Taiwan's Nuclear Restart Debate: What the Experts Say About Safety and Waste
Taiwan President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) announced in March 2026 that the government would carefully evaluate restarting nuclear power, citing surging electricity demand from artificial intelligence, European Union low-carbon requirements, and shifting geopolitical conditions.
Taiwan Power Company (Taipower) submitted a restart plan forNo.3 nuclear power plant to the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) by the end of March. The NSC has set three benchmarks for any restart review: nuclear safety assurance, a credible solution for nuclear waste, and broad social consensus.
No.2 nuclear power plant will not begin safety inspections until its outdoor dry storage facility is completed. Taiwan has yet to designate a permanent site for final nuclear waste disposal, and public skepticism about nuclear safety remains significant.
To move beyond the political rhetoric, the Science Media Center Taiwan (台灣科技媒體中心, SMC) recently invited two specialists — nuclear engineering expert Yeh Tsung-kuang (葉宗洸) and nuclear waste governance scholar Tu Wen-ling (杜文苓) — to assess the technical and institutional feasibility of restarting nuclear power from a professional standpoint.
The Nuclear Engineering Perspective: Yeh Tsung-kuang
Public concern about restarting idled nuclear plants centers on two questions: how to ensure safety, and how to manage the waste. Yeh Tsung-kuang, distinguished professor in the Department of Engineering and System Science at National Tsing Hua University, argues that both are answerable with existing technology.
On the question of safety, Yeh told SMC that nuclear technology has advanced substantially over more than half a century. He noted that accidents historically caused by human error — such as the Three Mile Island incident in the United States and the Chernobyl disaster under the Soviet system — have prompted industry-wide safety enhancements designed to prevent recurrence.
On nuclear waste, Yeh identified three viable approaches. First, reprocessing technology can reduce spent fuel volume to one-quarter of its original size, and the material can be remanufactured into new fuel for continued power generation.
Second, dry cask storage — which relies on passive air convection to cool spent fuel decay heat — carries inherently low risk and cost, and spent fuel stored this way could be fully reused as feedstock once fourth-generation reactor technology matures.
Third, nuclear transmutation, using an advanced 'Accelerator driven sub-critical reactor system', can convert long-lived radionuclides into short-lived or non-radioactive isotopes while simultaneously generating electricity.
In Yeh's assessment, both nuclear safety maintenance and waste management can be addressed through advanced nuclear technologies.
The Governance Perspective:Tu Wen-ling
Tu Wen-ling, director of the Research Center for Sustainable Innovation and Democracy at National Chengchi University, focuses less on whether the technology exists and more on whether Taiwan's institutional frameworks are adequate to deploy it responsibly.
Tu explains that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommends a three-stage waste management model: short-term interim storage, dry cask storage, and final disposal. Taiwan has adopted this framework. Outdoor dry storage facilities at Nuclear Power Plants No. 1 and No. 2 have been completed; Plant No. 1 has begun transferring spent fuel rods, while Plant No. 2 is currently in testing and is scheduled to obtain an operating license by year's end. An indoor dry storage facility for Plant No. 3 is in the planning stage.
On design standards, Tu notes that the core principle of dry storage is "multi-layer protection": spent fuel is sealed inside stainless steel canisters filled with inert helium gas, then enclosed within thick concrete shielding that both protects the metal container and reduces radiation dose, with passive convection providing cooling. Under Taiwan's dry storage facility safety analysis review guidelines, assessments must cover radiation exposure, seismic design, radiation protection, and accident scenarios including fire, flooding, falling objects, and earthquakes. The NSC convenes more than 30 experts in working groups to review each application.
On monitoring, Tu notes that beyond sealed containment and shielding, Taipower applies fuel integrity screening in line with standards such as ISG-1 (Rev. 1, Rev. 2), reviewing operational records and verifying fuel condition through sampling and sipping tests. Taipower has committed to storing only intact fuel assemblies; those assessed as damaged or potentially compromised will not be transferred to dry storage, reducing the risk of radioactive release during the storage process.
On decommissioning and restart safety verification, Tu notes that under the Regulations Governing Review of Applications for Decommissioning Permits of Nuclear Reactor Facilities, Taipower must submit a decommissioning plan to the NSC that addresses all of the following:
1. Facility overview, operational history, significant incidents, and their impacts.
2. Methods for radioactivity surveys of facility systems, equipment, components, and materials, along with preliminary assessment results.
3. Decommissioning objectives, timelines, equipment used, methods, and safety operating procedures.
4. Systems, equipment, and components that must remain operational during decommissioning, and their mode of operation.
5. Safety analysis of anticipated accidents during decommissioning.
6. Decontamination methods and management of radioactive gaseous and liquid waste during decommissioning.
7. Categories, characteristics, quantities, and reduction measures for decommissioning radioactive waste, along with plans for its handling, transport, storage, and final disposal.
8. Radiation dose assessment and radiation protection measures.
9. Environmental radiation monitoring.
10. Organizational structure and personnel training.
11. Management of nuclear safeguards materials and related equipment.
12. Plans for reuse of buildings and land.
13. Quality assurance program.
14. Security measures.
15. Emergency response plan for accidents.
16. Technical, managerial, and financial capacity report, specifying sources and financial plans for covering decommissioning costs and radioactive waste management expenses.
17. Any other matters announced by the competent authority.
The Unresolved Tension: Interim Storage vs. Permanent Disposal
A persistent concern raised by local communities is that dry storage sites will quietly become permanent disposal sites. Tu argues this requires a credible governance response, not merely a technical one.
Under Taiwan's Regulations for the Implementation of the Radioactive Materials Management Act, dry storage licenses may be granted for a maximum of 40 years. In practice, however, the NSC has adopted a more cautious approach, currently issuing licenses for only 20-year terms. This "staged authorization" model, Tu explains, requires operators to resubmit safety assessments and pass fresh reviews before any license renewal — ensuring that monitoring protocols are dynamically updated rather than locked in at the time of initial approval.
Yet technical reviews alone are insufficient to address community anxiety about permanent storage, Tu argues. He contends that the government, when issuing interim dry storage licenses, should simultaneously advance and publicly communicate a clear roadmap for final disposal site selection. "The government has an obligation to make clear to the public that license renewals are not open-ended extensions, but must be accompanied by substantive progress on 'final disposal site selection'," Tu said.
On building institutional credibility, Tu identifies sustained engagement with civil society as essential. Based on his observation, civil society organizations have primarily called for the legalization of nuclear waste management procedures — including proposals for a dedicated Nuclear Waste Disposal Site Selection Act as a framework law. He suggests that legislative formalization, informed by civil society input, could serve as a pathway toward durable consensus. Most critically, Tu emphasizes, sustained and continuous dialogue with both civil society groups and communities near potential disposal sites — and the ongoing collection of their input — remains indispensable.
