On June 4, Singapore's former defence minister Ng Eng Hen told Bloomberg Television that U.S. President Donald Trump was right to put the U.S.-China relationship above Taiwan — and that he supported this as the path to regional stability.
Taiwan cannot treat that as routine diplomatic commentary.
Ng is not a retired academic or a fringe voice. He served as Singapore's defence minister for over a decade and was central to the country's national security decision-making. Singapore is a precision state: its defence posture, foreign policy, and economic strategy move in deliberate alignment. When someone of his standing speaks publicly about the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle, it is not personal opinion. It reflects how Singapore's strategic establishment actually positions Taiwan.
Not as a democratic partner to be protected — but as a risk variable to be managed.
Singapore's Troops Train in Taiwan. But Would They Fight for It?
For decades, Singapore has rotated military forces through Taiwan under what is known as the Starlight Program — a bilateral training arrangement that lets Singapore conduct large-scale exercises, including mountain warfare, armor, artillery, and field operations, that its small territory cannot accommodate.
During the Cold War, this served the practical interests of both sides. It was widely seen as a symbol of close military ties between two small, security-conscious states.
That era is over.
As the risk of conflict across the Taiwan Strait rises, the long-term presence of foreign military forces on Taiwanese soil can no longer be justified as friendly cooperation. It must be evaluated by one standard: wartime utility.
By that standard, the Starlight Program fails.
The Command Problem No One Is Talking About
The core military question is simple: would Singapore's Starlight forces come under Taiwanese command in the event of war?
The answer is no.
Starlight forces are not part of the Republic of China armed forces. They are not treaty allies. Their ultimate command authority rests with Singapore — a government that has made no commitment to defend Taiwan, upholds a one-China policy, and maintains deep economic ties with Beijing.
Now that a former Singaporean defence minister has publicly stated that U.S.-China stability should take priority over Taiwan, Taipei can no longer assume these forces would be a security asset in a crisis. The assumption has been invalidated in public, by a credible source, on the record.
Three Scenarios — All of Them Costly for Taiwan
Military planning is not built on optimism. If conflict erupts in the Taiwan Strait, one of three things happens with the Starlight forces — and none of them helps Taiwan.
Worst case: Under pressure from Beijing — political, diplomatic, or through information warfare — Starlight forces become a vulnerability inside Taiwan's own territory. This is not an accusation. It is what defence planners are required to consider. National security cannot rest on the assumption that a partner probably means well.
Most likely case: Singapore declares neutrality and stands its forces down, awaiting evacuation. Even this is not cost-free. Taiwan's military would need to monitor, protect, isolate, and manage the evacuation of Starlight personnel — all while preventing their bases, vehicles, and communications equipment from being exploited by hostile infiltration. Those are resources that belong in air defense, anti-landing operations, and reserve mobilization. Not babysitting a neutral foreign force.
Best case — but essentially impossible: Starlight forces fight alongside Taiwan against China. Singapore has no obligation to defend Taiwan. It will not break with Beijing on Taiwan's behalf. No honest reading of Singapore's national interests supports this outcome.
Goodwill Is Not a Command Structure
Wartime military decisions are not made on sentiment. They are made on five operational chains: command, communications, logistics, friend-or-foe identification, and rules of engagement.
Any armed force that cannot be integrated into all five has no place in a high-risk combat zone.
Starlight forces cannot be integrated into Taiwan's wartime command structure. That is not a political judgment — it is an operational fact. And Ng's remarks make acting on that fact more urgent, not less.
When a figure at the core of Singapore's national security establishment says publicly that U.S.-China relations come before Taiwan, the message to Taipei is clear: Taiwan's survival is not Singapore's highest strategic priority. Singapore's priority is avoiding a U.S.-China clash and protecting its own economic and security space.
That is a rational position for Singapore to hold. It also means Starlight forces will not be a reliable partner in any cross-strait conflict.
Taiwan cannot allow its own battlefield to be occupied by forces from a country that will not stand with it when it matters most.
What Taiwan Should Do
Some will argue that pushing for a Starlight withdrawal would damage Taiwan-Singapore relations. That argument conflates diplomatic ties with defence security — two separate things.
Taiwan can, and should, continue to engage Singapore on trade, finance, technology, and education. But the long-term stationing of foreign troops on Taiwanese soil is a categorically different matter. Especially when that country's strategic leadership has publicly placed Taiwan's security below the management of great-power competition.
Taiwan should move on three fronts immediately.
First, conduct a full audit of all Starlight personnel, equipment, bases, ammunition, vehicles, and communications systems currently on Taiwanese territory.
Second, open negotiations with Singapore on a clear withdrawal timeline and halt all new rotation deployments.
Third, reclaim the training facilities and logistical resources currently allocated to the Starlight Program and redirect them toward reserve mobilization, urban warfare training, counter-infiltration operations, distributed air defense, and drone countermeasures.
The Program Had Its Time. That Time Has Passed.
The Starlight Program had genuine historical value. But historical value cannot override current defence requirements. When the strategic environment changes, yesterday's asset becomes today's liability.
Taiwan does not need an ambiguous foreign military presence on its soil. It needs a defence structure that is clear, controllable, and entirely under its own command.
The conclusion is straightforward: Singapore's Starlight forces should be withdrawn — in an orderly, complete, and timely manner.
This is not an anti-Singapore position. It is Taiwan reclaiming sovereign control over its own defence. Singapore is entitled to pursue its national interests. Taiwan is equally entitled to eliminate a wartime risk from its own territory.
Defence is not sustained by goodwill. It is sustained by control.
*The author holds a doctorate in business administration from the University of South Australia. （Related： Behind the Scenes | Taiwan's Hai Kun Submarine: A Strategic Asset or Tactical Liability? ｜ Latest ）
