warfare planning. The Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has assessed that roughly 80% of Chinese research vessels show questionable affiliations when examined by ownership history, maritime patterns, or operational behavior.
Arsenal Ships and Novel Platforms Remain at Prototype Stage
Beyond vessels drawn from the civilian sector, Blandin catalogued a range of purpose-built or modified maritime platforms that have appeared in Chinese coastal waters almost entirely since Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012. These include floating radar stations, electronic warfare barges, underwater biological enclosures, and modified freighters reconfigured as fire support ships capable of deploying tracked self-propelled howitzers, MLRS units, or tanks.
China has also developed what Blandin described as an "arsenal ship" — a converted bulk carrier that could house up to 60 missile launchers, deck guns, over-the-horizon (OTH) radar arrays, and drone launch facilities, while doubling as an electronic warfare platform. Adding to the list are large jack-up barges — each measuring 110 meters in length, with the structural capacity to extend to 185 meters.
Blandin was direct about their present limitations. "These systems look formidable," he said, "but they have no overhead cover, no air defense weapons, and they are very slow." Deploying them in actual combat, he added, would require near-total air superiority — a condition that cannot be assumed.
China's Underwater Gliders Surface Worldwide, Go Unclaimed
China's unmanned maritime programs span the surface, semi-submersible, and deep-water domains, with deployments recorded across the South China Sea, the Java Sea, and the eastern Indian Ocean. Blandin highlighted the "Haiyi" series of underwater gliders as an instructive example of how these assets operate: more than 20 have been recovered — or found run aground on reefs — by foreign fishermen, coast guard patrols, and naval units across multiple countries. In not a single case, Blandin noted, did China formally request the return of a recovered device.
He added that these underwater systems are typically not deployed by the PLA Navy or coast guard directly, but through a network of opaquely affiliated research vessels whose links to Chinese state institutions are difficult to verify.
Development, Blandin Warns, Should Not Be Mistaken for Readiness
Despite the breadth of programs he catalogued, Blandin urged the forum not to equate development with deployment — or alarm with certainty. China's maritime agencies, including the PLA Navy, coast guard, and various research bodies, are each pursuing prototype programs largely in isolation from one another, without meaningful cross-agency coordination, and none of the non-traditional platforms he surveyed has visibly entered mass production.
"I think this looks more like signaling — outward toward neighboring states, and inward toward the Chinese public and even toward these agencies' own superiors," he said. With China's maritime militia and coast guard having lost some of their earlier budget autonomy following militarization, individual agencies may be competing for central funding by showcasing new hardware to Beijing rather than building combat-ready capability. Given China's broader economic headwinds, some publicized platforms may serve primarily as budget justifications rather than genuine strategic investments, he suggested.
That said, Blandin was measured rather than dismissive. "China's maritime power is absolutely not a paper tiger," he said. "It does have limitations. What we're seeing now — many of these non-traditional platforms and unmanned vehicles — remains largely at the prototype stage, without real operational capability. It is not a direct threat at this moment. But it demands sustained attention." （Related： Opinion | China's JL-3 Missile Test Reveals the Intelligence-Gathering Hand of Multiple Nations ｜ Latest ）
