For twelve consecutive days beginning February 27, People's Liberation Army aircraft recorded no sorties over the Taiwan Strait's western approaches — an absence that prompted a wave of speculation among analysts, commentators, and international observers. Theories ranged from a deliberate stand-down timed to Beijing's annual "Two Sessions" legislative meetings, to diplomatic signaling ahead of a prospective Xi-Trump summit, to fuel conservation driven by the war in the Middle East. The actual explanation, according to Lu Wenhao (陸文浩), a researcher at the Chinese Strategic Studies Association who tracked the period daily, was straightforward: the weather was unsuitable for flight operations.
"The further you look for a political motive, the further you get from the answer," Lu said, describing how he cross-referenced the Ministry of National Defense's daily aircraft activity data with Central Weather Administration radar imagery and regional forecasts. In every instance where PLA aircraft were absent from the Taiwan-facing sector, the radar returns showed rain, low cloud cover, or dense fog over Fujian's coastline and the western approaches to the Taiwan Strait. On days when aircraft appeared, the radar was clear and western Taiwan's counties recorded sunshine.
The Fog Season That Fooled the Analysts
February and March are the Taiwan Strait's established fog season. According to Lu's analysis, the period from February 27 to March 12 coincided with the final phase of the northeast monsoon and the arrival of early spring frontal systems. Cold air masses from the Chinese mainland collided with warm, moisture-laden flows along the southeastern coast, generating persistent overcast conditions, intermittent squalls, and advection fog over the western strait. Visibility at times fell below 1,000 meters, conditions under which both civilian airports and military flight operations are routinely suspended.
Lu noted that PLA aviation doctrine, as reflected in air force training literature, explicitly treats meteorological conditions — including time, geography, and weather — as primary determinants of whether aircraft operations proceed. "This is standard practice across all militaries," he said. The argument that aircraft stood down to project political goodwill or to avoid embarrassing Beijing during a sensitive legislative session, he contends, does not hold against the data. A review of his compiled table covering the Two Sessions periods from 2022 through 2025 shows PLA aircraft were active in the Taiwan-facing sector in every prior year during the same calendar window — including 2023 and 2024.
Ships Stayed; the Numbers Fluctuated with Sea State
While aircraft were absent, PLA naval vessels maintained their positions in waters surrounding Taiwan. Defense MinisterWellington Li-Hsiung Koo (顧立雄) acknowledged as much on March 6, stating that although no aircraft had appeared, at least five PLA warships remained in the surrounding sea area every day. "We cannot assess PLA pressure solely by whether aircraft appear," Koo said. "We must monitor all indicators."
Lu's tracking showed the vessel count fluctuating between five and eight ships over the period, a variation he attributed directly to sea conditions. On March 9, the Fujian Maritime Safety Administration issued a notice warning of winds exceeding Force 8 along the Fujian coast. The vessel count dropped from eight on March 8 to six on March 9 and remained at six on March 10. A Taiwan-based defense monitoring page, Taiwan ADIZ, reported that a Type 054A frigate, the Yixing (宜興艦/537), had been involved in intercepting a U.S. military aircraft in Taiwan's surrounding waters during the same window. Lu assessed that the three missing vessels had most likely sought shelter in Sandu'ao (三都澳) near Ningde, Fujian, or at Xiamen, consistent with standard storm-avoidance procedures for the 15th Escort Flotilla based in that area.
Weather Clears; the U.S. and PLA Both Move
On March 11, as Central Weather Administration forecasts predicted clearing skies across western Taiwan through March 17, a U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft transited the Taiwan Strait from south to north through international airspace. U.S. Seventh Fleet stated the transit demonstrated American commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific and affirmed the right of all nations to freedom of navigation and overflight consistent with international law.
The U.S. flight produced an immediate response. According to a report in Youth Daily News on the morning of March 12 — at the time of Lu's writing, the Defense Ministry's own website had yet to post the data — five PLA aircraft sorties and naval vessels were recorded in Taiwan's surrounding sea and air space during the 24-hour period from 0600 on March 11 to 0600 on March 12. Three of the five aircraft sorties crossed the strait's median line, operating in the airspace north of Dongyin Island and in the southwestern sector stretching from south of Kinmen through the Penghu Islands to the waters southwest of Cape Eluanbi.
Based on the aircraft activity patterns, Lu assessed that the P-8A's northbound transit along the median line was interpreted by the PLA Eastern Theater Command as a close-in reconnaissance approach toward the Fujian coast, triggering the resumption of air activity. "The U.S. aircraft woke the Eastern Theater out of its pause," he said, predicting that PLA sea and air forces would resume their "joint combat readiness patrol" exercises in Taiwan's surrounding area as weather permitted — and that the activity would also serve as a response to Premier Cho Jung-tai's (卓榮泰) visit to Japan.
The Premier's Japan Trip and Beijing's Escalating Rhetoric
On March 7, Premier Cho traveled to Japan to attend the World Baseball Classic game between Taiwan and the Czech Republic. Questions were raised over his use of the Song Zhi military base (松指部) (松指部) for a trip officially characterized as private, and over the cost of charter arrangements. The Executive Yuan stated that all expenses, including security personnel's airfare, were paid by Cho personally, and that all applicable procedures had been followed.
Ocean Affairs Council Minister Kuan Bi-ling (管碧玲) framed the trip differently, telling media that Cho had certainly met with Japanese government officials and that the visit represented a significant diplomatic breakthrough, and was therefore substantively an official engagement.
China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun (郭嘉昆) responded on March 9, stating that Beijing was "highly vigilant" and "firmly opposed" to what it characterized as Japan attempting to probe limits on the Taiwan question. Beijing warned that Japan's "indulgence of provocation" would "pay a price" and that all consequences would be Japan's responsibility. The Taiwan Affairs Office spokeswoman Zhu Fenglian (朱鳳蓮) added the same evening that the Democratic Progressive Party authorities were "wreckers of cross-strait peace" and "manufacturers of Taiwan Strait crises." Lu noted that in Beijing's established sequencing of statements on Taiwan-related issues, the declarations from the Foreign Ministry and the Taiwan Affairs Office typically precede a military response from the PLA.
Against Xi-Trump Summit Signaling Theories
Several analysts and media reports had suggested the PLA's reduced activity might constitute a goodwill gesture toward Washington ahead of a prospective meeting between President Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump. Lu assessed this interpretation as inconsistent with Beijing's demonstrated strategic posture.
He noted that during Trump's first term, China absorbed four years of trade war pressure without materially altering its military posture around Taiwan. Beijing's behavior during the current period, he argued, reflects a government that does not regard the prospect of a summit as reason to make concessions on Taiwan-related military activities. Lu also pointed to the recent commissioning of two new Type 055 (055型) 10,000-ton destroyers into the Eastern Theater Navy, announced during the Two Sessions, as evidence that Beijing's military buildup is calibrated to counter Japanese and American naval deployments in the southwestern Ryukyu Islands chain — not to signal flexibility toward Washington.
"China's economic and military strategies will not be adjusted to court Trump simply because a summit is approaching," he said.
A Russian Submarine Patrol Goes Largely Unnoticed
Lu flagged a parallel development he considered underreported. Japan's Joint Staff on March 6 and March 10 disclosed successive segments of a Russian Pacific Fleet submarine task group's passage through waters Japan closely monitors.
On the evening of March 5, a Russian Steregushchy-class frigate (Gromky/335), a Kilo-class submarine, and a Dubna-class ocean-going tug were observed approximately 60 kilometers northeast of Tsushima Island, moving southwest. The group transited the Tsushima Strait into the East China Sea. By the afternoon of March 9, the group was operating approximately 50 kilometers north of Iriomote Island in Japan's southwestern island chain, subsequently transiting the waters between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the Pacific.
Lu observed that PLA surface vessels transiting southward from the East China Sea typically pass through the waters between Taiwan and Japan's Yonaguni Island, whereas this Russian group consistently chose the Yonaguni–Iriomote passage. Whether the divergent routing reflects deliberate strategic or tactical coordination remains, in his assessment, a question for further observation.
He calculated that the group was traveling at approximately 12 knots, a pace he characterized as notably slow. Combined with the appearance of two PLA Y-9 electronic intelligence aircraft over the East China Sea and the Ryukyu Islands chain on February 28, Lu assessed it as possible that the Russian submarine group conducted coordinated exercises with Eastern Theater naval forces between March 6 and March 8, potentially including anti-submarine drills with PLA air assets.
At the National People's Congress press conference on foreign affairs on March 8, Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) declared that the China-Russia strategic partnership remained "as steady as a mountain amid a turbulent world," noting that 2025 marks both the 30th anniversary of the strategic partnership and the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. Lu noted the coincidence of that statement with the Russian submarine group's simultaneous passage through Japan's southwestern waters.
He also referenced an earlier Russian naval transit: on February 14, two Steregushchy-class frigates (333 and 343) and a Dubna-class replenishment vessel were observed passing through the Tsushima Strait into the East China Sea and through the Yonaguni–Iriomote passage on February 16. Lu had estimated that group would have reached the northern Indian Ocean around February 26, potentially in time to participate in the "Security Bond-2026" joint naval exercise with China and Iran — an exercise whose status became uncertain after U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran on February 28. A separate media report cited a U.S. strike on an Iranian naval vessel in the Indian Ocean on March 4. Lu noted that the subsequent movements of that Russian surface group have not been publicly reported.
A Methodology for Sustained Observation
Lu offered a pointed critique of what he described as the analytical failures surrounding the period of reduced PLA air activity. "The mistake is looking for a single explanation on a single day," he said. "You watch daily — not just daily, but multiple times a day. You watch for a week, then a month, then a quarter, then a year. The points connect into lines; the lines form a picture. Then you go back and look at the points again."
His broader methodological point was that PLA activity patterns — aircraft sorties, vessel deployments, balloon launches, electronic intelligence flights — must be analyzed as an integrated system, cross-referenced against weather data, sea state, and the documented seasonal patterns of the Taiwan Strait. The Defense Ministry's addition of balloon tracking statistics in 2024, for instance, he interpreted as connected to Beijing's interest in gathering upper-atmosphere meteorological data over Taiwan's western airspace to assess conditions for aircraft operations — not, as some media reported, exclusively as a simulation of rocket force missile trajectories.
"When a simple answer exists," Lu said, "the failure to find it is a methodology problem, not an intelligence problem."
The author is a researcher at the Chinese Strategic Studies Association.
Social Media Links & Editor Tag - Penny
