As tensions across the Taiwan Strait continue to simmer, a quieter but consequential shift is undermining Taipei's ability to read and manage Beijing: the steady erosion of Taiwan's academic and think-tank expertise on mainland China. Nearly a decade after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) returned to power in 2016, scholars warn that shrinking research capacity—driven by restricted exchanges, limited funding and a wave of retirements among senior experts—is creating dangerous knowledge gaps that could heighten the risk of miscalculation across one of the Indo-Pacific's most sensitive flashpoints.
Taiwan occupies a frontline position in the democratic world's engagement with China. Yet institutional support for China-focused research has steadily declined, even as cross-strait tensions intensify. Veteran cross-strait scholar Chao Chun-shan（趙春山）, an emeritus professor at Tamkang University, points to a stark contrast with earlier decades. During the Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo eras, universities placed strong institutional emphasis on China studies, with dedicated administrative posts and sustained funding that helped cultivate generations of specialists. “Now, that system has largely disappeared,” Chao told Storm Media. Several once-prominent programs, including Tamkang University's Institute of Chinese Mainland Studies, have been merged into other departments.
With resources increasingly scarce, researchers often rely on open-source materials and online information. Meanwhile, Beijing continues to devote far more personnel to studying Taiwan. “Taiwan has far fewer people studying the mainland than the mainland has studying Taiwan,” Chao warned, adding that this imbalance increases the likelihood of misjudgment.
A Generational Cliff on Both Sides
The decline is accelerating as scholars who once sustained cross-strait academic networks retire. Many of them were active during the Kuomintang (KMT) administration of former president Ma Ying-jeou（馬英九）, a period often described as the “golden eight years” of cross-strait engagement. In Taiwan, recent retirees include long-time China specialists from National Chengchi University, Tamkang University, Ming Chuan University and Chinese Culture University. On the mainland, senior Taiwan-focused researchers at institutions such as Renmin University of China, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and major Shanghai-based think tanks have also stepped back from frontline roles.
Unlike in Taiwan, where retired scholars may continue to comment publicly, mainland academics often withdraw entirely from the field after leaving active posts to make room for younger colleagues. This further thins the ranks of experienced Taiwan hands. Younger researchers on both sides face limited opportunities to gain direct experience, particularly after years of disrupted exchanges during and after the COVID-19 pandemic.
Informal Channels Once Helped Defuse Crises
Veteran scholars argue that academic and think-tank networks once played a quiet but vital role in crisis management. Chao himself helped defuse a 2015 dispute over China's M503 civil aviation route, which initially ran close to the Taiwan Strait median line and sharply reduced Taiwan's air defense warning time. Acting as an informal intermediary, he traveled to Beijing to convey Taiwan's concerns to mainland officials. Within a week, the route was adjusted westward by six nautical miles, easing immediate tensions. “Think-tank scholars don't make decisions,” Chao said, “but we can transmit accurate information so senior officials don't act on misunderstandings.”
Such backchannel functions, he noted, have largely disappeared amid tightened cross-strait exchange controls since 2016. Subsequent adjustments to the M503 route were made unilaterally by Beijing, without comparable informal communication.
Exchange Restrictions and Funding Shifts
According to Wei Ai（魏艾）, an adjunct associate professor at National Chengchi University, cross-strait academic exchanges continued cautiously in the early years of DPP rule but have since grown far more constrained. On the mainland, scholars often face mandatory retirement around age 60 and typically withdraw from the field afterward, accelerating turnover among Taiwan specialists.
In Taiwan, younger researchers encounter different obstacles. Travel approvals for academic exchanges with China, Hong Kong or Macau can be delayed until just before departure, if granted at all. Both public and private universities worry that facilitating such trips could jeopardize government subsidies. As a result, Taiwanese academics are no longer stationed on the mainland, even when funding is offered.
Student exchanges have also collapsed. Degree-seeking mainland students have effectively disappeared from Taiwan, leaving only a small number of short-term exchange participants. Many Taiwanese undergraduates who entered university during the pandemic have never visited China at all, deepening mutual unfamiliarity among the next generation.
Funding priorities have compounded the problem. Since 2016, government-backed research grants have heavily favored the New Southbound Policy, encouraging younger scholars to pivot toward Southeast and South Asia, where projects are more likely to be funded. At institutions such as National Chengchi University's Institute of East Asian Studies and the Center for International Relations, the number of mainland-focused researchers continues to shrink, leading to what Wei describes as a “serious generational break.”
Higher Stakes, Thinner Insight
As academic journals and policy reports on China grow scarcer, scholars warn that both sides increasingly fall back on media narratives or rigid assumptions. “When exchanges are cut off, the risk of miscalculation rises,” Wei said. At the same time, Taiwan's increasingly firm stance may leave Beijing with fewer nuanced signals to interpret. That dynamic, experts caution, could reduce subtlety on both sides at precisely the moment when careful analysis is most needed.
Chao argues that opposition-led initiatives, such as the Kuomintang's recent revival of a cross-strait think-tank forum after a nine-year hiatus, could still play a limited communication role. “Even if final decisions rest with the ruling party,” he said, “there is nothing inherently wrong with opposition parties maintaining dialogue.”
For Taiwan, the issue is no longer purely academic. As U.S.–China rivalry deepens and cross-strait tensions persist, maintaining robust expertise on mainland China has become a strategic necessity. Without renewed investment in research capacity and carefully managed academic exchanges, scholars warn that the erosion of knowledge could leave policymakers navigating an increasingly complex relationship with fewer reliable tools—raising the risk that miscalculation, rather than strategy, shapes future cross-strait interactions.
