Does the Latest Chinese General's Downfall Signal an Impeding Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?

Beijing's recent announcement of investigations into Zhang Youxia (張又俠) and Liu Zhenli (劉振立) has sparked international debate over whether this military purge increases or decreases the likelihood of an armed invasion of Taiwan.

Analysts are divided on the implications. Some suggest the purge consolidates Chinese President Xi Jinping's (習近平) control over military decision-making, potentially removing constraints on aggressive action against Taiwan. However, others argue the military upheaval could disrupt command structures for years, temporarily reducing the probability of cross-strait conflict.

Takayuki Igarashi (五十嵐隆幸), a researcher in the China Division of Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, told Storm Media that the purge logic may prioritize regime stability over planning for an invasion against Taiwan.

"This reflects preventing coups and internal challenges being placed as the highest priority," Igarashi noted, referencing Mao Zedong's principle that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

According to Igarashi's analysis, China's army has historically maintained unwritten rules about acceptable levels of side income across different ranks.

He suggests Zhang may have crossed these implicit boundaries due to overconfidence stemming from his close relationship with Xi.

Rather than viewing this as merely an anti-corruption campaign, Igarashi characterizes the purge as a "political judgment" reflecting Xi's priorities on regime stability, given that Zhang's absence was the only military representative on the Politburo with actual combat experiencefrom the Sino-Vietnamese War capable of providing realistic assessments about military costs and feasibility.​

This new round of restructuring leaves the Central Military Commission almost entirely under Xi's personal control, significantly narrowing channels for the views of military professionals to reach policy-makers. 

Regarding whether eliminating experienced veterans like Zhang weakens the Chinese army's capabilities, Igarashi suggests this isn't necessarily the case, as the Sino-Vietnamese War itself was not a successful operation.

"Xi may prefer new generation officers familiar with high-tech warfare. However, military personnel without combat experience often underestimate the cost of war," he warned.

Igarashi's analysis suggests Xi is prioritizing loyalty and obedience among his top commanders. ​However, this concentration of power creates a dynamic where cautious opinions or dissenting voices may shrink among military commanders. ​

Regarding implications for Taiwan's security, Igarashi believes that China's operational capabilities may declinein the short term following such purges. In the medium to long term, weakened checks and balances in decision-making processes could increase the risk of miscalculation.

"This is what Taiwan and neighboring countries need to be vigilant about," he emphasized.

Reports suggest Zhang believed large-scalemilitary operations against Taiwan would require significant preparation time, given the current capabilities of China's military. 

The shortage of top commanders followingZhang's removal likely reduces the chance of short-term military action against Taiwan or neighboring countries, Igarashi notes. ​

However, the psychological threshold for using military force may also be lower, he warns.

"When political slogans replace professional risk assessment, crisis management becomes unstable. My greatest concern isn't military strength, but when military decision-making increasingly concentrates in one person lacking realistic correction mechanisms, miscalculations become harder to avoid."

Regarding foreign media reports that Zhang might have disclosed China's nuclear weapon information to the United States, leading to his arrest, Igarashi considers this scenario unlikely given Zhang's age and circumstances, suggesting peaceful retirement in China would be a more rational choice.

Igarashi notes that with Zhang and Liu's removal, the Central Military Commission now operates under an extremely streamlined structure consisting only of Xi and one vice chairman.

Additionally, no military personnel remain in the Communist Party Politburo, marking a fundamental transformation in the institutional framework supporting relations between the government and the military since 1949.

Igarashi speculates to Storm Media that Xi likely seeks to promote a new generation of officers who received rigorous training during his tenure.

"If promotions proceed smoothly, this generation would now mostly be in their forties and promoted to senior colonel ranks." Consequently, "if the older generation of officers is eliminated and a generational transition is completed, PLA operational capabilities could exceed current levels within five to ten years."

Under China's socialist market economy system, individuals engaged in commercial activities typically earn higher compensation compared to the relatively compressed salary levels of party, government, and military officials. However, following corruption cases involving commanders of China's rocket force, those investigated have consecutively been high-ranking generals personally promoted by Xi.

"This reflects Xi's anger reaching a critical point," Igarashi observes. （Related： Taiwan's AI Semiconductor Industry Breaks $200 Billion in Annual Output ｜ Latest ）