A recent examination of State Department records from 1949 housed at the U.S. National Archives illuminates a pivotal "what if" in modern history: Did the United States ever seriously entertain backing a Taiwanese independence movement to forge a self-governing state? The documents suggest that if such an avenue ever existed, the chaotic months surrounding the fall of the Chinese mainland represented the final window to take it.
Looking at South Korea offers a useful parallel. There, the United States successfully partnered with local elites who had weathered Japanese colonial rule, pairing them with exiled leaders like Syngman Rhee to establish the Republic of Korea. On paper, a similar blueprint for Taiwan seemed entirely plausible. Independence advocates, including Thomas Liao (廖文毅) and Huang Chi-nan (黃紀男), vigorously lobbied the State Department, pitching themselves as the bedrock of a fiercely pro-American, anti-communist Taiwan.
Yet, American diplomats who met these figures left the room unconvinced. Robert C. Strong, the U.S. chargé d'affaires in Taipei, and Livingston T. Merchant, counselor at the U.S. Embassy in China, independently concluded that Taiwan's native political elites lacked the administrative capacity to govern. Notably, this assessment did not come from Chiang Kai-shek(蔣介石) loyalists; both diplomats harbored deep skepticism toward Chiang himself. Regardless, they simply could not envision the island's local leadership successfully taking the reins.
The more profound obstacle was the military. Korea's history diverged from Taiwan's because the peninsula was annexed into the Japanese Empire, allowing Koreans to achieve senior officer ranks within the Imperial Army. In stark contrast, Taiwan was administered strictly as a colony. The absolute highest rank a Taiwanese-born soldier could reach under Japanese command was major, presenting a fundamentally inadequate foundation for building an independent national defense force. Furthermore, the State Department still harbored hopes of peeling communist China away from Soviet influence, and fostering an independent Taiwan would have directly violated Washington's longstanding policy of recognizing a unified China. Consequently, the only pragmatic choice was to collaborate with the mainland military establishment already entrenched on the island.
Brief Candidacy of Sun Li-jen
As the Chinese mainland fell to communist forces, the official paying the closest attention to Taiwan's trajectory was Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo. For MacArthur, Taiwan was essential not only for its geographic advantage but also for its agricultural output, which was vital to Japan's postwar economic recovery. He feared that a communist takeover of Taiwan would jeopardize Allied control over Japan itself.
Though a staunch anti-communist, MacArthur was profoundly realistic. By 1949, he severely doubted Chiang's ability to hold the island and subsequently ordered his intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby, to scout alternative leadership options. The standout candidate was Gen. Sun Li-jen (孫立人), a brilliant tactician who concurrently commanded Taiwan's training operations, its ground defenses, and the army. Sun had fought alongside American forces under Gen. Joseph Stilwell in the China-Burma-India theater, and his subsequent triumphs against communist troops in Manchuria made him an ideal U.S. partner in the eyes of Tokyo.
Willoughby even brought Sun to Tokyo to meet with MacArthur to discuss assuming power if Chiang faltered, an offer Sun ultimately declined. But the concept never found footing in Washington anyway. The Pentagon opposed the maneuver, and the State Department offered practically zero support. The initiative evaporated largely because Sun lacked the civilian administrative machinery required to run a government, and his limited troop command offered no genuine political base.
Chen Cheng Falls Short
If Sun were too narrowly focused, Gen. Chen Cheng (陳誠) appeared to be a far more formidable alternative. His wartime collaboration with the United States rivaled Sun's, and his massive "Tumu Clique" forces had just played a pivotal role in crushing a communist landing at the Battle of Guningtou. Outside of Chiang, Chen was unequivocally the most powerful military figure on Taiwan.
His influence theoretically extended into the air force through a former classmate, Gen. Zhou Zhirou (周至柔). However, Chen's reach was effectively neutralized by Gen. Wang Shu-ming (王叔銘), an air force leader fiercely loyal to Chiang Ching-kuo(蔣經國). Ultimately, Chen could unify neither the air force nor the army, as several massive troop formations retreating to Taiwan fell entirely outside his jurisdiction. Pushing Chen into power would have merely fractured the island into competing military fiefdoms.
Chiang Kai-shek, despite having temporarily resigned the presidency, retained an irreplaceable structural authority as the founding commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy. As the institution that trained almost the entire Nationalist officer corps, Whampoa made Chiang the only figure capable of commanding broad military loyalty. When the Korean War erupted in June 1950, and President Harry Truman sent the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, Chiang had already reclaimed the presidency and consolidated the 600,000-strong military. He was the only viable partner Washington had left.
The Ill-Fated Third Force
While Taiwan's military unified under Chiang, one major rogue element remained: the Yunnan Anti-Communist National Salvation Army, led by Gen. Li Mi (李彌) across mainland Southeast Asia. The CIA utilized Li's forces through Operation Paper to harass communist troops during the Korean War. Emboldened by his conquests in the Golden Triangle — seizing territory across Burma, Laos, and Thailand — Li dreamed of establishing an independent "third force" and vigorously lobbied for U.S. recognition.
However, Li lacked both a navy and an air force. Once the Korean armistice was signed, his guerrilla campaigns morphed into a diplomatic nightmare for Washington, angering Southeast Asian allies who resented Nationalist proxy wars on their soil. Li was eventually recalled to Taiwan and placed under house arrest. The CIA continued its covert operations in the Golden Triangle by having Chiang install a loyalist replacement, but the dream of a third force died entirely. By the Eisenhower administration, the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty cemented Washington's formal recognition of the Republic of China under the Chiangs, a status quo maintained until 1979.
The Taiwan the Chiangs Built
Other political heavyweights, including Acting President Li Tsung-jen (李宗仁) and Premier Yan Xishan (閻錫山), were briefly weighed but quickly discarded. Li fled to the United States with practically zero island influence, while Yan arrived in Taipei after his entire army was annihilated on the mainland. A powerful network of American advocates, heavily influenced by Soong Mei-ling (宋美齡), ultimately recognized that only Chiang possessed the dual military and civilian authority necessary to prevent Taiwan from plunging into an endless cycle of coups.
Ray Cline, the CIA's eventual senior representative in Taiwan, recognized this reality and chose to cultivate a relationship with Chiang Ching-kuo as the rightful heir. It is highly doubtful that American-backed alternatives like Sun Li-jen or progressive governor K.C. Wu (吳國楨) would have birthed a more humane or stable regime. Both men participated in severe political persecution during the 1950s, and under U.S. sponsorship, they likely would have engaged in ruinous factional infighting. Both also harbored deep desires to either militarily reconquer or peacefully reunite with mainland China, meaning neither would have focused on building a distinctly Taiwanese identity.
The historian Lin Hsiao-ting (林孝庭) perfectly encapsulates Chiang Kai-shek as an "accidental founding father." Without the alliance between the Chiangs and the United States, and without Chiang Ching-kuo's eventual dismantling of martial law, Taiwan would not have experienced its peaceful, democratic transition. The fiercely democratic Taiwan that navigates Beijing's aggression today is the direct, albeit ironic, result of the foundation laid by the two Chiangs — an uncomfortable historical reality that defies the preferred narratives of modern political factions.
*The author is a researcher in military history. （Related： Lai Must Own Taiwan's Nuclear Pivot as the DPP Faces Reality ｜ Latest ）
