In assessing the conflict, University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer contendentIn assessing the ongoing conflict, University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer contends that the fundamental question any strategist must confront is: what does victory actually look like? For both the United States and Israel, he argues, a clear victory remains unattainable. For Iran, however, survival alone constitutes success — a goal Mearsheimer believes Tehran is poised to achieve.
Mearsheimer discussed the situation in Iran during a recent interview on "Judging Freedom," a program hosted by prominent American legal scholar and former New Jersey Superior Court Judge Andrew Napolitano. In the interview, he traces the current war to a pattern of Israeli provocation.
In 2024, Israel struck Iran's embassy in Damascus and later carried out an assassination in Tehran, killing Palestinian leaders on Iranian soil. Both actions triggered missile exchanges between the two countries. Israel's clear aim, Mearsheimer argues, was to draw the Biden administration into direct strikes on Iran. Washington assisted in defending Israel but — wisely, in his view — stopped short of attacking Iranian territory.
The Trump administration has taken a far more aggressive posture. It struck Iranian soil directly during the 12-day war of June 2025 and has since committed to a full bombing campaign — a dramatic escalation from its predecessor's restrained approach.

A Long War With A Shrinking Arsenal
Mearsheimer is blunt about the legal standing of these operations: they lack justification under both domestic and international law. Trump, he says, governs as a unilateralist who treats legal constraints as optional inconveniences.
While Trump has suggested the war could wrap up within four to five weeks, Mearsheimer predicts a much longer and costlier conflict. He is especially concerned about the toll on American weapons stockpiles — reserves already strained by the war in Ukraine — and what further depletion means for any future confrontation with China in East Asia.

Beijing's Quiet Windfall
China's leaders must be privately celebrating, Mearsheimer observes. With the United States simultaneously bogged down in Ukraine and now drawn into the Middle East, American forces are consuming ammunition at a rate the country's defence industry is ill-equipped to replenish. The strategic overstretching Washington's rivals have long anticipated is, in his view, now well underway.
Why Regime Change Won't Work
Mearsheimer dismisses any expectation that toppling Iran's government would deliver a pro-American successor. Whatever faction takes power in Tehran, he argues, would face the same strategic incentives as the current regime and remain hostile to Washington's interests. The fantasy of a friendly Iran, in his assessment, has no grounding in political reality.
More troubling still, Mearsheimer contends that the war may accelerate Iran's nuclear ambitions rather than curb them. Supreme Leader Khamenei had, in his view, actually served as the principal obstacle to Iran developing nuclear weapons. With Khamenei gone and the country under sustained military assault, the pressures pushing Tehran toward the bomb have intensified sharply.
Even if the United States succeeded in destroying Iran's current missile and drone capabilities, Mearsheimer argues the regime would survive and rebuild. None of the underlying strategic problems would be resolved.

The Houthi Precedent
Mearsheimer points to the Houthi campaign as a cautionary example. After taking office in January 2025, Trump declared his intention to eliminate the Yemeni militant group entirely and launched military operations. By May, he had abandoned the effort — unable to achieve the stated goal. If America could not defeat the Houthis, Mearsheimer asks, on what basis can it expect to defeat Iran?
Trump's options are few and none are good. Deploying ground forces would deepen an already dire predicament. The president's close alignment with Israel makes disengagement politically difficult. By Mearsheimer's reckoning, Trump is genuinely trapped.
No Satisfactory Ending
Trump has wagered on achieving regime change through air power alone. Even if that bet paid off, Mearsheimer questions what tangible benefit would accrue to the United States. He cannot envision a conclusion to this conflict that leaves Trump — or America — in a stronger position than before it began.
Both Iran and Israel regard themselves as locked in an existential struggle, making de-escalation unlikely regardless of battlefield developments. The United States, in Mearsheimer's telling, entered this war without a winning strategy — and shows no sign of finding one.



















































