A decade after an international tribunal delivered a landmark ruling against Beijing's sweeping South China Sea claims, China has not merely maintained its refusal to accept the verdict — it has turned that refusal into a sophisticated campaign to reshape global opinion on international maritime law.
On July 12, 2016, an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sided overwhelmingly with the Philippines, invalidating the legal basis of China's nine-dash line and ruling that Beijing had violated Manila's exclusive economic zone rights. Ten years later, the ruling has not moved an inch of ocean — but it has become the flashpoint for an escalating three-way strategic contest involving China, the United States, and the Philippines.
China's 62-Page South China Sea Report Targets Global Opinion, Not Domestic Politics
China's response to the anniversary has been anything but low-key. Beijing released a 62-page English-language report reasserting its legal position — a document analysts describe less as a legal brief and more as a calculated act of "lawfare," the use of legal argument as a weapon in geopolitical competition.
The report, circulated through affiliated think tanks and state-linked foreign affairs platforms, reiterates Beijing's long-standing position: the tribunal lacked jurisdiction, the proceedings violated the principle of state consent under UNCLOS, and the ruling is therefore "illegal, invalid, and without binding force." None of those arguments are new. What is new is the audience China is targeting.
In 2016, Beijing's rejection was framed largely for domestic consumption. This time, the English-language publication signals that China wants to contest the ruling directly on the international stage — countering a growing chorus of Western governments, including the United States, Japan, Australia, and the European Union, that have cited the 2016 decision to legitimize the Philippines' maritime position.
Why Second Thomas Shoal Has Become the Arbitration Ruling's Most Dangerous Test
The arbitration's tenth anniversary arrives at a moment of sharply heightened tensions in the waters it was meant to govern. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Manila has dramatically shifted its foreign and security policy, deepening the US-Philippines alliance and granting Washington expanded access to Philippine military bases under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Vessel confrontations between Chinese coast guard ships and Philippine resupply missions — particularly at Second Thomas Shoal (Ren'ai Reef) and Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island) — have become near-routine flashpoints.
China, meanwhile, has not stood still. Over the past decade, Beijing has pressed forward with island-building and facility construction across the Spratly Islands, increased coast guard and maritime militia patrols, and intensified diplomatic pressure to prevent the ruling from being operationalized by any regional actor. The message Beijing has sought to send is blunt: the South China Sea is Chinese sovereign territory, and foreign military activity near its shores will not be tolerated.
Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro has urged Manila to treat the next decade as an opportunity to convert its 2016 legal victory into a credible
G7 and US Back Manila's Legal Claim; ASEAN Splits Keep China's Flank Open
The Philippines has secured significant international support for the ruling's validity. The G7, the United States, Japan, and the European Union have all issued statements affirming the award's legal force, framing the South China Sea not merely as a bilateral dispute but as a test of the rules-based international order and of UNCLOS's authority as a framework for resolving maritime disagreements.
Manila holds the ASEAN rotating chairmanship in 2026, a platform the Marcos administration is expected to use to amplify multilateral pressure in favor of the ruling's implementation. The U.S. State Department has repeatedly reaffirmed the award's legally binding character.
Yet unity within Southeast Asia remains fractured. Most ASEAN members, wary of jeopardizing trade relationships and investment flows from China, have avoided taking sides openly. That reluctance has slowed negotiations over a proposed South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC) to a crawl, leaving the prospect of a legally binding regional framework distant at best.
Beijing has used this divide strategically, emphasizing its willingness to engage bilaterally and through the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) as alternatives to any framework grounded in the arbitral award.
Taiwan Rejects the Ruling Too — But for Very Different Reasons Than Beijing
Taiwan's position adds an unusual dimension to the anniversary. Taipei maintains traditional sovereignty claims over several South China Sea features, including Itu Aba Island (Taiping Island), which the 2016 tribunal classified as a "rock" rather than an island — a ruling that would strip it of any associated exclusive economic zone entitlement.
That classification drew sharp protests from Taipei across party lines. Both the Kuomintang government of Ma Ying-jeou and subsequent administrations under Tsai Ing-wen and Lai Ching-te have declined to accept any aspect of the ruling that affects Taiwan's claimed maritime rights. The stance creates a rare point of convergence between Taipei and Beijing on sovereignty — while the two governments face very different strategic pressures from the same ruling.
The South China Sea Ruling at 10: A Fight Over UNCLOS, Not Just Ocean Territory
What the tenth anniversary makes clear is that the South China Sea arbitration has long since outgrown the dispute it was designed to settle. Beijing has no intention of changing its position on the ground or in the courtroom. What it wants to change is the global consensus on whether the ruling means anything.
For the United States, Japan, and Europe, the award is a cornerstone of the argument that China must operate within an international legal framework — and that the Indo-Pacific order cannot be rewritten by force or fait accompli. For China, the ruling represents an illegitimate exercise of jurisdiction that must be actively contested rather than simply ignored.
A decade ago, an international tribunal tried to resolve the South China Sea through law. A decade later, none of the key parties have accepted the same answer — and the waterway remains what it has always been: a theater where legal argument, diplomatic pressure, and military posture converge without resolution.
