U.S. concern over Taiwan's stalled defense spending has shifted from private diplomacy to unusually public pressure, as Washington signals growing impatience with political deadlock in Taipei.
American Institute in Taiwan DirectorRaymond Greene recently voiced concern that Taiwan's defense budget has repeatedly been delayed or blocked in the Legislative Yuan, warning that the situation is increasingly difficult for the international community to understand—particularly at a time of heightened regional security risks.
That frustration has since spilled into the open. In Washington, anxiety over Taiwan's defense budget impasse has escalated across party lines, with senior U.S. lawmakers publicly criticizing Taiwan's opposition parties for moves to cut or obstruct key defense expenditures.
Roger Wicker, chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, said he was “extremely disappointed” by what he described as significant reductions and obstruction of Taiwan's defense plans. The rare decision to name Taiwan's domestic political actors underscored how seriously the issue is now being viewed on Capitol Hill.
Long-time Taiwan supporterDan Sullivan went further, arguing that blocking defense spending amounts to “kowtowing” to Beijing and “playing with fire,” warning that such actions would leave Taiwan more vulnerable in the face of growing military pressure from China. Democratic SenatorRuben Gallego also cited reporting that continued obstruction of defense budgets would raise Taiwan's security risks, urging lawmakers in Taipei to reconsider.
As Taiwan's internal political battles over defense spending and arms procurement intensify, a parallel development is unfolding to the north—one that carries clear strategic implications.
Japan–US ‘Iron Fist 26' Expands in Scale and Scope
From February 11 to March 9, 2026, Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) and the U.S. Marine Corps will conduct the annual bilateral exercise **Iron Fist 26** across a wide swath of Japan's southwest, spanning parts of Kyushu, Yamaguchi Prefecture, and Okinawa.
Originally launched in the mid-2000s and long held in California, Iron Fist was relocated to Japan in 2023 in response to evolving regional defense requirements. The 2026 iteration will be the largest in the exercise's history, both in troop numbers and in the breadth of operational areas involved.
According to defense sources, Iron Fist 26 carries three key objectives. First, it places greater emphasis on amphibious operations conducted in real-world locations beyond established training ranges—what Japan's defense planners refer to as “field sites,” where terrain, logistics, and local conditions more closely resemble actual contingencies. Second, it marks the first participation of the JGSDF's newly established 3rd Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, based in Nagasaki Prefecture, in full-scale U.S.–Japan joint training. Third, the exercise is designed to reinforce strategic coordination not only between Japan and the United States, but also with allied and partner nations operating across the Indo-Pacific.
The Japanese side of the exercise will be commanded by Lieutenant General Hiroki Kobayashi, head of the JGSDF's Ground Component Command, overseeing forces including the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, the 1st Helicopter Brigade, the 1st Airborne Brigade, and Maritime Self-Defense Force mine warfare units. Kobayashi previously served as commander of the JGSDF's 8th Division in Kumamoto and is regarded within Japan's defense establishment as a commander deeply familiar with Kyushu's terrain and operating environment.
The U.S. contingent will be led by Lieutenant General **Roger B. Turner**, commander of the III Marine Expeditionary Force, with participation from the Okinawa-based 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit and elements tied to the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet. The focus, according to officials, is on refining amphibious operations and enhancing interoperability across air, land, and sea domains.
Amphibious Hardware and Live-Field Training
Both sides are expected to deploy elite units and advanced platforms. Japanese forces will contribute reconnaissance craft, AAV amphibious vehicles, V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, CH-47 transport helicopters, and AH-64 attack helicopters. U.S. forces will field ACV amphibious combat vehicles, MV-22 Ospreys, CH-53 heavy-lift helicopters, AH-1 attack helicopters, and F-35 fighter jets.
Training will be conducted in two phases. The initial phase focuses on unit-level tactics, logistics, and deployment fundamentals. The second phase integrates these capabilities into high-intensity joint operations, testing the alliance's ability to coordinate amphibious landings, air mobility, and ground combat under realistic conditions.
The exercise footprint will stretch across multiple prefectures. Aviation bases in Yamaguchi, Saga, Kumamoto, and Nagasaki are slated to support aircraft maintenance, refueling, and rapid redeployment, while additional training areas in southern Japan will host repeated air mobility and sustainment drills designed to keep supply corridors open.
Island Recapture at the Core
The most sensitive phase of Iron Fist 26 is expected to center on island-focused operations. From March 1 to 4, amphibious and ground forces are scheduled to conduct live-field training on Tanegashima, with Amami Oshima designated as an alternative site. The drills will integrate maritime and air maneuver elements, testing how Japanese amphibious units and U.S. Marines coordinate landings and combat operations on complex island terrain.
In Okinawa, training intensity will be highest. Airborne landing exercises will be conducted throughout much of the drill period, supported by aircraft maintenance at major bases. Integrated fire coordination training will include simulated air-to-ground strikes by U.S. fighter aircraft and live-fire exercises by attack helicopters, alongside amphibious landings and reconnaissance operations on designated beaches.
Command-and-control integration will form another critical component. Joint exercises at multiple installations will focus on communications, intelligence sharing, and command coordination, aimed at ensuring a seamless U.S.–Japan command chain under high-pressure conditions.
Strategic Signals Beyond the Exercise
For Taiwan, the timing is difficult to ignore.
As Washington grows more vocal in pressing Taipei to resolve defense budget gridlock, Japan and the United States are simultaneously expanding amphibious training across the very region most closely linked to any future cross-strait contingency. The contrast between political paralysis in Taipei and accelerating military preparedness among key partners sends a pointed signal.
The message emerging from Washington and Tokyo is less about any single budget vote or exercise—and more about credibility. Allies are training for worst-case scenarios. They now expect Taiwan's political system to demonstrate that it is prepared to do the same.
