For decades, Japan's deepest security anxiety was being pulled into an American war it did not choose. That fear, a leading Japanese political scientist now argues, has been overtaken by a different one: that Washington may no longer be there when Japan needs it most.
Toru Yoshida (吉田徹), professor of policy studies at Doshisha University (同志社大學), made that assessment at a press conference analyzing the likely direction of a potential second cabinet under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi (高市早苗) and the broader trajectory of Japanese foreign and security policy. His remarks spanned Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, constitutional revision, and the domestic political logic driving conservative leadership in Tokyo — all of which carry direct consequences for cross-strait stability and Indo-Pacific security.
Building a Wider Security Net Beyond the U.S. Alliance
When an Indonesian journalist at the press conference noted that Japan cannot face the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, or energy security challenges alone — making ASEAN cooperation increasingly essential — Yoshida agreed, framing the observation within the context of Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) framework, first advanced under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
Japan's gradual relaxation of defense equipment export restrictions, Yoshida argued, reflects more than a military policy shift. It signals a response to a fundamentally altered geopolitical environment across Asia. Tokyo is now compelled to cultivate deeper partnerships with Global South nations as part of a security strategy that extends well beyond the traditional U.S.-Japan alliance framework. The goal, in his assessment, is to build a broader regional security cooperation network across the Indo-Pacific.
Yoshida was candid about a structural weakness in Japan's Indo-Pacific approach. While Tokyo is actively courting ASEAN and Global South partners, he said a normative vacuum persists: neither side has formed a clear shared vision of what kind of international order and governing norms should define East Asia's future.
Without that foundation of common values and institutional principles, he warned, security cooperation between Japan and ASEAN risks devolving into short-term, ad hoc exchanges of interests rather than a durable regional architecture. The underlying constraint is straightforward: most ASEAN states remain deeply economically dependent on China and are unwilling to take an explicit side in the U.S.-China strategic competition, even as they engage with Japanese security initiatives.
Takaichi's Governing Logic: Diplomatic Realism Abroad, Conservative Values at Home
On the hypothetical scenario of a second Takaichi-led government, Yoshida pushed back against the common characterization of Takaichi as an ideological hardliner. Her actual governing approach, he argued, is better understood as a dual-track model — diplomatic realism on external affairs paired with domestic conservatism.
On foreign and security policy, a Takaichi administration would prioritize practical national interests and the preservation of the regional status quo. On domestic policy, it would likely advance more pronounced conservative values while simultaneously deploying electoral strategies designed to attract independent voters and broaden its base. This combination, Yoshida suggested, reflects a significant evolution in Japanese conservative politics: growing pragmatism on security matters alongside a continued rightward drift on cultural and social issues at home.
Fear of Abandonment Drives Japan's Rapprochement With South Korea
On the U.S.-Japan alliance, Yoshida identified two enduring postwar anxieties within Japan's security establishment: entrapment in an American conflict, and abandonment by Washington. The relative decline of U.S. global primacy, he argued, has decisively shifted Japanese strategic psychology toward the latter.
"Japan is now more afraid that the United States may no longer be as reliable as it once was," he said. Against that backdrop, Japan's recent diplomatic repair work with South Korea is not merely a bilateral improvement — it is part of a broader reconfiguration of the East Asian security order. The strategic value of Japan-South Korea security cooperation, Yoshida assessed, is likely to keep rising.
Constitutional Revision Faces Procedural Hurdles Beyond Parliamentary Numbers
On Japan's long-running constitutional debate, Yoshida cautioned that successfully amending the constitution remains extremely difficult even with activist conservative leadership in power. The obstacles extend well beyond seat counts to include the amendment procedure itself, referendum requirements, and the challenge of building sufficient social consensus.
Article 9 — which addresses postwar pacifism, the legal status of the Self-Defense Forces, and deeply embedded historical memory — remains particularly sensitive. Significant divisions within Japanese society persist despite years of conservative advocacy. Constitutional revision has long been a central goal of Japan's political right, Yoshida concluded, but the procedural hurdles remain formidable regardless of who holds power.
Japan's Security Shift Is Driven by Realism, Not Ideology Alone
Taken together, Yoshida's remarks suggest that Japan's rightward shift on security policy is driven less by ideological transformation than by pragmatic recalibration in response to intensifying U.S.-China competition, a reshaping regional order, and deepening uncertainty about American security commitments.
Where Japan once anchored its identity as a "peace nation," Tokyo today is increasingly oriented toward becoming an active participant in constructing an Indo-Pacific security architecture — a shift whose consequences extend well beyond Japan's own borders. （Related： Global Talent War | Ep4: How Japan Turns 20-Year-Old Technical College Graduates Into Job-Ready Engineers: ｜ Latest ）
