The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been rocked by a major leadership purge, with Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia (張又俠) and Joint Staff Department Chief Liu Zhenli (劉振立) placed under investigation on January 24. The seven-member CMC has effectively been reduced to Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平) and Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin (張升民), who is responsible for military discipline.
The following day, the PLA's official newspaper, PLA Daily, accused Zhang and Liu of five “severe problems,” including seriously undermining the “Chairman Responsibility System” that enshrines Xi's personal command over the armed forces—language that signals a primarily political purge rather than a routine anti-corruption move.
Red Second-Generation Allies Turned Liability
Zhang and Xi both come from so‑called “red second-generation” families with deep revolutionary roots in Shaanxi. Zhang hails from Weinan, while Xi's family is from nearby Fuping County; their fathers, founding general Zhang Zongxun (張宗遜) and former vice premier Xi Zhongxun (習仲勳), served together as commander and political commissar in the 1940s, jointly defending the Shaan‑Gan‑Ning border region against Nationalist forces. Zhang built his career as a powerful princeling within the PLA, long seen as one of Xi's closest military allies.
That pedigree helped Zhang secure real authority inside the CMC, setting him apart from other vice chairmen. He was elevated to CMC vice chairman at the 19th Party Congress in 2017 and, despite already being 72, retained the position at the 20th Party Congress in 2022—a sign of Xi's personal trust. The sudden move to investigate him for “serious violations” suggests that the official charges may be a surface justification for deeper political concerns.
From Nuclear Secrets to the “Chairman's Responsibility System”
One possible explanation for the harshness of the purge emerged from external reporting. The Wall Street Journal,citing a briefing attendee, reported that Zhang is under investigation for allegedly leaking core nuclear plans to the United States and for taking bribes to promote former defense minister Li Shangfu (李尚福) and others.
The PLA Daily editorial listed five “severe issues”: betraying the trust placed in them by the Party leadership and the CMC; seriously trampling on and undermining the Chairman Responsibility System; damaging the Party's absolute leadership over the military by fostering political and corruption problems that threaten its ruling foundation; harming the CMC's image and authority; and shaking the political and ideological basis of military cohesion and combat readiness, inflicting “extremely negative” consequences on the Party, the state, and the armed forces.
The simultaneous fall of Zhang and Liu points to factional dynamics inside the CMC and alleged violations of the Chairman Responsibility System. On January 26, the PLA Daily's front-page article “Forever Sounding the Charge” declared that no one's background or past record could shield them from scrutiny—an unmistakable warning that even senior princelings are no longer untouchable. Defense Security Institute associate research fellow Jie Zhong (揭仲) told Storm Media that Xi's goal goes beyond punishing graft; he sees an effort to uproot the influence of former CMC Political Department Director Miao Hua (苗華) and the so‑called southeastern clique.
Dismantling the Last Factions: The Southeastern Clique Under Fire
According to Jie, many of those who disappeared in earlier waves of purges did not receive especially heavy punishments, but they were never reinstated, and their former posts remain unfilled. This pattern, he argues, reflects a deliberate attempt to erase Miao's influence network from the PLA. Miao, once an exceptionally powerful officer whose reach extended across different military services and institutions, was unique in the breadth of his appointment power aside from Xi himself.
With Zhang's downfall, the latest round of removals can be traced back to decisions after the Fourth Plenum, affecting several of his close associates. These include former Army Deputy Commander Zhao Yu (趙宇), former Acting Commander of the People's Armed Police Cao Junzhang (曹均章), and former Acting Political Commissar of the Navy Leng Shaojie (冷少杰)—all of whom have vanished from public view. Jie interprets this as the systematic dismantling of the PLA's last remaining “mountain tops” and factional strongholds.
Not a Coup, but a One-Way Chain of Command
Some outside observers have speculated that Zhang may have been quietly plotting a coup. Defense Security Institute special research fellow Qi Leyi (亓樂義), however, rejects that characterization. A coup, he notes, involves an organized group using military rebellion or political action to seize state power. In Zhang's case, there were no signs of resistance; he was removed and placed under investigation without any visible pushback, underscoring Xi's unchallenged authority over both the Party and the military.
Qi argues that this round of purges will wipe out the remaining factional forces inside the PLA, leaving loyalty to Xi as the sole political line. He describes the shake-up as a comprehensive clearing of Xi's military leadership, sweeping away both elder figures and more reform-oriented officers. The reshuffle is also accelerating the rise of younger officers—largely below the rank of full general—laying the groundwork for Xi to potentially pursue a fourth term with a more thoroughly reshaped command structure.
Short-Term Stability Around Taiwan, Long-Term Risks in Crisis Management
Following Zhang and Liu's removal, the CMC is effectively left with only Xi and Zhang Shengmin at the top. Qi notes that the CMC's work traditionally spans three major areas—military command, political work, and discipline—but with only the discipline side clearly filled, the command and political functions now lack full leadership.
On the question of PLA activities around Taiwan, Qi believes routine operations are unlikely to change in the short term “as long as there is no war.” He argues that regular exercises around Taiwan and “grey zone” operations have already been institutionalized, with day-to-day operations handled by major and colonel-level officers through party committees within the forces. In the near term, capable but less experienced younger officers will continue to execute these plans, and drill patterns are expected to remain consistent.
Defense Security Institute associate research fellow Jie similarly predicts little immediate change to the PLA's routine encirclement exercises or grey zone activities around Taiwan. Since the Democratic Progressive Party took office in 2016, authorization for the Eastern Theater Command's operations has been normalized, making such activities part of standing orders rather than ad hoc decisions.
When the Script Breaks: Can a Hollowed-Out Top Handle a Crisis?
The real test, Jie warns, will come not in scripted routine drills but in “major unexpected events,” such as natural disasters, sudden crises, or territorial disputes like Japan's 2012 nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands. Such scenarios require rapid coordination across all five theater commands and four military services. With experienced senior officers being replaced by less seasoned figures, he worries that the PLA's ability to manage unforeseen incidents may be weakened, raising the risk of miscalculation.
Overall, Jie believes that while day-to-day operations may remain stable, the high-level purges will impair the PLA's capacity to handle large-scale crises not covered by existing plans—a vulnerability that could persist for roughly three years. Stanford University's Wu Guoguang (吳國光), a senior fellow at the Center on China's Economy and Institutions, similarly assesses that the likelihood of a full-scale war across the Taiwan Strait may actually decline in the near term. But he notes that a system in which all power flows upward to one man, and where factions are eliminated rather than balanced, can be less predictable once a crisis breaks the script.
Original Article in Chinese
