Profile | Beyond the Elephant’s Pace: How Ko Pao-hsuan is Bridging the Gap Between Taipei and New Delhi

Deputy Foreign Minister Ko Pao-hsuan (葛葆萱) spent five years in New Delhi building the relationship. Now he's running it from Taipei.

Taiwan's decision to recruit Indian migrant workers has ignited a fierce public backlash — including a campaign billboard in Kaohsiung that depicted an Indian flag and a turbaned man crossed out with a prohibition symbol. Opposition lawmakers have warned of Taiwan becoming a "rape island," a phrase that drew international media attention. The controversy has exposed long-standing stereotypes about India within Taiwanese society, touching on public safety, cultural difference, and gender-based violence.

What the public debate has largely missed is that India has been a diplomatic priority for Taiwan for nearly a decade, dating to former President Tsai Ing-wen's (蔡英文) New Southbound Policy launched in 2016.

Under Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍), MOFA's senior leadership on the fifth floor now includes Political Deputy Minister Wu Chih-chung (吳志中), known for his frequent shuttle diplomacy in Europe; Political Deputy Minister Chen Ming-chi (陳明祺), versed in both China affairs and U.S. relations; and a career diplomat who has spent years quietly building Taiwan's ties with India — and who has just been promoted to one of the three deputy minister posts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).

The fifth floor of MOFA's Taipei headquarters — where the minister and three deputy ministers are based — underwent a significant reshuffle in 2025. Former Political Deputy Minister Tien Chung-kwang (田中光) was reassigned as representative to the Netherlands, and outside observers initially assumed that Chen Ming-chi (陳明祺), a former deputy chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council and Lin's junior schoolmate, had been brought in to take over Asia-Pacific affairs from Tien.

Instead, Chen took over North American and Latin American affairs. Asia-Pacific responsibilities shifted to Chen Li-kuo (陳立國), a career diplomat from the North American division who was serving as Administrative Deputy Minister — a move that left analysts puzzled about Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung's staffing logic.

The picture clarified in May 2025, when the Executive Yuan approved Chen Li-kuo's posting as representative to the Czech Republic. Ko Pao-hsuan (葛葆萱), who had served as Taiwan's representative to India since 2020, was named Administrative Deputy Minister — completing what analysts now describe as a deliberate India-oriented reorganization of MOFA's senior leadership.

The appointment fits a discernible institutional pattern. Tien, Ko's predecessor as India representative, was valued by former Foreign Minister Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) and was himself promoted to Political Deputy Minister in July 2020 after seven years in New Delhi beginning in 2013. The precedent suggests that sustained India expertise is now treated as a credential at MOFA's highest levels.

According to sources familiar with the internal dynamic, Ko impressed Lin during policy briefings with a clear strategic framework for advancing Taiwan-India political relations — one that aligned closely with Lin's concept of "comprehensive diplomacy." Ko's analytical clarity and strategic coherence reportedly sealed his appointment.

Ko's engagement with India spans nearly two decades. He became Deputy Director-General of MOFA's Department of East Asian and Pacific Affairs in 2008, with India among his responsibilities. After postings as Director-General of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Chicago and as ambassador to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ko returned to MOFA as Director-General of the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Department in 2018, resuming oversight of India relations before his five-year stint in New Delhi beginning in 2020.

India's diplomatic history with Taiwan is defined by a foundational act of realpolitik. Shortly after the Nationalist government relocated to Taiwan in late 1949, India recognized the People's Republic of China, becoming the first non-socialist country to switch recognition from the Republic of China. India also voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 on October 25, 1971, which transferred China's UN seat to Beijing.

Yet Ko argues that India's pragmatism cuts both ways. After India launched its Look East Policy in the 1990s, it was New Delhi — not Taipei — that proposed establishing mutual representative offices in 1995, a move Ko describes as laying a durable foundation for the following three decades.

Subsequent expansions followed a similar logic. Taiwan opened a representative office in Chennai in July 2012 and in Mumbai in October 2024. India did not obstruct either move; the Chennai office was, according to Ko, actively facilitated by the Indian side.

A further structural advantage shapes the relationship: because India and the PRC established diplomatic relations through an exchange of letters rather than a formal treaty, the two sides never explicitly addressed the "one China" question in writing. India has therefore never formally committed to Beijing's position on Taiwan's status — a legal ambiguity that Taipei's diplomats view as strategically useful.

When Beijing reportedly pressed New Delhi in the 2000s to formally endorse a "one China" principle, India is said to have counter-demanded that China first accept a "one India" principle — effectively recognizing Indian sovereignty over disputed border territories. The resulting impasse left India without a binding commitment on Taiwan's status.

A Sino-Indian border clash in June 2020 — just months before Ko arrived in New Delhi — accelerated the warming. Indian and Chinese troops fought with rocks and iron bars along the western border, killing at least 20 Indian soldiers and wounding dozens more. The incident generated a powerful anti-China sentiment within India that, analysts note, created political space for deeper Taiwan-India engagement.

Ko points to a concrete indicator of shifting attitudes: the Raisina Dialogue, an annual strategic forum co-hosted by India's Ministry of External Affairs and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) think tank in New Delhi. Ko observed that Indian organizers grew progressively more comfortable inviting senior Taiwanese national security officials — moving from initial caution to permitting Taiwanese officials to give media interviews in India, and eventually arranging featured speaking slots at the forum itself.

"You can see that India is increasingly comfortable engaging with Taiwan and willing to treat us as friends," Ko said.

During the week of Storm Media's interview, Taiwan hosted a cross-party delegation of Indian political leaders — including members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the opposition Indian National Congress (INC), and other parties. MOFA described it as the first time it had publicly acknowledged an Indian cross-party delegation of this composition visiting Taiwan, citing it as evidence of the relationship's maturation.

Despite improving diplomatic ties, the social footprint remains strikingly thin. Only approximately 500 Taiwanese nationals reside long-term in India — compared with tens of thousands in individual Southeast Asian countries where Taiwanese-invested factories number in the thousands. Ko noted that Taiwan has only around 250 companies operating in India.

The contrast extended to his own social experience. During postings in the United States, he recalled, a diaspora banquet around the holidays might fill dozens of tables. At gatherings for Taiwanese nationals in the Delhi area, he said, "fifty-odd people already felt like a lot."

"I think that's abnormal," Ko said of Taiwan's limited familiarity with India.

Ko argues that many Taiwanese still hold a mental image of India frozen roughly three decades ago. During his five years as representative, he traveled through 23 of India's states and found a country that has changed significantly. Street vendors in Delhi now accept QR code payments. Ko and his wife frequently traveled around Indian cities without security escorts, occasionally hailing auto-rickshaws on their own without incident.

Ko also challenged the hospitality dimension of the public narrative. In some formal visits in the United States, a multi-hour drive might end with no refreshments at all. In India, by contrast, "in larger settings, they practically won't let you leave until you've finished the meal."

Ko declined to address directly why Taiwanese society has developed such unfamiliarity — and in some cases hostility — toward India. He emphasized instead that interpersonal exchange is the most reliable mechanism for dismantling misperception, and that formalizing that exchange through a bilateral cultural agreement is a priority for the current phase of the relationship.

During his tenure, Ko held meetings with the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), the cultural diplomacy body under India's Ministry of External Affairs, as part of efforts to deepen exchanges with what he called "a 5,000-year-old civilization."

A second concrete objective was restoring direct air links severed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Aviation industry sources indicate that EVA Air is expected to resume direct Taipei-Delhi service this year. Ko noted that Taiwan and the Philippines are currently the only two East Asian economies without direct flights to India — a gap he described as a meaningful drag on bilateral flows. Indian officials, eager for the route's restoration, visited Taiwan's representative office in New Delhi on two separate occasions to express their expectations.

A third area involves Mandarin language education. India's government, wary of Chinese Communist Party influence, subjects cooperation between Chinese universities and Indian institutions to strict scrutiny. That regulatory posture has created an opening for Taiwan. India views this cooperation on Mandarin education with Taiwan very positively. By the time Ko left his post in July 2025, 42 Indian universities and colleges had established Taiwan Education Centers; by May 2026, that number had grown to 45. Ko estimated that tens of thousands of Indian students are currently studying Mandarin with teachers dispatched by Taiwan.

Bilateral trade data reflect the relationship's trajectory, if not yet its potential. Taiwan-India total trade stood at under $5 billion in 2020; by 2025, it had surpassed $12.5 billion, with growth on both the export and import sides. Ko nonetheless acknowledged that even this figure represents less than 1% of each country's total external trade.

"I often say: we don't see each other," Ko said.

Ko frames India's domestic political ambitions as a structural driver of convergence. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, campaigning for a third term in late 2023, set a target of India achieving developed-country status by 2047 — the centenary of independence, a goal known domestically as Viksit Bharat. Ko said he has told Indian interlocutors directly that hitting the required average annual GDP growth rate of approximately 9.5% would necessitate cooperation with Taiwan. He described Indian officials as deeply envious of Taiwan's manufacturing track record and said Taiwan has been formally placed on India's cooperation agenda.

Yet the economic relationship remains constrained by political caution. "There is still some residual hesitation on the Indian government's side," Ko said, attributing the bottleneck to politics rather than commerce.

When Taiwan-Europe ties accelerated in 2025, Foreign Minister Lin observed that the EU maintained a "one China policy" but could also develop a "one Taiwan policy." The same question now applies to India.

Ko's assessment is cautious. India has not designated Taiwan an ally, he said, but it does treat Taiwan as a friend — a meaningfully different relationship than it maintains with China. He noted that Indian officials understand Taiwan's strategic arguments clearly; the constraint is not comprehension but political will.

"We're like teachers over there," Ko said. "Every meeting, we tell them: what you're doing isn't enough — you need to keep going."

Ko described India as "like an elephant — it turns slowly." His prescription is straightforwardly structural: increase people-to-people contact as the foundation for everything else. Without sufficient human exchange, advancing trade, investment, or labor mobility is like building a bridge with matchsticks. Increase the volume of interaction, and the bridge becomes steel — strong enough to carry heavy tanks, or anything else you put on it.

​Original Article in Chinese​

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