Xi Is Weakening His Army and Still Coming for Taiwan, Retired Japanese General Warns

​​​China's "Two Sessions" wrapped up this week with a striking image: a near-empty presidium at the People's Liberation Army delegation session, the visible toll of Xi Jinping's (習近平) sweeping military purges. But according to one of Japan's foremost Taiwan security analysts, the hollowed-out ranks have done nothing to blunt Xi's determination to take Taiwan by force.

Kiyoshi Ogawa (小川清史), a retired lieutenant general of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) who served as commanding general of the Western Army, delivered a lecture in English at Tamkang University on March 12 via video link, under the title "China's Moves and Japan's Defense."

Ogawa opened by cataloguing the scale of Xi's purge. Since the 20th Party Congress in 2022 confirmed Xi's third consecutive term, dismissals and investigations of senior PLA commanders have continued without pause — spanning the Army commander, the former Navy commander, political commissars of the Air Force and the Strategic Support Force, and the head of the military court system.

The purge has cut across both operational command and political work structures. The most recent wave came on February 26, when five generals were simultaneously stripped of their National People's Congress delegate credentials.

The numbers tell the story. According toBBC Chinese, the total NPC delegate count from the PLA and People's Armed Police shrank by 38 — from 281 to 243 — compared to the start of the current legislative term.

The thinning was most visible at the top. On the presidium, only newly appointed Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin (張升民) and Xi himself were present. Among generals in the audience, those clearly identifiable in public footage were limited to Defense Minister Dong Jun (董軍), Eastern Theater Commander Yang Zhibin (楊志斌), Central Theater Commander Han Shengyan (韓勝延), retired General Fan Xiaojun (范驍駿), and retired General Yi Xiaoguang (乙曉光) of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Ogawa reached for a blunt historical analogy: "This situation is similar to Stalin of Soviet Union." Xi, he argued, is simultaneously consolidating absolute personal authority and degrading his military's actual combat effectiveness. "For him personally it is a good thing, but for the country, I think it is a bad thing."

"Xi Jinping is not a military man — he is a politician and does not truly understand military affairs. But that does not mean he has given up on Taiwan. Quite the opposite."

Xi's stated position has shown no sign of softening. Ogawa cited a consistent pattern: a declaration in 2019 that China would "not renounce the use of force"; reaffirmation after securing a third term in 2023; and the same posture maintained in National Day speeches in both 2024 and 2025. U.S. intelligence assessments have concluded that Xi has ordered the PLA to develop the capability to invade Taiwan by 2027.

Drawing on a non-public December 2021 report from Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense, Ogawa outlined the PLA's projected three-phase operational concept for an invasion of Taiwan. In the initial phase, forces would assemble under the guise of military exercises, while cognitive warfare operations would be launched simultaneously to generate social panic and naval vessels would be deployed to prevent foreign military intervention — "just like Russia assembled forces on Ukraine's border in December 2021, calling it exercises." The intermediate phase would involve ballistic and cruise missile strikes against key military installations, with cyber attacks conducted in parallel by the Strategic Support Force.

The final phase would see amphibious landings along Taiwan's western coast — following the achievement of air and maritime superiority — with advances pushing north, south, and east.

Ogawa analyzed the terrain constraints shaping this calculus: Taipei is a high-density urban environment difficult to seize rapidly; Tainan hosts a naval base; eastern Taiwan is mountainous and similarly resistant to quick seizure. The PLA's core operational objective, he argued, is to complete effective control before U.S. and Japanese forces can arrive. Time compression is therefore the single greatest structural constraint on any invasion scenario.

Taiwan's response strategy drew an unambiguous endorsement from Ogawa: "This is a very good strategy." Taiwan's 2023 National Defense Report formalized the concept of "resolute defense and multi-layered deterrence," introducing the principle of "in-depth defense." The underlying logic is to sustain attritional land-based resistance long enough to allow U.S. and Japanese reinforcement, while simultaneously strengthening whole-of-society resilience. "Taiwan can tie down Chinese forces for a considerable period of time," Ogawa said, adding that the Philippines could also potentially contribute to that support effort.

Ogawa presented a quantitative balance assessment, calculating with approximately one-quarter of total U.S. Indo-Pacific deployable forces. The combined Japan-U.S.-Taiwan order of battle: 320,000 ground troops, 515 naval vessels, 1,501 aircraft — a composite score of 3.5. China's figures: 970,000 ground troops, 790 naval vessels, 1,668 aircraft — a score of 4.0.

The gap is driven by missiles. Ogawa estimated Taiwan's missile score at 1.0, Japan's at 0.5, and the U.S. contribution at 2.0, for a combined 3.5 against China's 4.0. "I am not certain how many missiles Taiwan currently possesses," he said, "but this is the area that most urgently needs to be reinforced."

On nuclear weapons, the U.S. currently holds more than 1,500 active warheads against China's estimated 600 to 700. But Ogawa warned that China may be adding roughly 100 warheads annually, with the gap projected to narrow significantly around 2034. "Before that point, China cannot absorb a nuclear confrontation with the United States — that is an objective constraint. But this window will not remain open indefinitely."

Ogawa devoted considerable attention to Japan's "Survival-Threatening Situation" mechanism (存立危機事態) — the legal instrument introduced in the 2015 security legislation revisions that for the first time codified Japan's right to collective self-defense, with a Taiwan contingency as the central scenario.

He traced its evolution through three iterations of the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Guidelines: the 1978 version responding to Cold War U.S.-Soviet tensions; the 1997 revision oriented toward a Korean Peninsula contingency; and the 2015 revision that explicitly addressed Taiwan. "Before 2015, it was very difficult for Japan to act on collective defense — we could essentially only defend ourselves. After 2015, we can employ collective defense capabilities in Japan's surrounding areas."

The pivotal question: which phase of a PLA invasion triggers a formal determination? Ogawa noted that then-Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi (高市早苗) had explicitly stated the previous year that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would "certainly" constitute such a situation.

Once designated, the prime minister must seek parliamentary approval before issuing a defense mobilization order — but may act first and seek retroactive Diet approval in urgent circumstances. "In any case, the prime minister has the authority to activate this mechanism."

Ogawa closed with an admission that drew some self-deprecating candor. Taiwan's civilian protection capabilities currently exceed Japan's: "You have underground shelter capacity at 300 percent of your population, and every district has its own protected zone — this is a very good approach."

Japan's civil protection legislation still requires revision; shelter infrastructure and evacuation planning remain works in progress. "We are now working as quickly as possible to build such facilities," Ogawa said. "But to be honest, Taiwan is doing better than Japan in this regard."

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