A Hollowed-Out PLA Is Not Safer for Taiwan

A political earthquake has struck the Chinese Communist Party's military leadership. Xi Jinping has moved against Zhang Youxia (張又俠), a fellow “red second generation” princeling and long-trusted deputy, effectively hollowing out the top tier of the Central Military Commission. Some observers argue that such turmoil within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) reduces the risk of conflict across the Taiwan Strait. This is a dangerous misconception.

The greater danger lies not in military weakness, but in miscalculation. Under an increasingly centralized system where political loyalty outweighs professional judgment—and where no effective crisis communication channels exist across the strait—the risk environment facing Taiwan has grown more volatile, not safer.

Since the 20th Party Congress, Xi has carried out sweeping purges under the banner of anti-corruption, beginning with the Rocket Force. Li Shangfu (李尚福), a red second generation figure who served as State Councilor and defense minister, fell amid procurement scandals tied to the former General Armament Department. This was followed by the removal of Central Military Commission Vice Chairman He Weidong (何衛東) and Political Work Department Director Miao Hua (苗華).

More than 110 officers have been purged to date, including four military commission vice chairmen and successive defense ministers. In the past year alone, senior casualties have included multiple commission members, the Eastern Theater Command commander, and successive Rocket Force leaders. The seven-member Central Military Commission has effectively been reduced to Xi himself and the official responsible for discipline, leaving major military and political command posts vacant.

Zhang Youxia's case is particularly revealing. He and Xi share similar revolutionary pedigrees and regional roots; their fathers were close wartime comrades. Zhang, a veteran with rare combat experience, had already surpassed the customary retirement age. Xi broke informal age limits to retain him, relying on his expertise and networks.

Yet the PLA's official newspaper recently accused senior figures of forming factions and undermining the chairman responsibility system—language widely interpreted as directed at Zhang. The implication is clear: his influence had grown beyond what Xi was willing to tolerate.

Speculation by some foreign media that Zhang was plotting a coup is unconvincing. Xi's earlier marginalization of rival party factions involved political balancing within the civilian leadership. The removal of Zhang, by contrast, eliminated the military's last stabilizing pillar. The logic at work is not factional rivalry, but preemptive control.

Chinese political history offers a familiar lesson: highly centralized leaders fear not open rivals, but trusted subordinates who command armed loyalty. The fate of Lin Biao under Mao Zedong remains the most prominent example—where proximity to power ultimately became a liability rather than protection. Zhang was not a designated successor, but like other powerful enforcers before him, he became expendable once his influence appeared to threaten absolute control.

This pattern underscores a structural risk. Leaders obsessed with concentrating power often act from deep insecurity, prioritizing personal control over institutional stability. In such systems, professionalism gives way to political signaling, and restraint is easily interpreted as weakness.

The upheaval has prompted debate over its implications for the Taiwan Strait. One view holds that the purge has disrupted command continuity and institutional memory, leaving the PLA unprepared for major operations and reducing near-term risks. Rebuilding senior leadership takes time, and a disorganized force is less likely to challenge U.S. military presence in the region.

A more sobering assessment points in the opposite direction. When political loyalty eclipses professional judgment, decision-making becomes unpredictable. Xi, who lacks a military background, now presides over a system in which subordinates may compete to demonstrate ideological zeal rather than operational prudence. Ambitious officers may view escalation as a career opportunity, while caution is dismissed as disloyalty. Under such conditions, the probability of misjudgment rises sharply.

For Taiwan, the most immediate threat is not a sudden, well-planned strike, but intelligence failure. The real danger lies in dual miscalculation: on one side, PLA commanders selected primarily for political reliability may misread the strategic environment to please the leadership; on the other, Taiwan's government—lacking robust confidence-building measures and crisis communication channels with Beijing—may misinterpret internal power struggles as external intent.

As U.S.–China strategic rivalry intensifies and cross-strait hostility deepens, the absence of reliable communication mechanisms makes verification increasingly difficult. Predicting PLA behavior under these conditions is becoming harder, not easier.

Taiwan cannot afford complacency.Strengthening crisis communication and early-warning capabilities is more urgent than ever, and reliance on external intelligence alone is insufficient. When power in Beijing becomes more centralized and opaque, stability depends less on declared intentions than on avoiding fatal misread signals. That is why the current turbulence inside China's military should worry Taiwan—and the region—far more than it reassures.
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Original Article in Chinese