their military influencetheir military influenceOn the afternoon of January 24, China's Defense Ministry suddenly announced that Central Military Commission members Zhang Youxia(張又俠) and Liu Zhenli (劉振立) were under official investigation for "serious disciplinary and legal violations."
The two men's punishment likely stems from crossing red lines with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, rather than corruption alone. The extensive purge of senior military leadership will negatively impact the PLA's decision-making quality and ability to execute large-scale unplanned operations over the next three to four years.
Should a cross-strait crisis erupt during this period, Beijing's ability to manage it effectively will be severely compromised.
Xi's Long-Planned Campaign
The most obvious evidence came in December 2025, when three of Zhang's key proteges who had risen to prominence in the previous year - former Army Deputy Commander Zhao Yu (趙宇), former Armed Police Acting Commander Cao Junzhang (曹均章), and former Navy Acting Political Commissar Leng Shaojie (冷少杰)—were all replaced by others, in a move that ensured Xi's control over the capital region and neutralized Zhang's influence within the Army.
Xi's purge of Zhang influence in the military mirrors his earlier removal of former Chinese Admiral Miao Hua (苗华).
The logic of authoritarian rule dictates that leaders in such a system deliberately foster competing factions within power structures like the military and party to consolidate personal authority. This competition makes the leader the arbitrator and resource allocator, forcing individual factions to curry favor to prevail on specific issues. The more intense the factional competition, the more secure the leader's authority.
In recent years, China'sarmed forces appeared to have one large and one smaller faction: the Southeast clique centered on Miao Hua, and Zhang Youxia's network. These groups constantly competed over senior appointments, alongside Air Force officers who, influenced by former CMC Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang (許其亮), remained relatively independent and avoided factional alignment.
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Under Xi's management, while Miao and the Southeast clique held far more power than Zhang, members of Zhang's faction still received high-level appointments, including Southern Theater Commander Wu Yanan (吳亞男) and Joint Staff Chief Liu Zhenli, both of whom have been purged alongside Zhang.
However, any faction becomes a severe threat requiring immediate elimination when one of two situations arises: first, when they consider any other person as a center of loyalty, even Xi's designated successors; second, when factions across different power systems begin collaborating, such as military and party factions joining forces.
Because Miao Hua and the Southeast clique's influence was deeply entrenched across all institutions except the Air Force, they were originally Xi's prime target. However, given their extensive connections, they could only be handled gradually in batches. While Miao was suspended in November 2024, Beijing only announced his crimes in October 2025, nearly a year later. When initially announced in November 2024, Chinese authorities deliberately used softer language like "suspected serious disciplinary violations" and "suspension for investigation" to avoid alarming faction members.
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Once Miao's network was eliminated, dealing with Zhang Youxia, whose influence was far less extensive, required fewer precautions. Therefore, Zhang and associated personnel were immediately charged after being detained, with a front page ediorial in People's Liberation Army Daily run a day after their arrest cataloguing their crimes, using language rarely seen since the Cultural Revolution, including "seriously trampling and destroying the CMC Chairman Responsibility System" and "seriously fostering political and corruption problems that affect the Party's absolute leadership over the military and endanger the Party's ruling foundation."
These recent purges have devastated not only the military but also the government, suggesting Xi believes the Miao and Zhang factions crossed red lines by collaborating with certain party-government figures, constituting betrayal.
How the PLA Will Fill Senior Leadership Gaps
With only four active generals remaining and few senior lieutenant generals left, filling these numerous high-level positions will likely follow several principles in the short term.
First, priority will go to senior officers whose promotions stalled over the past seven to eight years, as this typically indicates they didn't align with Miao or Zhang. For example, newly promoted Air Force General Han Shengyan (韩胜延) was promoted to lieutenant general in August 2017 and was scheduled for early retirement by the end of 2025. Similarly, promoted Air Force General Yang Zhibin (杨志斌), after becoming lieutenant general in March 2021, briefly left frontline units to command a provincial military district.
Third, since the purge of Miao and Zhang stemmed from disloyalty to Xi, future senior appointments will likely prioritize loyalty over competence.
Impact of the Purge on Army Capabilities
Despite massive leadership changes across all services and commands, the purge's impact on the Chinese armed forces' routine operations, combat readiness, and annual training will be limited.
Many procedures are well-established with precedents, and military reforms have trained a sufficient number of professional staff to maintain core operations, as demonstrated by the PLA Eastern Theater Command's recent large-scale "Justice Mission 2025" military exercises around Taiwan.
This severe leadership gap will inevitably degrade the Chinese armed forces' decision-making andquality of leadership over the next three to four years, affecting their ability to handle unplanned, unexpected major events—such as large disasters, overseas long-term large-scale force projection, or even combat operations. Post-reform PLA operations require multi-departmental cooperation; if these departments' leaders generally lack expertise and experience, cooperation will suffer accordingly.
Additionally, these successors may second-guess leadership intentions rather than express genuine views, leading to senior-level misjudgments. When facing a major crisis, they may err on the side of being "leftist rather than rightist," attempting to appear more aggressive to match nationalist sentiment, making de-escalation more difficult.
Implications for Taiwan
First, Zhang's downfall won't significantly increase the probability of a Chinese attack on Taiwan by 2027. Not only does "peaceful unification" remain Beijing's stated priority with no established timetable for military action, but related decisions come from the CCP Central Leading Group on Taiwan Affairs, led by Xi, Deputy Leader Wang Huning (王滬寧), and Secretary-General Wang Yi (王毅). Zhang was merely one of many group members, so his removal won't eliminate forces opposing a 2027 military assault on Taiwan.
Moreover, among the many senior positions needing filling, Xi prioritized selecting Yang Zhibin, a senior Air Force lieutenant generalwith over four and a half years of experience serving in the Nanjing Military Region Air Force, to permanently fill the Eastern Theater Command position and promote him to general. This demonstrates Xi's emphasis on the Eastern Theater and his priority on restoring normal operations there.
