Kuomintang Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) is leading a party delegation to China from April 7 to 12, after being formally invited by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and General Secretary Xi Jinping (習近平).
TheKuomintang (KMT) Central Committee emphasized that the trip adheres strictly to the party's established policy of upholding the "1992 Consensus" and opposing Taiwan independence, aiming to demonstrate to the world that military conflict across the Taiwan Strait is not inevitable.
Although neither side has officially designated the engagement as a "Cheng-Xi summit," the two leaders are confirmed to meet in Beijing on April 10, with attendance on the KMT side restricted to a high-level five person delegation comprising vice chairs and senior think-tank executives.
Cheng's delegation will undertake a tightly choreographed five-day itinerary, visitingthe Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing on April 7, proceeding to Shanghai on April 8, passing through Beijing from April 9 to 11, and finally returning to Taiwan on April 12.
According to analysts and party insiders, Beijing is preparing a level of diplomatic protocol for Cheng expected to exceed the courtesy shown during Xi's previous meetings with former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九).
Internal Skepticism Amid a Coordinated Diplomatic Push
Upon assuming the KMT party leadership, Cheng aggressively pursued a meeting with Xi to tighten cross-strait economic ties and lower regional military tensions. Acknowledging herself as a "novice" in cross-strait affairs, she relied heavily on experienced party cadres.
According to sources familiar with cross-strait operations, KMT insiders were initially sharply divided on the summit's viability givenCheng's lack of experience. Her unusually high-profile public declarations—including assertions that a summit with Xi faced fewer variables than a prospective meeting between the leaders of China and the U.S.—confounded analysts, as such statements ran counter to the strict discretion typically required for high-level bilateral diplomacy.
However, internal directives previously reported by Storm Media eventually mandated that KMT officials refer to the trip merely as a "mainland exchange plan," a tactical downplaying that signaled to insiders the meeting had indeed been secured.
Backchannel Preparations
The groundwork for the April 10 meeting was laid by a series of preliminary steps that were unexpectedly disrupted. KMT party sources note the initial backchanneling began with a cross-strait think tank forum held on February 3, orchestrated by KMT Vice Chairman Chang Jung-kung (張榮恭) and executed by Vice Chairman Hsiao Hsu-tsen (蕭旭岑).
Hsiao's subsequent meeting withCCP Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Huning (王滬寧) in the Great Hall of the People served as a critical diplomatic opening maneuver where both parties discussed mutual interests towards AI and energy policy frameworks.
According to internal sources and prior Storm Media reporting, Beijing and the KMT originally agreed that the date of the Cheng-Xi summit would follow a prospectivemeeting between Xi and U.S. President Donald Trump, originally scheduled for late March or early April.
When that meeting was delayed due to the outbreak of U.S. conflict with Iran, KMT insiders expected the summit with Cheng would also be pushed back to May or June 2026.
Instead, the date of the meeting wasabruptly pushed up to April 10. Analysts attribute Beijing's refusal to delay partly to a recent unexpected decision by the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation to suspend all 2026 cross-strait youth exchanges—a program personally negotiated by Xi and Ma.
Thisdecision raised suspicions among high-level Beijing officials of covert US interference aimed at sidelining pro-China factions within Taiwan. Consequently, analysts assess that Beijing is locked in the April timeline to definitively deny its geopolitical adversaries a perceived victory.
In addition, Beijing's selection of April 10 also carries distinct strategic weight, perfectly mirroring the date of a previous meeting between Xi and Ma Ying-jeou in2024. By deliberately aligning this timing and explicitly issuing an invitation from the CCP Central Committee and Xi himself, Beijing intends to project an image of state-level formality.
Analysts conclude that extending such unparalleled diplomatic protocol to a self-acknowledged newcomer like Cheng underscores a broader strategic imperative: Beijing is determined to signal absolute control and continuity in its cross-strait engagement framework, projecting confidence regardless of Taiwan's internal political dynamics. （Related： Why Xi Jinping Greenlighted the Cheng-Xi Meeting: The Role of Ma Ying-jeou’s Fallout and Taiwan's KMT Factional Struggles ｜ Latest ）
