Interview | Why China’s “Run-to-Japan” Wave Is Now Planning a Second Move

A growing number of Chinese migrants who “ran” to Japan in recent years are now preparing to move again, according to Japan-based journalist and authorMasutomo Yudai (舛友雄大). Some have already returned to China, while others are considering destinations such as Singapore or Australia in what he describes as a potential “second migration.”

“Run” (润) is a piece of Chinese internet slang that gained prominence during the COVID-19 era. It carries a sardonic undertone, referring to those fleeing lockdowns, tightening political control, economic uncertainty, and shrinking personal space in search of opportunities abroad. Japan has emerged as one of the primary destinations for this outward flow.

Yudai began closely following the phenomenon in 2018 after settling in Tokyo and noticing the rapid growth of Chinese communities in and around the capital.
In southern Saitama Prefecture, areas sometimes described as a new “Nishi-Kawaguchi Chinatown”（新西川口唐人街） have drawn particular attention. In the Shibazono Danchi (芝園團地) housing complex, Chinese residents now account for roughly half of the population, he said.

Cash purchases of property, Chinese-language real estate advertisements, and brokerage services designed specifically for Mandarin speakers are, in Yudai‘s view, signs of a structurally different migration wave. Rather than traditional labor migration, he argues, many arrivals are transferring assets and recalibrating their lifestyles by establishing a base outside mainland China.

Yudai distinguishes this group from earlier waves of “new overseas Chinese” (新華僑) who arrived in Japan in previous decades.

The recent arrivals are typically urban middle-class professionals from cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen: entrepreneurs, technology workers, investors, artists, and intellectuals with international exposure and relatively strong purchasing power. Yudai estimates their number at around 100,000, with more than half residing in Tokyo and many of the rest concentrated in Osaka.

Unlike earlier migrants who often made significant efforts to learn Japanese and integrate socially, many newer arrivals rely heavily on Chinese-language digital platforms such as WeChat. Some show limited interest in acquiring Japanese-language skills, instead building semi-autonomous Mandarin-speaking communities that function largely within Chinese digital ecosystems.

Japan's overall Chinese population has continued to grow. By mid-2025, the number of Chinese residents surpassed 900,000 for the first time and could exceed one million in 2026, according to government statistics cited by Yudai.

He also pointed to prominent cultural figures. The YouTube couple “Mr & Mrs Gao” (老高與小茉), who built an audience of millions while living in Japan, reportedly relocated to Singapore, citing Japan‘s tax burden.

“One migrant told me, ‘I don‘t plan to return to China. Singapore feels culturally familiar because a majority of the population is ethnic Chinese, but I‘m not sure I want to stay there permanently. I‘m also considering Australia,‘” Yudai said.​

For Yudai, the current moment carries historical echoes. He argues that Tokyo is once again becoming a gathering point for Chinese liberal intellectuals, recalling the late Qing and early Republican periods when reformist thinkers relocated to Japan.

He cited Jia Jia (賈葭), a former columnist and editor at Tencent's Dajia platform, as an example. Detained by Chinese authorities in 2016 while traveling from Beijing to Hong Kong, Jia later moved to Japan and now serves as a visiting researcher at the University of Tokyo. According to Yudai, Jia has indicated he does not intend to return to China.

At the turn of the twentieth century, figures such as Lu Xun, Liang Qichao, and Sun Yat-sen also spent formative years in Japan, engaging with Western political thought and organizing reform movements. Yudai sees parallels in the quiet consolidation of intellectual networks in Tokyo today.

Yudai identifies three primary motivations behind the run-to-Japan wave: economic anxiety, education concerns, and freedom of expression.

1. Economic Anxiety

China‘s economic slowdown and intensifying competition have shaken the confidence of many middle-class families, Yudai said. Some migrants sell properties in China and use the proceeds to purchase homes in Japan, effectively moving assets offshore while seeking a more predictable environment.

He described the COVID-19 lockdowns—particularly in Shanghai—as a turning point for many urban residents who had not previously imagined that their freedom of movement could be restricted so abruptly. In late 2022, hundreds of Chinese residents gathered near JR Shinjuku Station in Tokyo in support of protests in mainland China, signaling, in his view, a shift in diaspora sentiment.

2. Education Concerns

Many parents, Yudai said, are uneasy about what they perceive as an increasingly ideological education environment in China. Some worry that their children will face a rigid curriculum and limited academic autonomy, and are determined that the next generation study abroad.

Japan's demographic decline has helped keep some international school tuition comparatively lower than in major Chinese cities. In certain cases, he noted, tuition in Beijing can be roughly double that of comparable schools in Tokyo, making relocation financially feasible for families with sufficient means.

3. Freedom of Expression

A third group consists of intellectuals, writers, and artists drawn by what Yudai describes as Japan‘s more permissive environment for speech and association.

In Tokyo, Mandarin-language bookstores such as Feidi Books (飛地書店), Owspace Books (單向街書店), and Outsider Books (局外人書店) host talks, book launches, and weekend salons. According to Yudai, such gatherings would be difficult to organize openly in mainland China under current conditions.

Many participants in these circles operate primarily in Mandarin and remain embedded in Chinese-language networks, even while residing in Japan.

Even as Chinese communities expand, Yudai cautions that the broader political climate in many democracies has grown more sensitive to immigration.

He argues that public debates in Japan have increasingly focused on foreign investment and demographic change, with some political figures calling for stricter oversight of immigration and property ownership.

Japan has also adjusted aspects of its immigration policy. In recent years, authorities have raised capital and compliance requirements for certain business-related visas, making it more demanding for small-scale entrepreneurs to use such channels primarily for residency purposes.

According to Yudai, these regulatory shifts—combined with a more guarded political tone—have led some “run-to-Japan” migrants to reassess their long-term prospects. He recalled interviewing one entrepreneur who ultimately closed his Tokyo business and returned to China after concluding that the environment had become less predictable.

Yudai said that developments in Japan, Hong Kong, and mainland China are being closely observed across the region.

As Beijing consolidates political control and reshapes Hong Kong's governance structure, Taiwan has tightened scrutiny of Chinese capital and influence. Yudai noted that policymakers in Japan have watched these debates as they consider how to balance economic openness with national security concerns.

For some Chinese migrants, neither returning to China nor committing permanently to Japan feels certain. Those unwilling to go back to the mainland yet uneasy about Japan's trajectory have begun exploring Southeast Asia. Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand are frequently mentioned, Yudai said, as possible next destinations.

“As long as the current political system in China remains unchanged, the ‘run‘ phenomenon will continue,” Yudai said. “The only question is where the next stop will be.”