Beijing made a major move on March 30, 2026, as state media announced that Xi Jinping (習近平), General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, personally welcomed and invited Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文), Chairwoman of Taiwan's Kuomintang (KMT), to lead a delegation to China. This set the stage for the highly anticipated Cheng-Xi Meeting, which is now confirmed to take place in mid-April 2026 in Beijing.
An Unexpected Diplomatic Breakthrough
The news of the Cheng-Xi Meeting (鄭習會) has been a long-standing rumor, and many were unsure if it would materialize. However, in a surprising development, China's state-run news agency, Xinhua, officially announced that Xi personally extended the invitation to Cheng, marking a notable shift in the way Taiwan's major political figures are treated in Beijing. From April 7 to 12, Cheng will visit Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Beijing. Based on the known itinerary, sources suggest that the summit between Cheng and Xi will likely take place on April 10 or 11.
What makes this development particularly significant is the internal turbulence within the KMT (國民黨) that preceded it. Hsiao, a close aide of Cheng, who has been instrumental in facilitating communication between the KMT and Beijing, had recently been publicly distanced by Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), former President of Taiwan, who stated that Hsiao would no longer represent him in future political matters. This rift led many to believe that without Ma Ying-jeou's cross-strait credibility and network, the Cheng-Xi Meeting was unlikely to happen. Yet, in a twist of fate, Beijing not only proceeded with the summit but also extended Cheng a much higher-profile reception than any previous KMT leader.
The Role of Beijing's Strategic Diplomacy
Beijing's decision to publicly announce the visit and specify the dates of Cheng's tour is a significant departure from past practices. In previous interactions, KMT (國民黨) leaders such as Chu Li-luan (朱立倫) and Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) met with Xi, but the arrangements were not pre-confirmed by Beijing in such a formal manner. The fact that Beijing has now chosen to announce Cheng's visit in advance and to explicitly state that she was personally invited by Xi suggests that Cheng is being treated with a level of respect and recognition that surpasses that given to her predecessors.
This marks a significant shift in the KMT-Beijing relations, as Cheng's position within the party and her approach to cross-strait relations are somewhat at odds with more pro-U.S. figures within the KMT, such as Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) and former Chairman Chu Li-luan (朱立倫). These figures, who are seen as leaning towards Washington, have been more active on issues like arms procurement and other military-related matters, which has created a certain degree of isolation for Cheng within her own party.
The Internal Struggles within the KMT
When Cheng assumed the role of KMT Chairwoman in November 2025, she immediately tasked her trusted aides, Chang Jung-kung (張榮恭) and Hsiao, with quietly exploring the feasibility of a summit with Xi. Initial responses from high-level officials in Beijing were positive, with both sides reaching a mutual understanding that such a meeting should be carefully arranged to avoid any perception of hasty or sudden diplomacy. The timing was also considered important, with the preference being to hold the meeting after the Xi-Trump Summit (川習會), which was initially planned but later postponed due to global tensions, including the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict.
However, when the personnel dispute at the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation (馬英九基金會) erupted in early 2026, and Hsiao was removed from his position due to internal party disputes, many assumed the summit would be further delayed or even cancelled. Yet, in a surprising turn of events, Beijing chose to maintain the original timeline for the Cheng-Xi Meeting , defying expectations.
Beijing's Confidence in Hsiao
Despite the public fallout between Ma and Hsiao, Beijing has remained confident in Hsiao's ability to continue facilitating communication with the KMT, suggesting that Beijing is not overly concerned with the party's internal struggles. Hsiao's previous remarks, which criticized the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)'s director, Raymond Greene, for his relatively low rank, only added to the suspicions in Beijing that external forces—specifically U.S. influence—may have played a role in the dispute.
According to sources close to the KMT, Beijing believes that the timing of the personnel changes, the push for arms procurement, and the U.S.'s increasing involvement in Taiwan's domestic affairs are too coincidental to ignore. Beijing has thus interpreted these events as a deliberate attempt to weaken the pro-engagement faction (親中派) within the KMT and reaffirmed its commitment to supporting Cheng and her pro-engagement stance.
