Taiwan Independence vs. Status Quo: Japanese Expert Warns Against Misreading Beijing’s Real Objective

When U.S. President Donald Trump said after his meeting with Xi Jinping that he did not want to see anyone "move toward independence," the remark drew immediate international attention. For Yoshiyuki Ogasawara (小笠原欣幸), a prominent Japanese political scientist specializing in Taiwan politics, the reaction itself reflects a fundamental misreading of Taiwan's political reality — one with serious consequences for how outside powers assess the strait.

​In a Facebook post, Ogasawara laid out what he described as the original, precise definition of "Taiwan independence": the dissolution of the Republic of China, which currently governs Taiwan, and the establishment in its place of a new state — a Republic of Taiwan or State of Taiwan. Those who pursue this goal are the "independence faction." In China, this is referred to as "de jure independence."

On that definition, the two major Taiwanese parties occupy clearly different ground. The Kuomintang (KMT) opposes Taiwan independence. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) formally called for the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan in its 1991 party platform, but reversed course at its 1999 party congress — enshrining in what became known as the Taiwan Future Resolution a commitment to maintaining the status quo and continuing under the Republic of China framework. Having formally shelved Taiwan independence is now, Ogasawara wrote, the DPP's operative position.

The hypothetical of Taiwan "declaring independence," Ogasawara argues, is a premise detached from reality. The debate over a declaration of independence was live in the 1990s, shortly after democratisation. Today, Taiwan operates under the rule of law, and a presidential declaration of independence would carry no legal basis — it would change nothing and produce only chaos.

Achieving independence through legitimate means would require a new constitution, which in turn requires clearing the Republic of China's amendment procedures: a bill passing the Legislative Yuan with three-quarters of members present and three-quarters of those present voting in favour, followed by approval in a public referendum by an absolute majority.

The barriers work in the other direction as well. Any force holding more than one quarter of legislative seats can block a constitutional amendment outright. Given Taiwan's typical voter turnout of around 75 percent, a boycott by just 25 percent of eligible voters would be enough to sink the required referendum.

If the KMT simply adopted a passive stance, that alone would be sufficient to prevent passage. "The threshold for constitutional amendment is extremely high," Ogasawara writes. "It can be stated with certainty that Taiwan independence is impossible in terms of domestic politics."

Even if those thresholds were somehow cleared and a Republic of Taiwan established, Ogasawara argues the outcome would yield nothing substantively new. Both the United States and Japan maintain one-China policies under which they do not support Taiwan independence, meaning neither would extend diplomatic recognition. China's opposition would preclude United Nations membership.​

For the United States, the national interest lies in maintaining a political entity on Taiwan that is not under Chinese rule — not in confronting China for the sake of a Republic of Taiwan. Japan's calculus is the same. The result — a new state without diplomatic recognition — would be no different from the present situation, while carrying far greater risks.

Chief among those risks is military force. Ogasawara is unequivocal on this point: China would use force, as is clear from longstanding Communist Party policy and the 2005 Anti-Secession Law. The realistic outcome of a founding declaration, then, would not be a gain of anything new, but a potential loss of Taiwan's liberal democratic system. "This is the reality," he writes.

Support for the status quo, Ogasawara notes, rests on more than just practical barriers. Since democratization, a broad Taiwan identity — the sense that Taiwan and China are distinct — has expanded across Taiwanese society. Alongside this, the ROC itself has undergone a degree of Taiwanization, which is why "Republic of China" and "Taiwan" are now used interchangeably in everyday discourse. This has paradoxically deepened support not for formal independence, but for continuing to operate under the ROC name — making the status quo the strongest political position on the island.

Given these constraints, Ogasawara turns to the question of why Taiwan independence nevertheless continues to attract such sustained international attention. His answer lies in the distinct incentives of each actor involved.

The DPP has formally shelved independence as a policy objective, but its politicians broadly share independence as a personal conviction, and so does its core support base. As a result, the party will not deny the possibility of independence and does not welcome others denying it either. Independence survives as an ideal, even without being a programme.

The KMT, for its part, fears independence. If the Republic of China were dissolved and replaced by a Republic of Taiwan, the KMT would lose its own political foundation. The party understands independence is not achievable, but continues to attack the DPP as "independence-leaning" in order to check its rival and sharpen supporters' sense of threat.

China also fears independence — though in a different register. Chinese specialists on Taiwan affairs understand that formal statehood is not a realistic prospect. But for the Communist Party, the DPP represents a hostile force that refuses to accept "one China" and obstructs unification. Driven by deep distrust, Beijing operates on the assumption that "the DPP is perpetually scheming toward independence."

Here, Ogasawara identifies what he considers the most consequential analytical distortion in circulation. China, he argues, is deliberately using the language of "opposing independence" as cover for the promotion of unification. The two are not equivalent — but the framing allows Beijing to conflate them.

While the likelihood of China using force remains low, Ogasawara warns that should it ever do so, Beijing would likely justify the action by claiming Taiwan had moved toward independence.Chinese information operations have already succeeded in spreading this framing widely, and many have accepted it uncritically. Japanese media, he notes, have carried Beijing's messaging and allowed it to flow into Japanese public discourse.​

For China, he argues, the existence of any Taiwanese state structure — whether called "Taiwan" or the "Republic of China" — is itself unacceptable. Beijing does not recognise the Republic of China as a sovereign independent state. This, Ogasawara emphasises, is the substantive meaning of China's stated opposition to "Taiwan independence": opposition not to a hypothetical future declaration, but to the present political reality of Taiwan as it exists today.

The actual structure of the Taiwan Strait's political contest, Ogasawara argues, is a tug-of-war between unification and the status quo — not a confrontation between unification and independence. The Republic of China's state structure has persisted from the Chiang Kai-shek era to the present. Misreading the axis of that competition, he warns, leads to a fundamental misjudgment of the entire situation.

Reviewing reporting on the Trump-Xi summit, Ogasawara concludes that Trump does not appear to have endorsed Xi's positions outright. But whether Trump fully understands the implications of "opposing Taiwan independence" — particularly as Beijing defines the term — remains, in his assessment, highly uncertain. Trump's subsequent public remarks have reflected a transactional perspective rather than strategic clarity on the issue.

If the United States and Japan, both of which say they support maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, were to express opposition to "Taiwan independence" alongside Xi Jinping, Ogasawara cautions, the effect would be to destabilise the very status quo they claim to want to preserve — undermining the legitimacy of the Republic of China's continued existence on Taiwan.

This, Ogasawara acknowledges, is no easy matter. Both Japan and Taiwan need to avoid being led by Trump's statements — resisting the temptation to read too much into any single remark, while keeping careful, sustained attention on the actual policy positions of the U.S. government.