Taiwan's birth rate has nearly halved over the past decade, even as government subsidies have expanded dramatically — raising fundamental questions about whether cash transfers alone can reverse one of the island's most serious demographic crises.
According to Taiwan's Ministry of the Interior, the number of newborns fell from approximately 208,000 in 2016 to roughly 107,000 in 2025. The total fertility rate has remained well below the replacement level of 2.1 for years, and has ranked among the lowest in the world on multiple occasions.
Decades of Subsidies, Declining Results
Taiwan's subsidy-driven approach to low birth rates stretches back nearly three decades. As early as 1997, select townships in Hsinchu and Miaoli counties began offering birth incentives. In 2010, then-President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) formally designated falling birth rates a national security issue at a senior National Security Council meeting, prompting counties and cities across the island to follow suit.
Birth subsidies have grown steadily — from a few thousand New Taiwan dollars (US$ 100–300) in early programs to over NT$40,000 (US$ 1,300) per first child in some municipalities today.
Central government policy accelerated in 2018 with the introduction of childcare subsidies. During the 2019 presidential primary, Terry Gou (郭台銘) proposed a "state-sponsored child-rearing from ages zero to six" framework, intensifying cross-party competition on family welfare. Most recently, President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) announced a monthly growth stipend of NT$5,000 (US$ 160) for children from birth through age 18 — the most expansive commitment to date.
Why Cash Transfers May Not Be Enough
The persistent decline in birth rates — despite escalating financial incentives — points to structural barriers that subsidies alone cannot address.
For younger generations in Taiwan, the primary disincentives to having children are widely identified as high housing costs, stagnant wages, long working hours, and a broader sense of economic insecurity. When the cost of raising a child to adulthood can reach several million New Taiwan dollars (US$ 100,000 or more), monthly cash transfers, while helpful, are unlikely to be the decisive factor in family planning decisions.
South Korea: A Cautionary and Instructive Parallel
South Korea, which faces an equally severe demographic contraction, offers a relevant point of comparison. In recent years, Seoul has shifted its policy emphasis from direct cash payments toward systemic reforms: expanding public childcare infrastructure, strengthening parental leave protections, reforming workplace culture, and introducing housing support programs for young couples and newlyweds.
South Korea's birth figures have shown a modest uptick in recent periods — though the country remains far from resolving its low-fertility crisis. The incremental improvement nonetheless suggests that comprehensive structural reform, rather than subsidy escalation alone, may be a necessary precondition for meaningful demographic recovery.
The Underlying Question of Social Confidence
Low fertility is not simply a matter of how much money the government offers — it is a question of whether people believe this society is still a viable place in which to raise the next generation. When young people feel uncertain about their own futures, no amount of additional subsidy is likely to restore the confidence needed to start a family.
So long as housing affordability, job security, and work-life balance remain unresolved, incremental increases in monthly stipends are unlikely to shift birth intentions at scale. The evidence from Taiwan and comparable East Asian economies suggests that addressing the root conditions of economic precarity — rather than layering additional subsidies onto an unreformed structural environment — is the more durable path forward.
