"China is very happy that I am permanently opening the Strait of Hormuz. I am doing it for them, also - And the World. This situation will never happen again.
They have agreed not to send weapons to Iran. President Xi will give me a big, fat, hug when I get there in a few weeks. We are working together smartly, and very well!
Doesn't that beat fighting??? BUT REMEMBER, we are very good at fighting, if we have to - far better than anyone else!!!
Donald Trump, social media post, April 15, 2026
Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) placed a call to Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman on April 20, publicly urging the immediate reopening of the Strait of Hormuz — a move that implicitly contradicted Donald Trump's claim that he had already resolved the crisis, according to a statement published by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Beijing, which has long maintained strategic ambiguity — or outright silence — during international conflicts, had itself been cast as a backdrop by Trump just days earlier, when he claimed that President Xi will certainly thank him for his efforts to open the Strait of Hormuz. Xi's direct outreach to Riyadh signals that China does not regard the strait's status as settled, and that Beijing intends to position itself as an independent diplomatic actor in the Gulf.
In the call, Xi called for an "immediate and comprehensive ceasefire," stating that "the Strait of Hormuz should maintain normal passage, which is in the common interest of regional countries and the international community."Prince Mohammed, for his part, said that "developing relations with China is of vital importance to Saudi Arabia," and that Riyadh "hopes to avoid escalation" through dialogue.
Xi noted that this year marks the tenth anniversary of the establishment of China and Saudi Arabia's comprehensive strategic partnership, expressing his hope to "seize this opportunity to deepen strategic mutual trust, strengthen practical cooperation, expand exchanges at all levels, and continuously broaden and deepen China-Saudi relations, serving as a model for the development of China's relations with Arab states."
Xi's Difficult Balancing Act in the Middle East
Xi's public statement reflects a difficult balancing act, The New York Times has reported. Iran remains Beijing's closest strategic partner in the Middle East, yet China maintains deep economic ties with Gulf states that have been subjected to Iranian attacks in recent weeks — states Beijing has conspicuously declined to publicly condemn Tehran over.
Tuvia Gering, a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub in Washington, said Xi's public remarks were a symbolic gesture reflecting Saudi Arabia's importance to Beijing, and offered some compensation for China's earlier reticence,The New York Times reported.
Brian Wong (黃裕舜) of the University of Hong Kong's Centre on Contemporary China and the World argued that Xi's remarks were directed not only at Saudi Arabia but also at Iran itself. "Beijing is undoubtedly sending subtle but important signals to hardliners within Tehran that further unconstrained escalation will not be tolerated," Wong said, as cited by The New York Times.
The call came after Xi met Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled in Beijing the previous week — a meeting at which Xi warned that "the world may return to the law of the jungle," without directly referencing the Strait of Hormuz.
"China supports regional countries in building a common home of good-neighborliness, development, security, and cooperation — one in which they hold their own future and destiny in their hands — and in promoting lasting regional stability," Xi told the Saudi crown prince.
Manoj Kewalramani, who leads Indo-Pacific studies at the Takshashila Institution in Bangalore, said Xi's position is consistent with China's earlier calls for de-escalation: Beijing wants the United States to lift its blockade and wants Iran to allow vessels to transit the strait. The New York Times noted that both Saudi Arabia and Iran have called on China to play a greater mediation role, given that Beijing helped broker the restoration of their diplomatic relations three years ago. Whether Xi is willing to go further — and risk deeper entanglement in the Middle East crisis — remains unresolved.
Beijing's Economic Anxiety Can No Longer Be Concealed
China's primary concern over the Gulf conflict is structural: approximately 40% of its oil imports transit the Strait of Hormuz, The New York Times noted. A prolonged closure of the waterway would risk a cascading global economic contraction, directly threatening China's export-dependent growth model.
Newsweek has reported additional detail on China's energy exposure. Although Beijing had pre-positioned substantial strategic petroleum reserves in anticipation of economic pressure from Trump's trade war, the deteriorating Gulf situation hasindeed eroded that buffer. Customs data published by Caixin (財新), a leading Chinese financial media outlet, show that China's oil imports from the Gulf region fell approximately 25% year-on-year — a figure that, ffor the world's factory floor — a economy that is heavily dependent on external energy sources — has raised serious supply-security concerns.
Newsweek also noted that Beijing may characterize the fragile ceasefire of the past two weeks as a diplomatic achievement — one attributable, in part, to pressure China exerted on the Iranian government. Following the killing of Ali Khamenei (哈米尼) in a joint US-Israeli operation, Beijing has maintained open lines of communication with the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, preserving China's ability to influence Tehran's calculations.
Gering said the precise nature of Beijing's relationship with Iran's current leadership remains unclear, but that China likely expects the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to retain its central role. Mojtaba's close ties to the Revolutionary Guard mean Beijing has also built an institutionalized relationship with the Revolutionary Guard — meaning Mojtaba's succession represents what Beijing would consider "good news," Gering said.
China purchases approximately 13% of its oil from Iran — transactions that effectively fund the Revolutionary Guard — with most dealings conducted through a state-backed informal economy, Gering noted.
Is Beijing the Key to Ending the US-Iran Conflict?
If Beijing can help bring the conflict toward resolution before a planned Xi-Trump summit in May — particularly by finding a formula acceptable to both Washington and Tehran — it would represent China's most significant diplomatic achievement in years, and would add further weight to Trump's planned visit to Beijing, Newsweek argued. Chinese leaders are actively seeking to recalibrate the bilateral relationship.
Adrian Ang of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore said China's recent responses to the US-Iran conflict have been carefully calibrated. "China has both condemned the US naval blockade and tried to push for a diplomatic resolution through cooperation with Pakistan," Ang said. "Beijing will not go all out to help the US out of its war predicament, but it also does not want the situation to escalate further."
Gering argued that Beijing's priorities are nonetheless clear: "Despite intensifying great-power competition, when forced to choose, China has consistently placed its relationship with the United States above its relationship with Iran — reflecting the vast difference in economic importance these two countries hold for Beijing." He added: "The significance of high-level US-China interaction, including Trump's visit to Beijing, speaks for itself. The order of priorities is unambiguous: for China, it is 'America first.'"
Newsweek noted, however, that for Tehran, Beijing's realist calculus carries an implicit message: China is unlikely to offer concrete security guarantees to Iran, particularly as the Revolutionary Guard continues retaliatory strikes against Gulf neighbors. That constraint introduces a persistent uncertainty into the China-Iran relationship — and into any mediation role Beijing might seek to play.
