PLA Military Activity Around Taiwan: Patterns Behind the Exercises
Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense reported at 9:27 a.m. on May 4 that only two People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft sorties, eight PLA naval vessels, and three government ships had been active in waters around the Taiwan Strait the previous day, with the two sorties entering airspace in Taiwan's north and southwest. Some media outlets asked whether President Lai Ching-te's (賴清德) successful trip to Eswatini — breaking through Beijing's diplomatic blockade — had prompted China to launch new military exercises against Taiwan.
Eswatini is a landlocked African nation whose international profile is lower than that of Paraguay, whose president was also due to visit Taiwan shortly. Based on established patterns, the PLA may choose to conduct military exercises against Taiwan in conjunction with its "May Day Combat Readiness" period and the improving weather forecast around Taiwan on May 6, as a show of force in support of Beijing's foreign policy.
At the end of April, while the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and Canada were conducting the "Balikatan 2026" multilateral naval exercises, the PLA dispatched two electronic intelligence (ELINT) vessels to shadow the drills and collect signals intelligence. Philippine media reported that the naval component of the exercise concluded early on April 29, before its scheduled end date of May 9.
Meanwhile, by May 3, the number of PLA naval vessels active around Taiwan had risen to eight, accompanied by three government ships. Based on what I call my own analytical rule — "ships move first, aircraft follow, and then exercises begin" — the PLA appeared to be waiting for the Paraguayan presidential delegation's arrival in Taiwan.
Balikatan 2026: How PLA Surveillance Forced an Early End
The "Balikatan 2026" exercises ran from April 20 to May 8. The naval component assembled eleven warships from the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and Canada to conduct formation and other drills in waters near the Philippines. In the early phase of the exercise, the PLA mobilized fourteen vessels from its Northern, Eastern, and Southern Theater fleets, led by the Northern Theater Navy's aircraft carrierLiaoning, and deployed them in waters west of Luzon. An additional four vessels from the Southern Theater Navy's 107th Formation were positioned east of Luzon, effectively encircling the northern Philippines in a layered cordon from the west, northwest, northeast, and east. PLA vessels also maintained their regular presence in Taiwan's southwest and southeast waters, monitoring the Bashi Channel sea lanes to the south.
Philippine broadcaster ABS-CBN reported on April 29 that the naval exercise had originally been scheduled to continue until May 9. According to that report, eleven allied vessels began formation drills on April 28, while China deployed seven ships to observe: a Type 052B destroyer (Guangzhou), a Type 054A frigate (Linyi), a Type 054B frigate (Qinzhou), two Type 815A ELINT vessels, and two coast guard ships conducting surveillance nearby. Three aircraft were also in the area: a shipborne helicopter (likely a Z-9), an unmanned aerial vehicle flying at approximately 6,000 meters, and a fixed-wing patrol aircraft (likely a Y-8 anti-submarine variant).
Cross-referencing these details with Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense daily releases of PLA activity, I found a close match with the April 28 announcement, which recorded five PLA sorties on April 27 between 06:00 and 19:25 — including anti-submarine patrol aircraft, UAVs, and shipborne helicopters — operating from the area southeast of Nan'ao Island in Guangdong to Taiwan's southwest. The presence of a shipborne helicopter indicates that at least one PLA vessel displacing over 3,000 tons was operating in that area. That evening, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense also released photographs of a Type 052C destroyer and a Type 054A frigate entering waters southwest of the Penghu Islands.
Philippine official sources claimed the exercise had concluded early because all training objectives had been met, but I am not persuaded. The actual at-sea drills lasted fewer than ten days before being called off on April 29. The real reason, I believe, is that the two PLA ELINT vessels shadowed the exercise continuously and in close proximity, making it untenable for the allied navies to continue. Every tactical maneuver was observed, and the electronic signatures of participating vessels — radar emissions from surface search and fire-control systems — were almost certainly captured and incorporated into Chinese electronic warfare databases for future reference.
There is also a broader strategic dimension. A PLA Northern Theater Navy ELINT vessel (hull number 799) was spotted by Japan transiting the Osumi Strait from the East China Sea into the western Pacific on April 11; as of this writing, Japan has not reported its return. An Eastern Theater ELINT vessel (hull number 791) was observed transiting the Miyako Strait on January 24 and was identified by Ocean Affairs Council Minister Kuan Bi-ling (管碧玲) as operating in Taiwan's eastern waters on April 6. Japan has likewise not reported its return. These extended deployments raise serious concern that PLA ELINT vessels may have gathered comprehensive data on Taiwan's eastern radar signatures and electronic parameters.
PLA "Combat Patrol" on May 1: Responding to Lai's Visit or Following a Preset Script?
Some media reports suggested that the PLA's "joint combat readiness patrol" on May 1 was a direct response to Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) visiting the Matsu Islands alongside Kuan Bi-ling to inspect Coast Guard Administration infrastructure, with officials emphasizing that the outlying islands represent the front line of national defense. By contrast, Kuan's visit to Itu Aba Island in the Spratly Islands on April 21 — where she presided over a humanitarian relief exercise — drew no PLA response. China's standard tool for responding to Taiwan Coast Guard activities near outlying islands is the China Coast Guard, not military aircraft and warships. The May 1 "combat readiness patrol" requires a separate explanation.
On April 30, the PLA Southern Theater Command announced it had deployed naval and air forces to conduct combat readiness patrols over the territorial waters and airspace of Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal) and surrounding areas. China's "May Day" Golden Week holiday ran from May 1 to 5, with a make-up workday on May 9. Pre-holiday "combat readiness" deployments — covering border regions, contested islands, and nearby waters — are standard PLA practice. This year I have also observed a notable increase in the PLA's use of armed reconnaissance UAVs and dedicated intelligence drones, often operating alongside manned aircraft. These activities cannot be captured simply by counting total aircraft sorties; they require daily observation to understand the operational logic behind them.
The timing of the May 1 Eastern Theater "joint combat readiness patrol" deserves scrutiny. President Lai had initially been blocked from traveling to Eswatini after high-profile pre-departure publicity caused his itinerary to be disrupted. On April 30, Eswatini's Deputy Prime Minister Thulisile Dladla arrived in Taipei as a special envoy, conveying King Mswati III's invitation for Lai to visit at an appropriate time — and to demonstrate freedom of the skies. On the evening of May 2, media suddenly reported that Lai had flown to Eswatini aboard the Swazi royal aircraft, successfully circumventing Beijing's diplomatic blockade. The arrangement — reportedly combining a China Airlines flight initially and then the ally's head-of-state aircraft — may become a new model for Taiwan's diplomatic outreach.
From a military perspective, I remain focused on the established pattern: in previous years, "joint combat readiness patrols" have been conducted before presidential overseas visits (see attached table). Visits that included transit stops in the United States, and meetings with senior American officials, have consistently triggered PLA military exercises both before and after the trips. Although President Lai changed his approach this time — keeping the visit low-profile to avoid disruption — I suspect the PLA was still aware of his travel plans and conducted the May 1 "combat readiness patrol" as a scaled-down warning signal the day before his departure.
Paraguayan Presidential Visit: Will PLA Exercises Follow the 2023 Pattern?
On April 30, Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Paraguayan President Santiago Peña, accompanied by Foreign Minister Rubén Ramírez, Minister of Industry and Commerce Marco Riquelme, and Presidential Secretary-General Francisco Javier Giménez, would make a state visit to Taiwan from May 7 to 10. President Lai Ching-te was scheduled to receive President Peña with full military honors on May 8, host a state banquet, and present the Order of Brilliant Jade — Taiwan's highest state honor — in recognition of Peña's contribution to Paraguay-Taiwan relations.
The precedent from Peña's previous visit is instructive. He visited Taiwan from July 11 to 15, 2023, in his capacity as president-elect. During that visit, the PLA conducted sea-air joint exercises outside Taiwan's southeastern response zone on July 11; dispatched 33 aircraft sorties and nine vessels on July 12; responded to a U.S. Navy P-8A patrol aircraft with its own sortie and coordinated naval activity on July 13; and on July 14 conducted further sea-air exercises outside Taiwan's southeastern zone, with sixteen PLA vessels active. Activity only subsided on July 15 — when a mainland student exchange group invited by the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) Foundation began its Taiwan visit — at which point PLA aircraft dropped to ten sorties with no crossings of the median line, and vessel numbers fell to five.
With Peña's state visit scheduled for May 7 to 10, several factors point to a window for PLA exercises. China's Golden Week holiday runs through May 5, with a make-up workday on May 9. Weather around Taiwan is forecast to turn rainy on May 4 and clear again on May 6. Given these conditions, the PLA may choose the period around May 8 to conduct sea-air joint exercises, "joint combat readiness patrols," or long-range open-ocean voyages in waters around Taiwan — or to conduct sustained low-intensity aerial and naval harassment over multiple consecutive days, coordinated with statements from Beijing's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Taiwan Affairs Office. (See attached figure.)
What Comes Next: Liaoning, Hainan, and the Type 076 Carrier
The conclusion of "Balikatan 2026" on May 8 may also trigger movement by the PLA Northern Theater'sLiaoning carrier battle group, which could seek to transit the Bashi Channel into the western Pacific for long-range training. The Southern Theater's amphibious assault shipHainan has reportedly completed maintenance and is on standby near the Yangtze River estuary, awaiting an opportunity either to return to its home port in Zhanjiang, Guangdong, or to conduct open-ocean exercises en route.
A further development warrants close attention. On April 23, members of the public attending Chinese Navy Day events at Zhanjiang in Guangdong witnessed what appeared to be the third sea trial of the Type 076 amphibious assault shipSichuan, which is designed with electromagnetic catapult capability. Online reporting of "the PLA's GJ-21 (Gongji-21) stealth combat drone and J-35 stealth carrier-based fighter conducting joint training over the Bohai Sea suggests a trajectory toward carrier-based integration on theSichuan. With the ship and its aircraft currently undergoing separate trials in southern and northern waters respectively, the timeline for combined ship-aircraft operational exercises — and ultimately combat capability — is accelerating. The movements of these major PLA vessels deserve sustained and close monitoring.
The author is a researcher at the Chinese Strategy Association.
