China's top political advisory body maintained a notably restrained approach toward Taiwan in its annual work report, signaling Beijing's preference for economic stability over high-profile cross-strait rhetoric as the country enters its 15th Five-Year Plan period.
The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) held its fourth session on March 3 at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. The session was attended by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), Premier Li Qiang (李強), and other senior officials, and was presided over by Wang Huning (王滬寧), a member of the Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee and CPPCC chairman.
A 'Do More, Say Less' Approach
The approximately 10,000-word CPPCC work report maintained a decidedly low-key tone regarding Taiwan. When reviewing the past year's work, it only briefly mentioned practical activities—such as the 7th Cross-Strait Grassroots Governance Forum—as examples of strengthening united front efforts and fostering a shared sense of Chinese national identity.
Notably, the report omitted high-intensity political buzzwords typically associated with Beijing's cross-strait policies. Customary phrases such as the "1992 Consensus," "oppose Taiwan independence," and "national reunification" were absent, and there were no standalone sections dedicated to Taiwan or cross-strait relations.
Analysts suggest this reflects a pragmatic "do more, say less" strategy. Amid intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition and ongoing geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, Beijing is prioritizing domestic economic stability. By avoiding sensitive rhetoric that might prematurely elevate cross-strait issues to an international focus, leadership aims to prevent disruptions to the main agenda of the annual political sessions.
Instead, Taiwan-related work is increasingly embedded within China's broader national development framework. The strategy focuses on compressing the survival space for Taiwan independence through economic attraction and grassroots penetration—such as encouraging Taiwanese enterprises to integrate into the mainland's "new productive forces" and share in domestic market expansion.
A 'Low-Front, High-Back' Strategy for 2026
While the CPPCC report toned down the public rhetoric, the Central Committee's Taiwan Work Conference held Feb. 9-10 had already established the baseline framework for the year's policy. During that conference, Wang emphasized upholding the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, while heavily promoting the "cross-strait family" concept to facilitate personnel exchanges and support Taiwanese youth studying and working on the mainland.
However, the apparent softening of rhetoric in the first half of the year is expected to pivot sharply in the fall.
When outlining major tasks for 2026, the CPPCC work report explicitly included organizing commemorative activities for the 160th anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's birth. Late last year, the CPPCC Standing Committee passed a decision to hold "solemn" commemorative activities on Nov. 12, 2026.
Given Sun's symbolic significance in Beijing's united front strategy, this move reserves a high-profile space for Taiwan-related messaging in the latter half of the year. During the 150th anniversary in 2016, Xi personally presided over the assembly and delivered a lengthy speech reaffirming the goal of complete national reunification. Mainland scholars anticipate this year's activities will be comparable in scale, likely featuring senior leaders invoking Sun's discourse on "national unity" and "national rejuvenation."
Overall, Beijing's political sessions present a "low-front, high-back" pattern on Taiwan issues: restrained and pragmatic in the spring to prioritize economic stability, while preparing to heavily play the cultural and historical card in the winter. （Related： Ko Wen-je’s Prosecutorial Complaint Exposes Systemic Flaws in Taiwan’s Justice System ｜ Latest ）
