Opinion｜Why Beijing Weaponized Airspace to Block President Lai’s Africa Trip

How Beijing's Anti-Independence Drive Shapes Cross-Strait Tensions​

A high-profile meeting between Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping (習近平) and Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) took place in Beijing on April 10. Xi notably omitted standard formulations — including "peaceful reunification," the "one China principle," and opposition to "foreign interference" — from his public remarks before closed-door sessions, distinguishing this meeting from the second Ma Ying jeou-Xi jinping meeting held at the same venue on April 10, 2024.

Shortly after the Cheng-Xi meeting concluded, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) Taiwan Affairs Office issued, under formal authorization, ten policy measures to promote cross-strait exchange and cooperation. Although Taiwan's government did not respond positively, the announcement generated a rare atmosphere of cross-strait détente.

That atmosphere did not last. As President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) prepared to visit Eswatini, the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar — reportedly under pressure from Beijing — abruptly revoked overflight permissions for the presidential aircraft over their respective flight information regions, forcing a delay. Cross-strait tensions escalated again.

The episode drew particular attention because former President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), also of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), successfully visited Eswatini in 2023 without incident. Beijing's decision to effectively weaponize civil aviation safety to block President Lai's trip — so soon after the goodwill symbolism of the Cheng-Xi meeting — struck many observers as counterproductive.

The move risked alienating Taiwanese public opinion at a moment when détente sentiment was building, and could damage the KMT's electoral prospects. Yet Beijing proceeded regardless. To understand why, policy experts point to a set of guiding principles Beijing has applied to cross-strait affairs since approximately 2016 — principles that are widely misread or underappreciated in Taiwan and the West.

While CCP leadership still treats "peaceful reunification" as its preferred outcome, two events fundamentally shifted its calculus: the 2014 Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, and the KMT's sweeping defeat in the 2016 presidential and legislative elections, which cost the party both executive power and its legislative majority.

Those outcomes led CCP leadership to conclude that goodwill gestures and economic incentives alone are insufficient to secure peaceful reunification. Beijing determined it must instead seize and maintain the strategic initiative throughout the process, actively shaping an international environment structurally hostile to Taiwan's pursuit of independence — constraining Taiwanese public choices until accepting reunification on Beijing's terms appears to be the only viable option.

This strategic reassessment produced a further conclusion: Beijing no longer needs to prioritize Taiwanese public sentiment when taking action.

Internal CCP discourse has framed the current period as a time to falsify "soft Taiwanese independence" through coercive means. Once Taiwanese people understand that this path leads nowhere, "their thinking will change," this framing holds. "The mainland is not afraid of provoking resentment among the Taiwanese people — it is a necessary process."

More consequentially, this logic reinforced a third principle: Beijing must keep the strategic initiative firmly in its own hands, rather than place excessive trust in any particular Taiwanese political party or faction.

Since 2016, three operational principles have thus governed CCP cross-strait policy: shaping an international structure adverse to Taiwan's independence; deprioritizing Taiwanese public sentiment; and maintaining strategic control rather than depending on specific political partners. These principles remain in force today.

During the first term of President Donald Trump, Washington formally designated the CCP as a long-term strategic competitor, leading to significantly expanded U.S. political and military support for the Tsai administration. Under President Joe Biden, Washington deepened that posture — coordinating with Indo-Pacific and Western partners to constrain CCP influence, increasing engagement with Taipei, and more actively advocating for Taiwan's international space.

After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, European governments grew increasingly critical of Beijing's role in helping Moscow circumvent Western sanctions. Several major European states began publicly supporting Taiwan's government and easing certain restrictions on official interactions with Taipei.

These developments inflicted significant setbacks on Beijing's efforts to construct an internationally hostile environment for Taiwan's independence movement. They also prompted the CCP, during the Biden years, to elevate diplomatic contestation as the central instrument of cross-strait strategy — blocking Taiwan from exploiting what Beijing viewed as an internationally unfavorable moment to advance what it terms "relying on foreign forces to pursue independence" (倚外謀獨).

With Trump's return to the White House, conditions shifted again. The "democratic alliance" framework Biden had assembled fractured rapidly. Washington's threats of sweeping tariffs increased the relative economic importance of the Chinese mainland market for many countries. Beijing's international position improved considerably.

CCP leadership has sought to capitalize on this window, accelerating efforts to construct an international framework hostile to Taiwan's independence. Countering Taiwanese independence — and specifically the international dimension of that effort — has become Beijing's declared first-order priority on the Taiwan question at this juncture.

The high-profile reception Beijing accorded the KMT delegation in early April served multiple purposes. Reducing cross-strait tensions and promoting social and cultural exchange were genuine, if secondary, objectives. The primary strategic aim was to persuade Washington that opposing Taiwanese independence is sufficient to stabilize the Taiwan Strait and the wider Western Pacific — thereby reducing American incentives to intervene militarily in a cross-strait conflict.

A secondary objective was to exploit Trump's reported interest in reaching a "grand bargain" with Beijing as a means of boosting his party's prospects in the 2026 midterm elections. Beijing hoped to use a potential Trump-Xi summit in mid-May to secure U.S. statements favorable to its international anti-independence campaign — reversing the diplomatic setbacks suffered during the Biden years in a single stroke.

The Cheng-Xi meeting carried genuine importance for Beijing. Xi's decision to receive KMT Chairman Cheng at a higher protocol level than his two immediate predecessors signals that cross-strait tension reduction retains real significance for CCP central leadership.

Nevertheless, a clear hierarchy in Beijing's cross-strait priorities. Reducing tensions, fostering party-to-party exchanges, and cultivating Taiwanese public goodwill all rank below the anti-independence struggle — particularly its international dimension. When events arise that Beijing judges to be significant opportunities for advancing its international anti-independence campaign, lower-priority considerations — including cross-strait cultural exchange, bilateral party relations, Taiwanese public sentiment, and individual party electoral prospects — are set aside or temporarily sacrificed.

Beijing's decision to move against President Lai's Africa visit reflected several converging factors. Beyond the CCP's deeper distrust of the Lai administration relative to the Tsai government, the airspace jurisdiction characteristics of the Eswatini route and the current international environment proved highly favorable for intervention.

These favorable conditions included: the collapse of the Biden-era democratic alliance architecture; countries' moves to repair relations with Beijing; persistent U.S.-European friction; and a Trump administration distracted by Iran-related developments and reportedly seeking Chinese cooperation on that file. It cannot be denied that pre-departure media reports about the trip's itinerary may have further convinced Beijing that action was warranted.

The strategic payoff extended beyond the immediate disruption. By successfully persuading Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar to publicly deny overflight permission on "one China principle" grounds, Beijing established a precedent it can now invoke with other states — particularly those that have acknowledged the one China principle in bilateral statements. While major European nations are unlikely to comply, some Central Asian, Middle Eastern, and Global South states may, significantly increasing the logistical complexity of future Taiwanese presidential travel and advancing Beijing's goal of constructing an international anti-independence framework.

The same analytical framework applies to the question of military pressure. Whether Beijing escalates military intimidation — through exercises comparable to "Joint Sword" or "Strait Thunder" — depends on whether Taiwan's government, the United States, or regional actors take actions Beijing judges to cross its red lines. Actions perceived as directly threatening Beijing's anti-independence objectives demand immediate response. In those circumstances, other considerations, including cross-strait goodwill, carry little weight in Beijing's calculus.

​Original Article in Chinese​

*The author is a research fellow at the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies and a research fellow at the Centre for Advanced Technology(CAT) at Tamkang University.​

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