Taiwan's vulnerability to energy disruption — long flagged as a strategic liability in Washington policy circles — has gained renewed attention following recent conflict in the Middle East. Retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery warned in 2025 that Beijing has studied the Ukraine war closely and may conclude that a combination of economic warfare, cyberattacks, and grey-zone tactics offers the most effective path to compelling Taiwan's submission without firing a shot.
Such an approach, analysts argue, could undermine Taiwan's will to resist while buying time against a timely U.S. response.
On the economic front, China could block foreign liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers from reaching Taiwan, tightening the island's energy supply. Cyberattacks could be launched simultaneously against Taiwan's financial sector, telecommunications infrastructure, and energy facilities — targeting both civilian morale and social resilience.
Beijing could also conduct parallel cyberattacks against Japan and the United States, targeting critical infrastructure in both countries to keep them focused on self-defense rather than Taiwan's aid.
These measures could be coordinated with Chinese military exercises around Taiwan, creating a mutually reinforcing cycle of hard and soft pressure.
Montgomery has argued that Washington should reaffirm its commitment to Taiwan's defense, while Taiwan itself should simultaneously strengthen its capabilities across three domains: economic resilience, cybersecurity, and maritime security.
How Beijing Could Seek Submission Without Combat — And What Taiwan Can Do
Montgomery currently serves as Senior Director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Washington think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Before his retirement in 2017, he served over 30 years in the U.S. Navy, holding commands including carrier strike group commander at Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan, destroyer squadron commander for the Seventh Fleet, and commanding officer of a Navy Aegis destroyer. He also held senior positions at the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. European Command, and the National Security Council.
In early December 2025, Montgomery delivered a keynote address at the annual Cyber Week conference held at Tel Aviv University in Israel. His lecture was titled "Cyber-Enabled Economic Warfare: The Battle for Taiwan's Energy Lifeline."
Analyzing Taiwan's energy exposure, Montgomery noted that approximately 98% of Taiwan's energy supply is imported, ranking it among the world's most energy-insecure economies. Fifty percent of Taiwan's electricity comes from LNG. The island holds only about ten days' worth of LNG reserves, and requires roughly one LNG tanker delivery per day — approximately 350 shipments per year.
From a national security standpoint, all of Taiwan's LNG receiving terminals are located on the west coast, directly exposed to threats from across the Taiwan Strait. China could readily employ a naval blockade to prevent incoming LNG shipments from reaching the island.
Second, by OECD standards, Taiwan's electricity grid operates at a load rate among the highest of any major economy — running at approximately 75% capacity even under normal conditions.
A Chinese cyberattack on Taiwan's power grid would threaten not only civilian life, but also the electronics manufacturing and semiconductor industries that underpin Taiwan's economic identity.
"So you have high-risk LNG supply, a grid running at 75% load, and an adversary that can easily strike — this very quickly becomes a very serious problem," Montgomery said.
He added that if such a scenario materialized, "it would be an economic catastrophe for the entire world."
A Three-Track Response: Energy, Cybersecurity, and Maritime Security
Montgomery has outlined three broad areas in which Taiwan could strengthen its resilience against such hybrid threats.
First, on energy: Taiwan should diversify its LNG import sources, expand energy storage capacity, and explore the introduction of nuclear power — including Small Modular Reactor (SMR) technology.
Second, on cybersecurity: Taiwan should improve public-private cooperation to better protect critical infrastructure, consider developing offensive cyber capabilities, and work with allies to establish coordinated cyber defense frameworks.
Third, on maritime security: Montgomery recommended Taiwan urgently plan and conduct exercises for incoming resupply vessel convoys, and establish a maritime security coordination mechanism along with a maritime information sharing center.
Montgomery also noted that Taiwan's government should conduct a thorough review of any investments potentially linked to Taiwan by COSCO Shipping Ports Limited (中遠海運港口有限公司), a subsidiary of China COSCO Shipping Corporation (中國遠洋運輸集團, COSCO) — the dominant Chinese state-owned shipping conglomerate.
Stanford Scholar: Renewables Alone Are Insufficient for Taiwan's Energy Resilience
The intersection of nuclear energy, energy resilience, and Taiwan's national security was raised publicly by an American scholar two years earlier. The assessment points to a structural debate that remains unresolved in Taipei's policy circles.
Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, visited Taiwan in January 2024 to observe the presidential election. He stated publicly at the time that Taiwan was fundamentally unprepared — both in building internal resilience and in developing external deterrence — to confront Xi Jinping's and the Chinese Communist Party's ambitions to compel unification by any means available.
Diamond added that few people in Taiwan understood how far the island remained from an adequate state of readiness.
He argued directly that for the United States to provide effective assistance to Taiwan in a crisis, Taiwan must possess energy resilience as a prerequisite.
Diamond warned that without nuclear power in Taiwan's energy mix, renewables alone would fall short of the resilience threshold required for the United States to provide effective assistance to the island in a crisis.He argued directly that for the United States to provide effective assistance to Taiwan in a crisis, Taiwan must possess energy resilience as a prerequisite.
More in-depth reporting:
Original Article in Chinese
