In 2012, then-Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping (習近平) introduced the concept of a "new type of great power relations" during a visit to the United States. While ostensibly aimed at avoiding conflict between a rising China and an established America, the rhetoric signaled Beijing's self-positioning as a global heavyweight.
More than a decade later, that status is largely recognized on the world stage. During the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in October 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump characterized his meeting with Xi as a "G2 summit." More recently, on the "Start of Spring" festival, Xi held phone calls with both Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the same day, demonstrating his capacity to maneuver fluidly among global powers.
Yet, despite China's recognized status, a critical question looms over its actual capabilities: Is the Chinese military a genuine threat, or merely a "paper tiger"?
True great powers are defined by global influence, cross-regional intervention capabilities, and technological dominance. China undoubtedly meets several of these metrics. It is the world's second-largest economy, its Belt and Road Initiative has woven a vast global political and economic network, and it dominates the rare earth supply chain. Even in advanced technology, industry leaders like Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang have noted that "China lags behind the U.S. by only nanoseconds" in artificial intelligence.
Across political, economic, and technological domains, China displays undeniable great power characteristics. The only remaining variable is the People's Liberation Army (PLA).
The 2027 Convergence
The second half of 2027 is shaping up to be a defining juncture for China and its leadership. On Aug. 1, 2027, the PLA will celebrate its centenary, an event expected to feature grand military parades and likely serve as a declaration that military preparations regarding Taiwan are complete. Two months later, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will convene its 21st National Party Congress.
Barring unforeseen circumstances, Xi's internal political authority, external influence, and military power will peak at unprecedented levels in CCP history. However, with that consolidated power comes immense historical responsibility.
Xi's signature political platforms—realizing the "Chinese Dream" and the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation"—position the unification of Taiwan as the final piece required to complete China's transformation into a fully sovereign, integrated great power. Having broken precedent to secure a third term—and potentially a fourth—Xi faces mounting pressure to fulfill these core campaign promises, justify his regime's legitimacy, and deliver tangible results to party factions and the Chinese public.
Testing the Untested Force
The PLA has not engaged in major combat in decades, and this lack of modern operational experience draws widespread international skepticism. The military's true capabilities directly impact China's great power status, the CCP's legitimacy, and Xi's ultimate historical legacy.
Furthermore, Xi has recognized that prolonged peace can breed internal rot. The recent, high-profile downfalls of senior military and political figures—including Zhang Youxia (張又俠), Ma Xingrui (馬興瑞), and top commanders within the PLA Rocket Force—have exposed deep-seated corruption and operational vulnerabilities within China's missile and nuclear apparatus.
These purges suggest a leadership acutely aware that the PLA must be actively tested to verify its readiness. While Xi continually demands "combat-ready" training, simulated exercises cannot definitively prove whether the military possesses the capability to execute a complex assault on Taiwan or block foreign intervention.
To transform the CCP's mandate to "come when called, fight when deployed, win when engaged" from a slogan into a reality, analysts suggest Beijing will turn to "training through combat."
Regional sovereignty disputes provide the most likely arena for this capability testing. China is expected to escalate gray-zone military pressure against the Philippines and Japan in ongoing territorial disputes. These localized confrontations would serve as real-world training grounds, allowing the PLA to build the operational capacity and institutional confidence necessary for any future large-scale use of force across the Taiwan Strait.
For Xi, 2027 is not just an anniversary; it marks the starting point of a timeline where he must prove to his critics, his country, and himself that China's military might matches its global ambitions.
*The author is an adjunct professor in the Department of Diplomacy and International Relations at Tamkang University and a former director of the Institute of Chinese Communist Military Affairs Studies at National Defense University. （Related： US Escalates Iran Military Campaign, Rubio Promises to "Unleash Chiang" ｜ Latest ）
