What the Thucydides Trap Means for Taiwan and U.S.-China Rivalry

When scholars and policymakers discuss the risks behind U.S.-China rivalry, one concept often resurfaces: the Thucydides Trap. The term describes a dangerous pattern in international politics, in which a rising power unsettles an established one and creates a cycle of fear, suspicion and strategic mistrust that can push both sides toward conflict.

For Taiwan, the theory is not merely an academic reference. The island sits at the center of several of the most sensitive issues in U.S.-China competition, from military deterrence and democratic governance to advanced semiconductor supply chains and the future of the Indo-Pacific security order.

The concept takes its name from Thucydides, the ancient Greek historian who chronicled the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. In his account, the deeper cause of the conflict was not a single incident, but the structural anxiety created by Athens' rise and Sparta's fear that its dominant position was slipping away.

The war broke out in the fifth century BCE and became one of the most destructive conflicts of the ancient world. Sparta, then the established power, had sought to manage Athens' expansion through the Thirty Years' Peace, an agreement intended to preserve stability. But as Athens accumulated power and expanded its alliances, Sparta and its partners increasingly believed their security and influence were being eroded.

Both sides initially tried to avoid direct confrontation. The balance shifted when Corcyra, modern-day Corfu, moved from neutrality into the Athenian camp. For Sparta, the fear was not simply that Athens had gained another ally, but that inaction would weaken Sparta's own alliance system. The result was a preemptive war that lasted 27 years, engulfed much of the Greek world and left both Athens and Sparta severely weakened.

That episode later became a historical model for understanding conflicts driven by power transitions.

Harvard University professor Graham Allison popularized the modern use of the term Thucydides Trap. After examining 16 historical cases in which a rising power challenged an established hegemon, Allison found that 12 ended in war. His warning is that power transitions can create structural pressure that becomes dangerous when neither side trusts the other's intentions.

That logic is why the term is now frequently applied to U.S.-China relations. The United States remains the world's dominant power, while China has rapidly expanded its economic, technological, military and diplomatic influence. Beijing is seeking a larger role in regional and global affairs, while Washington is working to preserve a U.S.-led international order that has shaped global politics for decades.

This rivalry has turned a wide range of disputes into potential flashpoints. The South China Sea, Taiwan, trade restrictions, technology controls, semiconductor supply chains and military deployments across the Indo-Pacific are often cited by analysts as signs that the competition is no longer limited to one policy area. For many observers, these disputes reflect a deeper contest over power, influence and the rules of the international order.

Allison's view is influential, but it is not universally accepted. Joseph Nye argues that the Thucydides Trap should be treated as a warning, not a destiny. In his view, strong institutions, economic interdependence and steady channels of strategic communication can help major powers manage competition without falling into war. Nye also emphasizes the stabilizing role of soft power and multilateral cooperation in reducing the risk of miscalculation.

John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago takes a more pessimistic position. From a realist perspective, he argues that great powers rarely accept the rise of a peer competitor and that the international system offers no central authority capable of reliably restraining major-power rivalry. Under this view, confrontation between the United States and China is difficult to avoid.

The framework itself remains contested. Some scholars caution that applying an analogy from ancient Greece too directly to the modern world risks oversimplifying the present. Today's international system includes nuclear deterrence, global institutions, economic interdependence and deeply integrated supply chains — conditions that did not exist in Thucydides' era.

Taiwan occupies a uniquely exposed position in this debate. It is not one of the two great powers in the Thucydides Trap framework, but it is directly affected by the strategic rivalry between them. Questions surrounding Taiwan involve military deterrence, democratic resilience, regional security and the security of advanced technology supply chains.

Weng Ming-hsien (翁明賢), president of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, argues that Taiwan should not treat U.S.-China conflict as inevitable. In his view, Taiwan can reduce risk by strengthening defense resilience, pursuing pragmatic diplomacy and deepening cooperation with like-minded democracies in the region.

Li Chung-hsien (李忠憲), an associate research fellow at Academia Sinica (中研院), takes a broader view of the competition. He notes that today's great-power rivalry extends beyond the military sphere into technology, industrial supply chains, information warfare and the struggle over international narratives. For Taiwan, that means the challenge is not only to prepare for military risk, but also to expand its role in global governance and create space for cooperation where possible.

The Thucydides Trap is most useful not as a prediction, but as a warning. Power transitions become dangerous when fear, suspicion and poor communication are left unmanaged. The lesson is not that war between the United States and China is inevitable, but that structural rivalry can become more dangerous if both sides assume the worst of each other.

For Taiwan, the practical challenge is to navigate that rivalry without being consumed by it. Strengthening resilience, maintaining diplomatic flexibility and building deeper ties with democratic partners may not eliminate the risks of U.S.-China competition, but they can help Taiwan preserve room for maneuver in an increasingly divided strategic environment. （Related： Trump Confirms Potential Call with Lai: What It Means for Taiwan-U.S.-China Ties ｜ Latest ）

Original Article in Chinese