The US-Iran conflict has exposed fresh vulnerabilities in East Asia's energy supply chains, reigniting debate over Taiwan's heavy reliance on imported natural gas — and whether the island needs to rethink nuclear power.
Qatar's share of Taiwan's natural gas imports has fallen from 42% in 2016 to 25% in 2025, according to data from Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs Energy Administration. Over the same period, Australia's share rose from 2% to 38%, while the United States climbed from 0% to 10%.
Qatar was previously Taiwan's largest single source of natural gas. It has now been displaced by Australia, a shift analysts say reflects a deliberate government strategy to diversify import risk.
Nevertheless, energy mix and adequate supply remain critical issues bearing directly on Taiwan's civilian welfare, industrial competitiveness, and national defense security.
Even setting aside the risk of natural gas supplies being disrupted in the Middle East, could the People's Republic of China one day resort to non-military means to interfere with liquefied natural gas carriers transiting the South China Sea en route to Taiwan?
Given continuous advances in nuclear technology, how should Taiwan approach the prospect of reintroducing nuclear power as a means of further mitigating the country's energy risks?
Natural Gas Now Powers 53% of Taiwan's Grid — But Middle East Exposure Remains
Natural gas accounts for 53.3% of Taiwan's total electricity generation in 2025, according to Taiwan Power Company (Taipower) statistics. Coal accounts for 26.6%, with renewables at 12%.
The dominance of gas in Taiwan's energy mix means that any sustained disruption to LNG shipping lanes — particularly through the South China Sea — carries direct implications for industrial output, household energy supply, and national security.
Within one week of the US-Iran conflict beginning on February 28, Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs announced plans to increase US LNG procurement, targeting a rise in the American share from 10% to between 15% and 20% by 2029.
State-owned CPC Corporation (中油公司) signed a roughly 25-year supply agreement with Cheniere Energy — the United States' largest LNG exporter — in February. Deliveries are scheduled to begin in June, with annual purchase volumes reaching up to 1.2 million metric tons starting in 2027.
The ministry has also outlined a three-stage contingency plan for extreme scenarios such as a prolonged Iranian blockade. The first stage involves early cargo reallocation, drawing on non-Middle Eastern sources including the US and Australia.
The second stage involves regional coordination, negotiating mutual supply assistance with fellow LNG importers such as Japan and South Korea.
The third stage involves purchasing spot-market cargoes to fill supply gaps and ensure uninterrupted gas supply to Taiwan.
Nuclear Restart Timeline Remains Unresolved
Beyond LNG diversification, the US-Iran conflict has revived domestic debate over nuclear power — a policy area where Taiwan's government has formally reversed course, but where the operational timeline remains uncertain.
The energy security concerns thrown into sharp relief by the U.S.-Iran conflict go beyond natural gas import sources. The past week has also reignited debate over nuclear power generation. Adding to these concerns is the maritime security of LNG shipments transiting the South China Sea.
Tony Hu (胡振東), a former U.S. Department of Defense official, argued that Taiwan's geography makes nuclear power a strategic necessity. "Taiwan is an island, so not using nuclear energy is simply foolish," Hu said. "The fuel rods can be stored on the island itself, reducing dependence on constant imports."
Hu further stressed that energy self-sufficiency is directly tied to survival. "With nuclear power, your survival can last much longer," he added. "Taiwan's geographical situation is different, and that's precisely why it should make greater use of nuclear power."
The government has already made a significant policy reversal on nuclear energy. However, the timeline for reintegrating nuclear power into the national grid remains unresolved. The key sticking point is how long the reinstatement process will take.
Minister of Economic Affairs Kung Ming-hsin (龔明鑫) addressed the issue before the Legislative Yuan's Economics Committee on March 25. He stated that independent safety inspections and a restart plan must be completed before any reactor can come back online. Taiwan Power Company estimates the safety inspection alone would take one and a half to two years.
The subsequent review by the Nuclear Safety Commission adds further uncertainty to the timeline. Kung noted that the duration of this review falls entirely under the Commission's purview. As a result, an accurate overall timeline for resuming nuclear power generation cannot be determined at this stage.
Peter Kurz: Beijing's Non-Military Harassment of LNG Vessels Cannot Be Ruled Out
Beyond nuclear power, natural gas represents Taiwan's highest dependency among imported energy sources. It presents not only a question of supply origin, but also a shipping security concern with direct national security implications. Both dimensions warrant serious strategic attention.
Peter Kurz, widely known in Taiwan's securities industry as "Mr. Taiwan" and currently serving as Chairman of Alpha Ring in Taiwan, raised the issue at a Taipei Longmen Rotary Club meeting on March 18. He noted that natural gas is difficult to store, leaving Taiwan with reserves lasting only approximately two weeks. This means LNG carriers must arrive at Taiwan's shores continuously, throughout the entire year, without interruption.
Kurz assessed that current conditions make an outright military invasion by Beijing unlikely. However, he cautioned that the possibility of non-military interference with incoming LNG vessels cannot be ruled out. Such disruption could severely impact Taiwan's economy and the daily lives of its people.
He pointed to the recurring presence of Chinese Coast Guard vessels in the South China Sea and waters near the Diaoyutai Islands as a telling indicator. The South China Sea, he emphasized, serves as a vital maritime lifeline for East Asian nations. Taiwan is no exception to this dependence.
Kuo Yu-jen (郭育仁), a professor at National Sun Yat-sen University's Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies and deputy director of the Institute for National Policy Research, has studied Taiwan and East Asian security issues over the long term.
Kuo noted that China's Coast Guard Law and Maritime Traffic Safety Law, both enacted in 2021, authorize Chinese coast guard vessels to board and inspect foreign ships in waters Beijing claims as under its jurisdiction — a provision that carries real risk for vessels transiting the South China Sea.
Kuo Yu-jen: Contingency Plans Already in Place With US Support
Kuo noted that Taiwan had already developed countermeasures during the Tsai Ing-wen administration, including diversifying the national registry of LNG tankers bound for Taiwan — for instance, using US- or Australian-flagged vessels — to reduce exposure to potential Chinese interdiction.
On the legal dimension, Kuo pointed to Section 2 of the Taiwan Relations Act, passed by the US Congress in 1979, which states that any effort to determine Taiwan's future by non-peaceful means — "including boycotts or embargoes" — will be considered "a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States."
Further legislative movement is under way in Washington. Republican Representative Pat Harrigan has introduced the Taiwan Energy Security and Anti-Embargo Act this month, which aims to prevent Taiwan from becoming vulnerable to energy supply shocks, Chinese Communist Party coercion, or external geopolitical disruption.
The bill would support prioritizing US LNG exports to Taiwan, encourage supply diversification and safeguard mechanisms, and lay groundwork for reducing the leverage adversaries could exercise through energy pressure.
The legislation also encourages US-Taiwan cooperation in advanced nuclear technology, including small modular reactors (SMRs), to provide more reliable baseload power that is less susceptible to external interference.
Kuo also cautioned that Taiwan's underlying energy security conditions are structurally weak, making it difficult to meaningfully reduce the island's dependence on imported energy. Diversifying LNG sources, he argued, addresses symptoms rather than root causes.
From a national security standpoint, increasing the number of LNG receiving terminals would help — but such facilities require substantial land area for both receiving and storage operations. All three of Taiwan's existing terminals are located on the western coast. The eastern coast lacks sufficient flat land, making it difficult to site new terminals there.
More in-depth reporting from 風傳媒:
