China's youth labor market is defined by a persistent paradox: higher education has expanded to historic levels, yet youth unemployment remains structurally high. The growing popularity of internet labels such as “lying flat” and, more recently, “rat people,” should not be understood as passing online trends or individual attitudinal shifts. They reflect a widening mismatch between educational expansion, labor market demand, and social expectations—one that has left many educated young people with increasingly limited viable pathways.
According to China's National Bureau of Statistics, the national surveyedunemployment rate stood at 5.1% in December 2025. For those aged 16–24, excluding students, the rate reached 16.5%. Following a statistical revision in early 2024, youth unemployment rose to a revised peak of 18.9% in August before gradually declining from September onward, reflecting typical post-graduation seasonal patterns. Even so, the overall level remains higher than in previous years, indicating a problem that extends beyond short-term economic fluctuations.
Mass Higher Education and the Limits of Job Absorption
At the core of this challenge lies the rapid expansion of higher education. Over the past two decades, China has transitioned into a mass higher-education system. University enrollment rates rose from 17% in 2003 to 60.2% in 2023. During the same period, the number of university graduates increased sharply, from 7.53 million in 2018 to 11.58 million in 2023—an average annual increase of roughly four million. The labor market's capacity to absorb this influx, however, has not expanded at a comparable pace.
Why Unemployment Is Concentrated Among the Highly Educated
Youth unemployment is therefore concentrated disproportionately among the highly educated. Official labor statistics show that in 2022, approximately 70% of unemployed individuals aged 20–24 were university or vocational college graduates, while those with only junior high or high school education accounted for about 15%. That year, new university graduates numbered 8.57 million, more than twice the combined total of high school and junior high school graduates, which stood at roughly 4.01 million. This imbalance reflects a structural shift in labor supply rather than a temporary disruption.
Career Preferences and Structural Mismatches in Labor Demand
The problem is further compounded by a persistent misalignment between graduates' career preferences and employers' actual needs. Many young people aspire to enter high-paying sectors such as information technology and finance, while labor demand is concentrated in logistics, wholesale and retail, and frontline service positions. Manufacturing, meanwhile, continues to face chronic shortages of skilled technical workers with practical, hands-on capabilities.
The Long Shadow of the One-Child Policy
China's former one-child policy, officially ended in 2016, reinforced this pattern. For decades, families concentrated educational resources on a single child, often with the explicit aim of steering them away from blue-collar or manual work. This strengthened a preference for white-collar employment and further intensified structural mismatches within the labor market.
Faced with constrained prospects, an increasing number of young people are choosing non-traditional trajectories. Some combine job searching with temporary or short-term work, while others delay entry into the labor market through postgraduate study. At the same time, more young people are distancing themselves from conventional life milestones such as stable employment, homeownership, and family formation.
From “Lying Flat” to “Rat People”
This group is commonly described as the “lying flat generation.” They reject the “996” work regime—working from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a week—and adopt a minimalist approach to work and consumption, exerting only what they consider the minimum necessary effort while avoiding major financial commitments. The more recent label “rat people,” marked by self-mockery, depicts a low-energy, inward-looking lifestyle centered on avoiding high-pressure social and economic competition.
Survey data point to clear generational differences underlying these shifts. In the World Values Survey, respondents born after 1990 show significantly lower agreement with the idea that work is a duty to society than those born in earlier decades. Data from the China Family Panel Studies similarly indicate that belief in the notion that “hard work pays off” is weakest among cohorts born in the 1980s and 1990s.
These trends are unfolding against the backdrop of sustained population decline and rapid aging, which will further constrain future labor supply. In this context, the growing disengagement of educated youth is not merely a cultural or generational phenomenon. It reflects a structural dilemma rooted in the interaction between education policy, labor market demand, and social expectations—one with long-term implications for economic resilience and social cohesion.
Chai Siyuan is a researcher at the School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Japan.
