A recent survey released by the National Science and Technology Council, known as the Taiwan Election and Democratization Study (TEDS), found that public support for democratic institutions among Taiwanese citizens fell from 53 percent to 49 percent between 2020 and 2024. Few paid attention to the findings — but former Judicial Yuan President Hsu Tzong-li (許宗力) did, responding with a public lecture later published as "Strengthening Defensive Democracy to Prevent 'Using Democracy to Destroy Democracy.'" Former Vice President Annette Lu (呂秀蓮) also took note, issuing a public call to action titled "Democratic Mudslide — Who Will Stop It?" while announcing plans to personally meet with Legislative Yuan Speaker Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜). （Related： The Cheng-Xi Summit: A KMT Chair Walking Into a Minefield ｜ Latest ）
Both Lu and Hsu bring deep legal expertise to the table and are acutely sensitive to questions of democracy and the rule of law. Their approaches, however, diverge sharply: Lu moved directly toward political engagement, while Hsu proposed a "defensive democracy" framework calling for tighter boundaries on free speech and stricter loyalty requirements for civil servants. Though their methods differ, both ultimately look to the Legislative Yuan as the arena for change — whether through direct lobbying or legislative reform.
It is difficult to say without dampening expectations, but their concrete proposals are unlikely to meaningfully restore public faith in democracy among Taiwanese citizens. They may, in fact, produce the opposite effect.
Democracy on Defense: Can It Survive Without Sharp Edges?
Having served twice as a Justice of the Constitutional Court and spanning sixteen cumulative years across both KMT and DPP administrations, Hsu Tzong-li has witnessed Taiwan's democratic development firsthand. It is precisely this experience that leads him to view the erosion of majority support for democracy as "a grave warning sign" — one he fears will weaken the nation's will to resist authoritarian encroachment.
In Hsu's framework, two threats stand against Taiwan's liberal democracy: infiltration by foreign forces, and the exploitation of democratic procedures by domestic extremists to dismantle democracy from within. His reference to "foreign forces" is deliberately vague, but it broadly aligns with the DPP's oft-cited concept of "hostile foreign influence" — simply rendered in less partisan language. The second threat forms the central thesis of his lecture: defensive democracy. （Related： The Cheng-Xi Summit: A KMT Chair Walking Into a Minefield ｜ Latest ）
Hsu drew on both American and German models, citing the "paradox of tolerance" — that unlimited tolerance of the intolerant will ultimately destroy tolerance itself. He also acknowledged the counterargument: that excessive defensive measures born of fear may themselves accelerate a slide into authoritarianism. The debate over whether democracy needs safeguards is, at its core, a debate over competing definitions of democracy itself.
One vision holds that even an authoritarian government produced through democratic procedures remains democratically legitimate. The other insists that all constitutional mechanisms must ultimately protect human rights — and it is this second vision that underpins "defensive democracy," which aims to prevent democracy from drifting toward authoritarianism. Its four defining features are: entrenchment of core values beyond the reach of majority votes; active opposition to internal enemies; restriction of the political rights of those deemed enemies of democracy; and authorization of preemptive measures before democracy suffers substantive harm. （Related： The Cheng-Xi Summit: A KMT Chair Walking Into a Minefield ｜ Latest ）
Germany, shaped by its Nazi past, has developed the most comprehensive defensive mechanisms — including the dissolution of unconstitutional parties and requirements that civil servants and naturalized citizens not only pledge loyalty, but actively commit to upholding the free democratic order. The United States sits at the opposite end of the spectrum, applying the "clear and present danger" standard to anti-democratic speech — a threshold that has also governed Taiwan's democracy for the past four decades. Yet now, as the DPP enters its third consecutive term in power, the party that once championed "one hundred percent freedom of speech" has reversed course to argue that free speech cannot exist without limits.
Hsu supports adopting preemptive measures in the AI era — before democracy sustains actual damage — to avoid missing the window for protection. He cited the high-profile case of a mainland Chinese spouse Liu Zhenya (劉振亞) who was expelled from Taiwan after publicly advocating for forcible unification. He also pointed to TPP legislator Lee Chen-hsiu (李貞秀), currently at the center of political controversy, arguing that public officials should be required to renounce citizenship from states hostile to Taiwan, "to ensure absolute loyalty to the constitutional order."
Democratic Decline Began Before Hsu Ever Left Office
Hsu further proposed amending the Civil Servant Service Act to require civil servants to affirm their commitment to liberal democratic values as a baseline condition of loyalty to the constitutional system. What he apparently fails to recognize is that the very measures he endorses — restricting free speech and allowing the Executive Yuan to unilaterally petition for the dissolution of political parties — are themselves symptoms of a slide toward authoritarianism. That slide began during Tsai Ing-wen's (蔡英文) administration and has only accelerated since. （Related： The Cheng-Xi Summit: A KMT Chair Walking Into a Minefield ｜ Latest ）
Democratic deterioration took its most damaging turn before Hsu's own term as a Justice ended, with what critics describe as the "seizure of legislative power." The judiciary overrode the legislature by issuing rulings deemed procedurally invalid due to insufficient quorum, while the executive branch defied the legislature by refusing to promulgate, countersign, or implement duly passed laws. How could such a "democracy" possibly retain public confidence?
Hsu does not appear to recognize that what he endorses are, in essence, the authoritarian tools of a bygone era. Taiwan spent forty years dismantling its authoritarian system — yet those very mechanisms are now being restored, piece by piece, under DPP governance. Is it any wonder that citizens are losing faith?
Lu Annette stands as a symbol of democratic disillusionment. During Tsai Ing-wen's administration, she loudly protested the effective suppression of referendums by prohibiting them from being held concurrently with general elections — and was ignored. She called for the Control Yuan to operate above partisan lines in its nominations — and was ignored again.
Now she expresses shock and grief that a majority of citizens no longer believe in democracy. Where Hsu argues that Lee Chen-hsiu must renounce her "hostile state citizenship," Lu counters that under Chinese nationality law, acquiring ROC citizenship automatically voids PRC nationality — no separate application required. Lu's position is straightforward: all political parties must operate within the law, and by that standard, Lee's appointment as a proportional representation legislator is legally valid. （Related： The Cheng-Xi Summit: A KMT Chair Walking Into a Minefield ｜ Latest ）
Lu raises a further question, however: under the ROC Nationality Act, foreigners — including mainland Chinese spouses — who have held citizenship for ten years may run for not only legislative seats, but also ten other offices including the presidency, vice presidency, heads of the four yuan, and county and city mayors. She asks whether this legal framework still fits Taiwan's current national circumstances and whether it warrants review. In fact, the Presidential and Vice Presidential Election and Recall Act already bars those who have restored, naturalized, or obtained residency status from Hong Kong, Macao, or the mainland from registering as presidential or vice presidential candidates — meaning that any further restrictions on political participation rights would require legislative amendment, which is precisely why Lu intends to visit Han Kuo-yu.
Can Taiwan's Democracy Hold? The Judiciary, Democratic Erosion, and Hsu Tzong-li
Lu raises additional structural questions: the Constitution specifies a four-year term for proportional representation legislators — so why are parties permitted to arbitrarily replace them mid-term? Why can a premier, serving under a president with a four-year mandate, submit budget proposals that bind the next administration? And why can legislators serving four-year terms review budgets spanning eight years?
The first question targets the TPP; the second and third point squarely at the NT$1.25 trillion, eight-year defense special budget. None of these problems are new — Tsai Ing-wen's NT$880 billion, eight-year Forward-Looking Infrastructure Program already set the precedent, drawing widespread criticism at the time yet proving impossible to constrain. As Legislative Yuan Speaker, Han Kuo-yu can only preside over sessions and facilitate cross-party negotiations — even if Lu persuades a legislative majority to support reform, the DPP's "Lai-Cho system" can simply refuse to countersign, promulgate, or implement whatever is passed. （Related： The Cheng-Xi Summit: A KMT Chair Walking Into a Minefield ｜ Latest ）
Hsu quoted an Israeli judge who observed that "democratic collapse is usually not a sudden rupture, but a cumulative process of erosion." The observation is apt — but Hsu fails to see that the DPP's decade in power has been precisely such a process, and one that is accelerating. More pointedly, the Israeli Supreme Court justice he cited was speaking in opposition to Netanyahu's attempt to strip courts of the power to strike down government policy on grounds of unreasonableness — a defense of judicial checks on executive power. In Taiwan today, the judiciary has instead become an instrument for weakening the legislature and shielding the executive; the Israeli judge argued against executive autocracy, while Hsu invokes the same words to justify restricting free speech and tightening civil servant loyalty — a telling inversion that confirms: democratic collapse begins when the judicial firewall falls.
The difference between Lu and Hsu ultimately comes down to consistency. Lu applies a uniform standard to democracy and authoritarianism regardless of which party holds power. Hsu, by contrast, defines both through a strongly partisan lens — the "authoritarianism" he opposes is that of the formerly authoritarian KMT and the Chinese Communist Party abroad, and in his effort to preempt the latter, he is willing to suppress opposition parties currently out of power. As for the DPP government's own authoritarian conduct, it is recast within his framework as legitimate "defensive democracy" — and it is precisely this double standard that lies at the root of Taiwan's democratic mudslide. （Related： The Cheng-Xi Summit: A KMT Chair Walking Into a Minefield ｜ Latest ）
