Two weeks into the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran, the strategic picture is becoming clearer — and considerably less favorable to Washington than early declarations of strength suggested.
The Iranian government has not collapsed. The Iranian public has not risen up. And the international coalition that once rallied behind American military leadership has quietly, but unmistakably, failed to materialize. For observers in the Asia-Pacific, this is not simply a Middle East story. The Iran conflict has become a live stress test of American power, carrying direct implications for how regional partners view U.S. reliability, alliance management, and the credibility of strategic commitments closer to home.
The Limits of Military Coercion
The Trump administration has consistently led with displays of strength, from tariff confrontations with China to its current military posture toward Iran. The underlying message is that American power is overwhelming.
However, raw force applied without a sustained diplomatic architecture has limits. No serious observer doubts U.S. strike capabilities, but the question is whether coercion alone can produce desired political outcomes. Evidence from the first two weeks of the campaign is discouraging. With institutional memories of Vietnam and Afghanistan remaining raw, the administration has avoided putting boots on the ground, seemingly acknowledging that overwhelming firepower cannot substitute for a comprehensive political strategy.
Traditional allies opt for caution
Outside the U.S., reactions among traditional allies have been notably restrained. Spain moved explicitly to downgrade its diplomatic relationship with Israel in protest. More telling signals, however, have come from America's closest partners.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney expressed support for constraining Iran's nuclear program but unambiguously stated Canada will not participate in offensive military operations, calling on all parties to respect international rules.
UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has adopted a similarly cautious posture, wary of the domestic political costs and social friction that an open-ended military campaign in the Muslim world could trigger.
Across the Group of Seven (G7), the pattern is consistent. Governments are not prepared to openly defy Washington, but they will not endorse its actions either.
Taiwan's pro-US strategy stalls
While Washington focuses on military operations, Canada's Carney has pursued a different brand of statecraft. Following a call at the World Economic Forum in Davos for middle powers to resist coercion by major states, Carney completed a 10-day tour meeting with leaders from India, Australia, and Japan — three of the four Quad members. He followed this with a visit to Beijing to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping, pairing principled multilateralism with pragmatic engagement.
The strategy is yielding results. Despite Canadian exports to the U.S. falling 5.8% in 2025, Canada avoided a recession, proving the viability of economic diversification.
The contrast with Taiwan's pro-Trump political camp is stark. Voices advocating for unconditional alignment with the Trump administration have received little in return. Arms sales have stalled, tariffs have been imposed, and President Lai Ching-te(賴清德) has yet to secure a U.S. transit stop as he approaches his second year in office. Meanwhile, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is scheduled to visit Washington in March, and Trump is preparing to travel to Beijing.
Looming inflation and the Fed's dilemma
The Iran conflict is also generating severe economic consequences globally. With the Strait of Hormuz facing continued disruption, oil prices are holding above $100 per barrel, sparking a new inflationary cycle.
Despite the inflation surge driven by an oil shock, Trump publicly demanded Thursday that Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell immediately cut interest rates. The Federal Open Market Committee, scheduled to meet on March 17, faces a genuine dilemma: a slowing economy paired with rising energy-driven inflation. This combination risks a return to 1970s-style stagflation. If the conflict drags on, financial analysts warn that rate cuts could become not just premature, but actively counterproductive.
Elite consensus on Taiwan: The 'Ukraine model'
For Taiwan, the broader geopolitical shifts present a critical reality check. A recently released two-year study by U.S.-based scholar Sun Taiyi and Texas-based political science professor Weng Lu-chung (翁履中) surveyed over 100 political and academic elites across Taiwan, China, and Washington.
The findings carry significant weight for cross-strait risk assessment, noting that Washington elites broadly agreed that in the event of a cross-strait conflict, the U.S. would follow the "Ukraine model" — supplying weapons and sanctioning China, but withholding direct military intervention.
These elites also broadly believe a cross-strait war is unlikely through at least 2028, a significantly more sanguine view than the anxious domestic conversation in Taiwan.
This assessment aligns with remarks made on March 11 by Keith Kellogg, the Trump administration's former special envoy for Ukraine and Russia. Speaking at the Tokyo Forum 2026, Kellogg plainly stated the administration's strategic focus is on economic instruments, not military ones. Washington's core objective regarding China, he noted, is preventing Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang from consolidating into a unified bloc, rather than pursuing open confrontation.
For political factions in Taiwan arguing that the Iran strikes are a prelude to an American-led campaign against China, Kellogg's remarks serve as a direct refutation. Selling that narrative to the Taiwanese public is, ultimately, selling fear — not strategy.
