Now entering its third week, the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran shows no signs of resolution. Debates continue to swirl in Washington over whether to force open the Strait of Hormuz or seize Iran's Kharg Island oil terminal.
Meanwhile, most of Washington's European and Asian allies have declined to join the fight, yet President Donald Trump remains defiant and largely dismissive of their reluctance.
For Taiwan, watching this unfold from afar, a hard question must be asked: If the current U.S. administration fundamentally looks down on Europe, Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East alike, is Taipei's current diplomatic strategy still sound?
A Leadership Indifferent To Global Consequences
As the conflict drags on, battlefield developments have receded from the headlines, replaced by growing anxiety over global supply shortages of oil, natural gas, plastics, and even ammonia. On social media in Taiwan, reports of rising plastic bag prices have already begun circulating.
A quiet economic crisis, rooted in Middle Eastern disruption, is taking shape, and the public and policymakers would do well to pay attention. Yet the architects of this conflict — the leaders of the United States and Israel — project an attitude of striking indifference to the consequences.
This posture reflects something structural about the current U.S. administration's composition. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, widely seen as a principal driver of the decision to go to war, has faced severe scrutiny.
Trump's personnel choices have consistently prioritized the appearance of strength over the substance of competence. Similarly, his recent replacement of the homeland security secretary with Oklahoma Sen. Markwayne Mullin, a former mixed martial arts fighter with no actual military service, has drawn widespread questioning regarding his qualifications for the role.
Japan's Prime Minister And The Limits Of Alliance
None of this turmoil has stopped the routine of alliance diplomacy. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi recently kept a long-scheduled appointment to visit Washington.
However, the trip was overshadowed almost immediately when Trump, responding to a Japanese journalist asking why Washington had not consulted its allies before launching strikes on Iran, unexpectedly invoked Pearl Harbor.
The question itself was entirely legitimate. Japan is the world's fourth-largest economy and Washington's most important strategic partner in East Asia. Understanding why the United States went to war, and how it treats its allies in the process, is a matter of fundamental strategic importance for every country in the region.
Trump's answer was not a joke or a rhetorical slip; it was an unfiltered expression of his transactional view of alliances. In his framing, Japan is not an equal partner but a country burdened by historical debt — one that should be grateful rather than inquisitive. Senior American diplomats have expressed concern over this dynamic, and their unease is warranted.
Does Diplomatic Accommodation Actually Work?
For U.S. allies, the core dilemma is clear: No matter how much an ally accommodates Washington by offering trade concessions, absorbing tariff pressure, or signaling political loyalty, Trump does not interpret this as cooperation. He interprets it as an obligation.
Concessions are simply what others owe America, and gratitude does not enter into the equation. Hegseth made this logic explicit when he suggested that ungrateful European allies, Middle Eastern nations, and the American press should be thanking the administration for having the courage to launch this war.
This raises a direct question for Taiwan. When the mainstream of American media, politics, economics, and military circles harbor fundamental doubts about Trump and his team, does Taiwan's current diplomatic posture still serve its national interests?
Appeasing officials who regard every concession as their natural due is not a path to greater respect or security. Trump's Pearl Harbor comment carried a specific message for Japan: You attacked us, so you have no standing to question our decisions.
If that is how Washington privately views its most capable Pacific ally, Taiwan's strategic planners would be unwise to assume they are viewed any more favorably.
Reassessing The 2027 Threat And Internal US Dissent
Furthermore, assumptions about imminent regional threats are shifting. Recent research by U.S.-based scholars Dennis Weng (翁履中) and Taiyi Sun (孙太一), based on interviews with Washington insiders, suggests that American elites do not actually believe Beijing will use military force against Taiwan in 2027. This conclusion has been essentially confirmed by the latest annual threat assessment released by Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard.
Internal U.S. dissent regarding the administration's foreign policy is also becoming public. Joe Kent, who recently resigned as director of the National Counterterrorism Center, stated plainly in his resignation letter that he could not support the ongoing war against Iran, asserting that the conflict was launched due to pressure from Israel and its U.S. lobbying apparatus. When faced with a genuine moral choice, he declined to go along.
Across every dimension — domestic politics, the Iran conflict, economic pressure, and the broader contest between Washington and Beijing — the current U.S. administration is increasingly isolated. Until Washington and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reckon with what they have set in motion, the damage will continue to compound.
Within the range of choices available to Taiwan, leaders must pursue a course defined by clear-eyed caution and resist the temptation to double down on a diplomatic strategy that the evidence no longer supports. （Related： TSMC Chairman C.C. Wei Says Robot “Brains” Matter More Than Show ｜ Latest ）
