As Taiwan's current legislative session enters its final week, the Taiwan People's Party delivered on party chairman Huang Kuo-chang's post-U.S. visit pledge by introducing its own defense special act draft.
Predictably, the Democratic Progressive Party responded with sharp criticism.
"Why can you initiate military procurement cases? We might as well skip the Ministry of National Defense and directly address Huang as Defense Minister," quipped DPP legislator Puma Shen.
Why Opposition Parties Hold Leverage Over Defense Budgets
Shen's sarcasm carries merit on two fronts. First, Huang is indeed not the Defense Minister, and regardless of the Ministry of National Defense's budgetary performance, legislators have no obligation to overstep their bounds by providing institutional cover.
The DPP remains trapped in its own contradictions, swinging from one strategic defense doctrine to another, first claiming the plan is to defeat China at sea and then saying that the goal is to annihilate them on the beachhead. Such swings in logic damage public morale and give opposition parties leverage to reject the defense budget
Taiwan faces a harsh reality: unwanted American arms sales are now mandatory purchases subject to the whim of Washington, withdelivery delays without recourse.
Take the Volcano mines, heavily touted by former President Tsai Ing-wen against opposition. None of the ordered fourteen systems has yet reached Taiwan.
The F-16V case exemplifies this dynamic even more —originally a procurement initiative from former President Lee Teng-hui's era that required securing Mirage contracts with France before America expedited approval. Two to three decades later, Taiwan seeks F-35 upgrades like Japan and South Korea, yet America categorically refuses, permitting only F-16V upgrades.
Similar to the Volcano mine system, Tsai's military aircraft special budget, exceeding NT$200 billion, has yet to deliver a single aircraft.
Annual Defense Budget Increases
The American Institute in Taiwan repeatedly pushes for massive Taiwanese defense budgets, and arms dealers stream through congressional delegations competing for contracts. Yet no one seems able to explain how we might reduce the delays in these arms being delivered.
Budgets generate profit, and defense budgets classified as "confidential" for "national security" face weaker oversight. Consider the delayed delivery of theHai Kun submarine under Tsai—six sea trials without successful diving capability, with seven additional submarines awaiting construction.
How can subsequent budgets receive full funding when the first submarine remains unsuccessful? Even after the submarine program's chief coordinator departed, the Ministry of National Defense refuses to acknowledge the reality that America stopped manufacturing diesel-powered submarines long ago, ultimately producing "assembled model ships." Whether Hai Kun will succeed remains uncertain, yet allocating several hundred billion for subsequent submarines before the prototype model has proved successful seems entirely impractical.
If tea merchants and bathroom equipment suppliers can become arms dealers, why can't legislators propose defense special acts? However, regarding why military information and communications contracts were awarded to businesses lacking prior arms experience, the Ministry of National Defense's explanations lack credibility. This includes Minister Koo Li-hsiung, who showed no mercy toward the KMT during his party affairs role and maintained strict impartiality with financial holding companies as a regulator, yet cannot block these inexplicable "arms dealers" at the Ministry of National Defense. This represents more than losing public credibility—how do the armed forces view a minister who opens wide doors for military procurement interests?
Special Acts Mandating "Legal Auditing"
Defense special budgets have precedent under Lee, Tsai Ing-wen, and Chen Shui-bian. These special budget cases shared clear objectives and precise procurement items.
Lai Ching-te may wish to emulate Tsai's NT$800 billion special infrastructure budget, but defense budgets fundamentally differ from grassroots spending oninfrastructure. While not "successful," local communities at least eventually witnessed completed or incomplete construction projects.
Defense budgets, however, involve payments for uncertain delivery timelines and unknown fund destinations through specialized contracts. Chen's administration ultimately saw massive budget cuts equivalent to non-passage, meaning legislators possess both authority and responsibility to reject unreasonable "special budget proposals."
When the TPP introduced their version, they criticized Article 6 of the Executive Yuan's draft mandating "legal auditing," labeling it a superfluous "cover-up insurance policy." Unfortunately, the DPP government has overseen numerous budgets and contracts that even auditing processes cannot address.
The TPP's proposal during the final week before theend of the legislative session potentially provides an opportunity for a joint review of the Executive Yuan's special budget while offering alternatives for future cross-party negotiations.
Huang Kuo-chang is certainly not the Defense Minister, but the TPP's recent acts reflect the failures of the Ministry of National Defense. Opaque budgets and insufficient public communication invite legitimate criticism.
