Retired Japanese General Urges Counter-Strike Build-Up as Missile Gap Widens

A retired three-star Japanese general has warned that China’s expanding missile arsenal is widening a strategic imbalance in the Indo-Pacific, placing Japan and Taiwan under growing pressure to adapt their defense postures.

Speaking in an English-language video lecture on December 9 at Taiwan’s Tamkang University, Kiyoshi Ogawa argued that the security of Japan and Taiwan is now closely linked in any potential cross-strait crisis. What were once viewed as geographically separate contingencies, he said, increasingly form part of a shared strategic frontline shaped by missile dominance and compressed decision timelines.

Ogawa retired in 2017 after a four-decade career in Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF). He previously served as Commander of the GSDF Western Army and held senior positions including Commandant of the GSDF Staff College and Director of Equipment at the Ground Staff Office. A graduate of Japan’s National Defense Academy who also studied at U.S. military institutions, he now works as a senior researcher at the Security Strategy Research Institute (SSRI), focusing on Japan’s defense policy and regional security cooperation.China.

Beijing’s Phased Operational Model

During the lecture, Ogawa outlined what he described as Beijing’s likely phased operational model in a Taiwan contingency. The sequence, he said, could begin with large-scale “exercises” masking the forward movement of naval and air forces while cognitive operations generate internal disruption and naval assets seek to obstruct external reinforcement.

This would likely be followed by concentrated barrages of ballistic and cruise missiles, combined with cyberattacks aimed at degrading command systems, air defenses, and integrated combat capabilities. Amphibious operations could then proceed under air and sea superiority, seeking to establish a fait accompli before U.S. or Japanese intervention fully materializes.

He cited recent military drills as examples of elements of this pattern, including the 2022 maritime and airspace blockade exercises following then–U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and the 2024 “Joint Sword” drills launched after President Lai Ching-te’s（賴清德） inauguration.

Taiwan, Ogawa noted, has begun adjusting its defense concept in response. The 2023 National Defense Report’s emphasis on “resilient defense,” “multi-layered deterrence,” and “defense in depth” signals a shift away from strategies centered on repelling landings at the shoreline.

Instead, he said, the focus has moved toward ensuring survivability through the most vulnerable initial window—approximately the first 72 hours—by strengthening anti-ship missile deployments, enhancing surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, reforming reserve forces, and mobilizing broader societal support.

“The objective is not necessarily to repel the first wave,” Ogawa said, “but to prevent Beijing from declaring victory quickly.” Extending the timeline, he argued, would make sustained U.S. and Japanese political and military involvement increasingly likely.

Japan faces what he described as a parallel vulnerability. While comparing overall force structures, Ogawa suggested that ground, naval, and air capabilities between the U.S.-Japan-Taiwan side and China are relatively close. The decisive imbalance, he said, lies in medium-range missile capacity.

According to his presentation, allied anti-ship missile inventories total roughly 1,000—most of them fielded by Taiwan—while China possesses between 1,000 and 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles capable of covering the entire First Island Chain. In his comparative scoring model, the allied side registered 3.5 points against China’s 4.0, with the 0.5-point gap representing what he characterized as Japan’s counter-strike shortfall.

That assessment, he said, helps explain why Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program designated counter-strike capability as a central policy priority and accelerated related procurement schedules.

Ogawa outlined expected enhancements, including the acquisition of approximately 500 U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles, expanded production of upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missiles with extended range, accelerated development of hypersonic systems integrated with U.S. air and missile defense networks, and potential U.S. deployment of Typhon and NMESIS mid-range systems to Japan’s southwestern islands and western Honshu during the 2025 “Resolute Dragon” exercise.

He emphasized that counter-strike capability should not be interpreted as a doctrine of preemptive attack. “Counter-strike means the ability to impose costs after absorbing the first blow,” he said, “preventing early political coercion.” In his view, this logic parallels Taiwan’s time-denial approach and reflects what he described as the increasing strategic interdependence of Japan and Taiwan.

Ogawa’s lecture comes amid continuing debate in Japan over the implications of a potential Taiwan contingency. For international observers, his assessment illustrates how missile asymmetry is reshaping deterrence calculations in the Indo-Pacific and tightening the strategic linkage between Tokyo and Taipei.