The most consequential moment of Donald Trump's China visit did not happen in the room with Xi Jinping. During the roughly 30 hours Trump spent in Beijing, the Chinese leader warned that "Taiwan independence cannot coexist with peace in the Taiwan Strait" and cautioned Washington to handle the Taiwan question carefully — but Trump himself said little, and many analysts concluded that U.S. policy toward Taiwan had survived the summit intact. It appeared that both U.S.-Taiwan relations and cross-strait relations were on the verge of a historic moment.
Trump's Post-Summit Remarks Put Taiwan on Edge
That relief proved short-lived. Once Trump boarded Air Force One, the statements came in rapid succession: he told reporters on the plane that he did not want to see anyone declare independence; he told Fox News he did not want Taiwan to assume that U.S. support meant it could pursue independence; and he questioned whether the U.S. should fight a war "9,500 miles away." Then came the most direct signal of all — Trump said he would treat approximately $14 billion in arms sales to Taiwan as leverage in his negotiations with Xi Jinping.
For Ryan Hass — director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution and a former National Security Council director for China and Taiwan affairs — those statements demanded an immediate and unambiguous response.
'The Path Is Not to Bargain Away Taiwan'
Writing in an essay titled "Trump's Dangerous Taiwan Gamble," Hass argued on May 16 that Trump's post-summit remarks represent a fundamental departure from the logic that has kept the Taiwan Strait stable for decades. "The path to reducing the risk of conflict is not to bargain away Taiwan," he wrote. What Washington should do instead, Hass argued, is maintain its focus on preserving peace and stability in the strait, resist unilateral actions by either side that threaten that stability, and keep open a pathway for cross-strait leaders to resolve their differences.
The essay noted that Trump had also, on the eve of the summit, again accused Taiwan of "stealing" America's semiconductor industry — while simultaneously asserting that war would not break out in the Taiwan Strait as long as he is president, citing what he described as an unspoken understanding between himself and Xi. Since these remarks were also interpreted as an expression of strategic ambiguity, even as many American lawmakers and analysts warned he would use Taiwan as a bargaining chip, members of the Trump administration dismissed such concerns.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio had sought to reassure allies that Washington's approach to sensitive cross-strait matters would remain consistent. But even before those assurances had time to settle, Trump's post-summit comments landed — declaring that both Beijing and Taipei needed to calm down, and that he was not sure U.S. forces needed to travel 9,500 miles to fight.
In Hass's assessment, Trump's statements align more closely with Beijing's framing of the Taiwan question than with the position held by most U.S. officials and analysts, including senior members of his own administration. The prevailing view in Washington is that rising cross-strait tensions stem primarily from China's escalating military pressure — not from actions by the U.S. or Taiwan. By seeming to accept Xi's characterization of who bears responsibility, Hass argued, Trump will encourage Beijing to intensify pressure on Taipei, raising rather than lowering the risk of conflict.
A Red Cape in Front of the Bull
Hass described Trump's public signals as analogous to a matador waving a red cape at a bull — testing what can be extracted by weakening U.S. security commitments to Taiwan, while simultaneously goading China into escalating its pressure on both Taipei and Washington.
The stakes of that gamble, Hass argued, are substantial. Washington's longstanding cross-strait approach has allowed it to achieve something once considered impossible: maintaining close ties with Beijing while sustaining a deep relationship with Taipei. With Taiwan holding a near-monopoly on advanced semiconductor manufacturing, that unofficial relationship is critical to U.S. competitiveness in artificial intelligence and other high-technology sectors — even as Beijing has pursued unification with growing military and economic intensity. The last thing Trump should do, in Hass's view, is echo Xi's account of the cross-strait situation. Preserving Washington's position requires an unwavering commitment to cross-strait stability, backed by a credible military deterrent.
Beijing's calculation, Hass noted, is not hard to read. Its goal is to remove the U.S. from cross-strait affairs entirely. Chinese leaders have long believed that by sidelining Washington and dealing with Taipei directly, they could bring Taiwan's 23 million people to accept unification on Chinese terms. Trump's signals give Beijing an opening to tell Taiwan's public that he cares more about his personal relationship with Xi than about Taiwan's security — a message China's propaganda apparatus is already amplifying, framing Taiwan as a piece on the board in a great-power game.
Unilateral Concessions and the Erosion of Credibility
Rather than sating Beijing's appetite by showing sympathy toward China's opposition to Taiwan independence, Trump has emboldened Beijing to press for more.
On arms sales specifically, Hass warned that Chinese officials have long maintained these are not a negotiable item, citing the 1982 U.S.-China Joint Communiqué in which Washington committed to gradually reducing arms transfers to Taiwan over time. By signalling acceptance of that framing, Trump would be making a unilateral concession that yields nothing in return — and in the process, undermining confidence in U.S. security commitments among allies far beyond Taiwan.
Using arms sales as leverage would also, paradoxically, erode U.S. influence in Taipei itself. If Taiwan's leaders conclude that Washington is willing to sacrifice their interests to advance its relationship with Beijing, they will have diminishing reason to defer to U.S. preferences. If Trump genuinely believes Taiwan is the primary risk factor for cross-strait conflict, the logical response is to deepen U.S. influence in Taipei — not reduce it. Pressing Taiwan to avoid provocation is reasonable, Hass argued, but only if Trump simultaneously maintains firm opposition to Chinese coercion or the use of force.
To treat Taiwan as a bargaining chip would not be a policy adjustment; it would be the replacement of a decades-old deterrence strategy with a transactional model — and in this arena, Hass was blunt, it is a shift to dealmaking in a domain where there is no deal to be made, beyond offering unilateral concessions that undermine deterrence.
What the U.S. Should Do Instead
Maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait does not require Trump to regularly recite the catechism of America's 'one-China' policy — but it does require him to stand resolutely against unilateral moves by either side to alter it.
Hass did argue for one form of engagement: the U.S. should welcome and actively encourage direct dialogue between Taipei and Beijing as a means of managing cross-strait differences. This would signal that U.S. interests do not inherently conflict with Chinese ambitions, and could help channel Beijing's energies in directions that serve rather than threaten Taiwan's people. Crucially, he argued, decisions about Taiwan's future relationship with the Chinese Communist Party should ultimately rest with Taiwan's 23 million people — not with Trump. If Beijing wants unification, it must offer a vision capable of genuinely attracting Taiwan's support.
Hass acknowledged he was willing to allow that Trump's remarks may have been the statements of a leader running on jet lag after a gruelling summit and a long transpacific flight. But he closed with the same words he opened with: "The path to reducing the risk of conflict is not to bargain away Taiwan, but to focus on preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and to preserve a pathway for cross-strait leaders to ultimately resolve their differences — and that requires strengthening deterrence, resisting unilateral actions by either side that threaten peace and stability, and maintaining influence in both Beijing and Taipei."
