Chinese President Xi Jinping has recently launched investigations for serious disciplinary violations against Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia (張又俠) and Chief of Joint Staff Liu Zhenli (劉振立).
Former Mainland Affairs Council Deputy Chairman Zhao Chien-min (趙建民) tells Storm Media that these cases transcend mere corruption, reflecting deeper structural problems within the Chinese Communist Party's military command structure.
Since taking power in 2012, Xi has removed over one hundred generals, suggesting the Party's control over the military may be faltering.
Xi must now consolidate his authority, particularly as he positions himself for a fourth term where unification with Taiwan serves as part of his key political leverage.
Zhang - the second-highest military figure behind Xi himself - is a traditional battlefield commander with actual combat experience from the Sino-Vietnamese War and deep influence within the army. Both Zhang's and Xi's fathers were CCP veterans, creating personal ties that made Zhang appear indispensable to Xi's leadership and made this purge particularly shocking to observers.
Besides Xi himself, Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin (張升民) is now the only remaining member among the current Central Military Commission members appointed in 2022.
Impact on Taiwan: Escalating Pressure
Zhao identifies two competing interpretations of how these cases affect cross-strait dynamics. The first suggests Beijing's military actions against Taiwan may decelerate. The second argues that Xi's consolidation of military command will intensify pressure on Taiwan, as Xi prepares for potential reelection to a fourth term, making unification a crucial political asset for securing continued leadership. Zhao predicts Taiwan will face significantly greater pressure throughout 2026.
Military Leadership Restructured Under Xi
The Defense Ministry's January 24 announcement described Zhang and Liu as facing investigation for "serious disciplinary violations," typically indicating corruption. Since assuming power, Xi has conducted five rounds ofadjustments in the military, ostensibly targeting corruption but ultimately serving broaderobjectives of organizational restructuring and power consolidation.
The 2023 anti-corruption campaign led by former Central Military Commission Vice Chairman He Weidong brought down two defense ministers, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe (魏鳳和). Li previously served under Zhang in the Equipment Department, making Zhang the likely recipient of any upward bribes.
Xi's decision at the time to limit investigations to 2017 - when Zhang stepped down as department head - demonstrated Xi's intent to protect Zhang. This context underscores that the current cases transcend corruption, as Xi could have moved against Zhang years earlier if that were the primary concern.
Party Control Over Military Command
According to an editorial in the People's Liberation Army Daily, Zhang and Liu violated Xi's institutional military accountability systems. While the CCP has long maintained the tradition of "the Party commands the gun," these recent events suggest systemic problems within the Chinese military leadership.
Under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, Party command over the military functioned seamlessly because both leaders possessed military backgrounds. Subsequent CCP leaders lacked military credentials, with Hu Jintao essentially operating without military power during his decade in office.
Xi has removed over one hundred generals since taking office, including seventy during his first term alone.
During the 20th Party Congress, Zhang retained his official position despite already being 72 years old, in a break with the established protocol of retiring at 70 in the CCP bureaucracy. This exception demonstrated Xi's trust in Zhang and placed him alongside Liu Zhenli as the PLA's most powerful military figures.
This extensive purging demonstrates Xi's recognition of systemic problems in the relationship between the Party and the military, as well as his own limited military connections, necessitating continuous structural cleansing of military leadership. The most recent move against Zhang and Liu suggests Xi still feels his control over the military remains insufficient.
Taiwan-Focused Military Backbone Decimated
Before last year's Fourth Plenum, nine PLA generals were removed, five of whom originated from the army group stationed in Xiamen—the primary force facing Taiwan.
These consecutive purges suggest Beijing's military actions against Taiwan may indeed decelerate, as they have severely weakened Beijing's military deployment capabilities against Taiwan and decimated the senior ranks of the military.
Zhang's combat experience during the Sino-Vietnamese War, including being surrounded by enemy forces, may have led him to counsel Xi about warfare risks and mainland China's current unpreparedness, potentially triggering his removal.
Xi's Fourth Term Strategy: Intensified Unification Campaign
A second interpretation suggests Beijing has already prioritized cross-strait unification. Taiwan has largely overlooked Xi's potential reelection challenge in 2027. The current Politburo Standing Committee composition shows no clear succession planning or emerging successors, indicating Xi will likely pursue a fourth term.
How might Xi convince fellow Politburo members to support his continued bid for power? Having already broken precedent with his third term, Xi requires compelling justification for continued rule, and cross-strait unification appears to be his primary argument. Beijing's timeline towardsunification has sped up, evidenced by increasingly aggressive military exercises that blur the lines between training and actual combat preparation.
Zhao predicts Taiwan will face intensified pressure in 2026. While unification lacks immediate urgency—given ongoing US-China geopolitical competition, mainland economic challenges, and military structural problems—Beijing's military pressure is likely to continues escalating.
