U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently stated in an interview that Chinese President Xi Jinping's preferred cross-strait scenario would be achieved through some form of unification referendum. In response, Alexander Huang (黃介正), Director-General of Council on Strategic and Wargaming Studies told The Storm Media's program The Global Line, hosted by Catherine Lu (路怡珍), that Trump had claimed — after just one night — to understand Taiwan better than any other country. This narrative, Huang argued, must have come directly from Xi himself. The fact that both Trump and Rubio appear to have intuitively accepted Beijing's framing represents a pressure point and warning signal for Taiwan.
Huang noted, however, that Rubio did not need to restate Beijing's position on an internationally broadcast television program. What Rubio may have intended to convey, Huang suggested, is that Beijing has expressed a willingness to resolve the Taiwan question peacefully, without resorting to military force. Rubio also stated on multiple occasions that U.S. policy toward Taiwan has not fundamentally changed.
The more significant shift, Huang argued, is structural: in past high-level meetings, China would typically raise the Taiwan question — but those exchanges were largely pro forma, with both sides understanding each other's basic positions without formally engaging them. This time, those previously pro forma exchanges were placed squarely on the table for substantive discussion, signaling that Taiwan is no longer a diplomatic formality.
Huang added that the most consequential aspect of the recent exchanges is that both Trump's and Rubio's interviews were conducted and aired inside China, with minimal preparation time. With no staff-written talking points, their responses were necessarily instinctive. Both men appeared to have absorbed and restated the Chinese perspective — what Huang described as having been thoroughly "educated" by the Chinese side — with Beijing's perspective effectively absorbed into their thinking. Trump's claim to now understand Taiwan better than any other country, reached after a single night, reflects a narrative that could only have come from Xi, Huang said.
A Third Trump-Xi Summit in 2026? Huang Says U.S. Midterms Are the Pivotal Variable
Huang noted that the White House's post-summit fact sheet — beyond agricultural products and Boeing aircraft purchases — consists largely of letters of intent. Each item leaves room for resolution, likely requiring either another Trump-Xi summit or Xi's reciprocal visit to the White House before any final agreements are reached.
Huang projected that three additional Trump-Xi meetings are on the horizon: Xi's planned return visit to the United States in September; the APEC summit in Shenzhen, China, on November 18–19; and the G20 summit in Miami on December 14–15. The latter two fall after the U.S. midterm elections.
The September visit, Huang argued, is therefore the critical window to watch — because if Republicans perform poorly in the midterms, or if Trump loses the House majority, the political trajectory could split along two paths. First, Trump could become a lame-duck president, constrained by Congress on multiple fronts. Second — and more consequentially — Trump might respond by becoming more reliant on external actors to offset domestic political pressure, potentially creating openings for foreign governments to exert greater influence.
For Taiwan, Huang identified an additional and more immediate challenge: whether Taipei should re-engage Washington on the terms of a bilateral tariff agreement. Huang noted that arms sales and defense procurement feel far removed from the concerns of ordinary people's daily lives — making the tariff agreement far more politically immediate. The agreement grants sweeping zero-tariff access to U.S. goods, and once passed, a large volume of American products would flood the Taiwanese market.
Taiwanese politicians may therefore be more preoccupied with whether the tariff agreement can pass the legislature — and whether rejection would invite U.S. retaliation — than with defense spending. Either outcome, he argued, will shape the political atmosphere heading into Taiwan's nine-in-one local elections — in which nine categories of local offices are contested simultaneously.
