The US-Israel airstrike that killed Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28 did more than remove the Islamic Republic's most powerful figure. It also opened a far more uncertain question: what kind of Iran will emerge from his absence?
Tehran officials initially denied the killing, but Iranian state television eventually confirmed on March 1 that Khamenei died while working in his office, with his daughter and grandson also killed in the strike. As Donald Trump signals that air operations against Iran will continue until “Middle East peace” is achieved, the debate has shifted from whether Khamenei is dead to how his death might alter the structure, stability, and direction of the Iranian state. （Related： Iran declares 40 days of mourning after Khamenei’s killing, vows further strikes on US and Israel ｜ Latest ）
Preparing for Succession Inside Khamenei's Inner Circle
Given Khamenei's advanced age, it is hard to imagine that Iran had made no preparations for his sudden death. The most obvious case in point was the rise of former president Ebrahim Raisi, who — until his helicopter crash in May 2024 — was widely regarded as the presumed successor. Khamenei's son, Mojtaba Khamenei, has also long been mentioned as a possible candidate. However, his lack of administrative experience, combined with the Islamic Republic's ideological opposition to hereditary rule, makes him a far from ideal choice for many within the system.
Raisi's unexpected death forced Khamenei to look again for a successor. During the 12-day Israel–Iran conflict in 2025, reports emerged that the Supreme Leader had identified three clerics as potential candidates.Although those names were never officially confirmed, media speculation centered on senior figures with solid religious or administrative credentials:
•Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, head of Iran's seminary system and a member of both the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts;
•Hojjat-ol-Eslam Mohsen Qomi, a key adviser in Khamenei's office;
•Ayatollah Mohsen Araki, a long-serving member of the Assembly of Experts; and
•Ayatollah Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, head of the judiciary.
（Related： Iran declares 40 days of mourning after Khamenei’s killing, vows further strikes on US and Israel ｜ Latest ）
Limits of a Like-Minded Successor
Beyond their religious credentials, all of these men belong to Khamenei's inner circle. If the next Supreme Leader emerges from this group, Iran's political system could, in theory, preserve much of its existing balance of power. Evidence suggests contingency planning was likely already under way in the six months before the assassination: Khamenei's public appearances had gradually diminished, while his extensive patronage network operated with increasing autonomy.
Even so, there is no guarantee that Iran's current political trajectory will endure under a trusted confidant. The leading contenders are already in their sixties, and their limited executive experience — particularly in national security — could deepen institutional fatigue rather than bring renewal.
Could Collective Leadership Bring Reformists Back In?
This is one reason why Iran may experiment, at least temporarily, with committee-style collective leadership rather than concentrating power in a single figure. Such an arrangement would aim both to reduce the risk of another “decapitation” strike and to compensate for gaps in experience. It has a partial historical precedent: when Ayatollah Khomeini died, a collective leadership model was discussed but ultimately shelved. In practice, the early years of Khamenei's rule functioned as a kind of co-governance with then-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
Power-sharing of this sort could help smooth the transition by rallying broader elite and public support, giving new leadership time to consolidate. It could also create a pathway — however narrow — for long-sidelined reformist forces to edge back toward the center of power. （Related： Iran declares 40 days of mourning after Khamenei’s killing, vows further strikes on US and Israel ｜ Latest ）
This reformist camp is relatively more open to the West, more inclined to trade nuclear concessions for sanctions relief, and more willing to relax certain conservative social policies to broaden public support. Crucially, it still broadly accepts the framework of the Islamic Republic, seeking reform from within rather than the restoration of exiled crown prince Reza Pahlavi.
That said, the odds are stacked against a straightforward reformist comeback. Khamenei was killed in a US-Israeli operation, and since December 2025 Iranian authorities have intensified arrests of reformist politicians and activists. Even if collective leadership emerges, the real test will be how much power the core is willing to share — and with whom.
Scenario Two: An Iran Run by Its Guards
A second scenario is that the balance tips decisively in favor of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and associated security institutions. The IRGC already plays a central role in Iran's regional strategy, its missile and drone programs, and much of its “Axis of Resistance” network. In a moment of acute external pressure and leadership vacuum, the temptation for the military-security apparatus to tighten its grip would be strong — especially if civilians are seen as too weak or divided to manage the crisis. （Related： Iran declares 40 days of mourning after Khamenei’s killing, vows further strikes on US and Israel ｜ Latest ）
Under this path, Iran could drift toward a more overtly militarized system, in which clerical institutions remain in place but lose real decision-making power. Policy would likely become more hardline in the short term toward both external adversaries and internal dissent. At the same time, a military-dominated leadership might prove pragmatic on certain economic or diplomatic questions if tactical retrenchment seems necessary to preserve the state.
A deeper IRGC role would also sharpen factional rivalries inside the security apparatus, and risk alienating segments of the population already exhausted by economic hardship and political repression. Rather than stabilizing the regime, an unbalanced military takeover could simply postpone — and ultimately intensify — a future legitimacy crisis.
Scenario Three: The Risks of Outright Collapse
The third scenario is outright collapse of the Islamic Republic — the outcome the United States and Israel appear to be working toward. Yet regime collapse would also open the door to enormous uncertainty. History offers a sobering parallel: after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran did not quickly settle into a new equilibrium. Instead, it passed through years of internal violence and disorder — tribal uprisings, ethnic rebellions, localized power struggles among paramilitary groups, and organized terrorist attacks. （Related： Iran declares 40 days of mourning after Khamenei’s killing, vows further strikes on US and Israel ｜ Latest ）
If today's Iran were to slide into collapse, the first developments might not resemble the “democratization” many external actors like to evoke. A more immediate risk would be armed rebellion by some of Iran's ethnic minorities, especially Kurds and Baloch, who form powerful transnational communities across the region. Such conflicts could rapidly spill across borders, undermining the already fragile stability of neighboring states.
Why Gulf States Fear Iran's Turmoil
Whether through civil war or mass refugee flows, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies would almost certainly be among the first to suffer. For governments that in recent years have tried to maintain a low profile in regional conflicts and concentrate on economic diversification, this is a scenario they are deeply reluctant to confront.
Many regional actors might welcome a weaker Iran in principle — but not if it comes at the price of Gulf instability. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are currently pouring resources into artificial intelligence and advanced industries; the UAE has even reportedly considered inviting TSMC and Samsung to build fabrication plants. If turmoil in Iran disrupts the Gulf — whether through a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz or spillover clashes — the dream of a “Middle East Silicon Valley” will likely be postponed for years. （Related： Iran declares 40 days of mourning after Khamenei’s killing, vows further strikes on US and Israel ｜ Latest ）
No Single Script for ‘Regime Change'
“Regime change” in Iran is unlikely to follow a single, clean script. Hybrid trajectories are more probable. One plausible sequence: the leadership initially manages a nominally smooth transition, but the new Supreme Leader fails to control the situation. Power is then effectively seized by the Revolutionary Guards, triggering elite struggles that ignite Kurdish and other minority rebellions, US- and Israel-encouraged street protests, and eventually a cascading institutional breakdown reminiscent of post-1979 turbulence — only now in a far more interconnected and heavily armed region.
The dominoes of collapse might also stop falling earlier. Even after a fraught transition or a partial military takeover, Iran could enter a phase in which clerics, bureaucrats, reformists, and security elites strike a tenuous bargain to stabilize the system. Yet even in that more “managed” outcome, the underlying challenges would remain: a severely distorted economy, persistent inflation and currency erosion, acute water and energy shortages, entrenched corruption, and eroding public trust in state institutions.
A Crossroads for Iran's Strategic Choice
Ultimately, Iran will not be able to avoid a strategic choice. It must decide whether to persist with external intervention, uncompromising hostility toward the United States and Israel, sustained mobilization of the “Axis of Resistance,” and an unyielding nuclear trajectory — or whether to pull back in some areas in exchange for at least temporary strategic relief, including partial sanctions easing.
Whatever path emerges from the aftermath of Khamenei's killing, the Islamic Republic now stands at a crossroads that could redefine both the country and the region.
*The author is Chief International Commentary Writer for HK01. This article was originally published in HK01 and is republished with permission.
