One of the most consequential takeaways from China’s annual Two Sessions this year was not a headline-grabbing diplomatic clash or a short-term growth target. It was the launch of the 15th Five-Year Plan, which puts technological self-reliance at the center of China’s national strategy. That matters far beyond Beijing. It signals that the U.S.-China tech war is entering a new phase, one that could shape the balance of power for years to come.
Five-year plans are not new in China. They are broad national blueprints, and many of their goals are aspirational. But this time, the technology agenda stands out for both its prominence and its urgency. Beijing has made clear that “high-quality development” will be inseparable from technological advancement, industrial upgrading, and stronger national capacity in critical sectors. In the plan’s own hierarchy of priorities, technological self-reliance ranks near the top. That alone is revealing.
The message is unmistakable even where the language is indirect. The United States is not named as the target, but the purpose is clear: China wants to reduce its vulnerability to external pressure, especially in semiconductors and other high-end technologies. It wants to cut dependence on foreign supply chains, strengthen control over strategic sectors, and push harder in areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum technology, biotechnology, aerospace, and next-generation information systems. Beijing is not merely trying to withstand Western restrictions. It is trying to outgrow them.
Beijing’s Long Game on Technology
Skeptics may be tempted to dismiss this as another exercise in state planning rhetoric. That would be a mistake. The better guide is “Made in China 2025,” the industrial strategy that first alarmed Washington and helped trigger a more aggressive U.S. response. Beijing later stopped promoting that program so openly, but the policy drive never really stopped. If anything, U.S. restrictions only reinforced China’s determination and pushed more resources into the sectors where it felt most exposed, especially chips.
By many measures, that earlier push delivered results. According to research and analysis cited in the original Chinese editorial, roughly 86 percent of the key technological and industrial targets set under “Made in China 2025” have been achieved. In sectors such as new energy vehicles, solar power, shipbuilding, and high-speed rail, China has met or exceeded expectations. In others, including robotics, biomedicine, and semiconductors, it has narrowed the gap with the West.
The broader evidence is difficult to ignore. China has become a dominant force in electric vehicles, batteries, drones, and photovoltaics. Its industrial ecosystem is now large enough, fast enough, and well-financed enough to turn state priorities into global market power. That is why the new plan deserves to be read not as political theater, but as a declaration of strategic intent backed by a growing record of execution.
Why Chips and AI Now Define the Contest
Yet one weakness still stands out above the rest: semiconductors. And because semiconductors are the foundation of advanced AI, the two issues cannot be separated. China may have advanced rapidly across multiple industries, but it still faces serious Western constraints in the chip sector. As long as it remains cut off from the most advanced AI chips, it will struggle to overtake the United States in the most important technology race of the next decade.
That is why chips and AI now sit at the heart of the contest. The first chapter of the U.S.-China tech war was defined by tariffs, sanctions, export controls, and the fallout from “Made in China 2025.” The next chapter will be more focused and more consequential. It will center on whether China can break through the barriers that still limit its access to top-tier semiconductor technology, and whether it can translate industrial scale into leadership in artificial intelligence.
What This Means for Taiwan
For Taiwan, this is not an abstract geopolitical contest. Taiwan’s economy is deeply tied to technology and semiconductor manufacturing, which means any acceleration in China’s drive for tech autonomy will have direct implications for the island’s industries and strategic position. The potential shocks are real, and the risks may well outweigh the opportunities. That is precisely why Taiwan’s government and business leaders cannot afford complacency.
The next U.S.-China tech battle has already begun. Its decisive front will not be consumer gadgets or headline diplomacy, but the harder terrain of computing power, semiconductor capacity, and AI capability. The side that gains the upper hand there will do more than dominate the next generation of technology. It may help decide the wider balance of power in Asia and beyond.
