After nine months of intensive tariff negotiations with the U.S., Taiwanese Deputy Premier Cheng Li-chun returned to the country to Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰).
remain sharply divided across party lines, with differing views even among academics. This mirrors the political controversy that surrounded the Ma administration's Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement, which the KMT hailed as a major achievement while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) harshly criticized it, ultimately sparking the Sunflower Movement.
Role Reversal: Could the KMT Have Said No to America?
Whether the Taiwan-US negotiations benefit or harm Taiwan remains unclear. Both sides can cite objective data to support their positions, but neither can make definitive claims since all potential damage or benefits require real-world testing. Will the $500 billion investment in the United States represent what the DPP claims as a symbol of "Taiwan's industrial internationalization," or will it prove to be what the blue and white opposition parties allege—a waste of money that "hollows out Taiwan"? The answer may not emerge for three to five years, or even longer.
A useful exercise is considering role reversal: If blue or white parties were currently in power, could their negotiating teams have secured better terms than Cheng? Would they avoid appeasing Trump? Would they admit negotiating failure that left Taiwan vulnerable to American demands? Would they dare say no to the United States? Could they bear the consequences of refusal?
The negotiating team clearly worked hard—Cheng's visible dark circles tell the story. Facing Trump's unpredictable style, no country finds negotiations easy. Economic and trade negotiations are inherently difficult. Taiwan's lengthy WTO accession talks were grueling, and 38 years ago, protesters threw eggs at Vincent Siew (蕭萬長), then director-general of the Board of Foreign Trade, over opening Taiwan's market to American turkey imports.
Premier Cho's airport reception for Cheng resembled the treatment given to then-Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) upon his return from the United States, when Premier Yen Chia-kan (顏家淦) personally met him at the airport. This sends a clear political signal that Cheng may not want and that subjects her to additional mockery—speculation about a Taipei mayoral campaign.
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Whether Cheng is suitable for electoral politics remains debatable. Lack of campaign experience shouldn't disqualify anyone, as every seasoned politician starts somewhere. The challenge of facing incumbent Mayor Chiang Wan-an (蔣萬安) shouldn't be automatically disqualifying either, though other potential DPP candidates claim others are better suited. What is inappropriate is using Taiwan-US negotiations as a launching pad for a mayoral campaign.
The DPP's most objectionable trait is turning everything into electoral mobilization, even constitutional order becomes campaign ammunition. Despite US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick's gleeful statement that "$500 billion is just a down payment," Premier Cho insisted that "investing $500 billion is misinformation," determined to weave the Taiwan-US negotiations into campaign armor—not for himself but to forcibly drape it over Cheng. This exploits Taiwan's industrial future for the DPP's electoral advantage.
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Cheng explained the negotiation results to the public, including tariffs reduced to 15% without stacking, a concession that took nine months to achieve and merely provides Taiwan the same treatment as Japan and South Korea. She highlighted "most favored nation" status for semiconductors and semiconductor derivatives through Section 232 exemptions. However, she didn't address whether imported automobiles would face zero tariffs or whether agricultural markets would open fully to the United States. The eventual "Taiwan-US Reciprocal Trade Agreement" must be published and submitted to the Legislative Yuan, meaning her real challenges lie ahead.
Role Reversal: Can Cheng Support Legislative Review and Amendment Powers?
Twelve years ago, as a legislator, Cheng harshly criticized the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement as a "demon-revealing mirror" exposing the arrogance and authoritarianism of those in power. She condemned the approach: "They say you can't discuss it before signing, can't change it after signing, and won't allow review." Over the past nine months, despite several Executive Yuan press conferences, the government never discussed negotiation processes or content. Taiwanese citizens consistently received information more slowly than foreign media. The key question now: After future signing, can she support the Legislative Yuan's power to "review and amend"?
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Does Cheng now regret her harsh criticism of government trade negotiations? One might argue that cross-strait agreements differ from Taiwan-US agreements, which is true. The Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement saw mainland China open 80 sectors to Taiwan while Taiwan opened 64 to China, with China offering more concessions to Taiwan. Even after nearly ten years of DPP rule, the party hasn't proactively terminated what they called a "raging beast." The Taiwan-US agreement's opening list remains unseen, with no impact assessment reports on industrial effects. China never demanded that Taiwan invest in the mainland—Taiwanese businesses invested there, considering low labor costs, land costs, environmental costs, and market opportunities. Investment in the United States now faces high labor costs and inevitably high land and environmental costs.
Even when Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) used investment for diplomatic breakthroughs, he never made it mandatory. Regarding Taiwan-US negotiations, whether $500 billion or $250 billion, how will the government implement America's demands? Can it avoid telling businesses that, without investment, there are no preferential tax rates?
Taiwan's diplomatic situation is difficult, and its negotiating position even more so. While the Executive Yuan celebrates a "home run," Lutnick revealed the truth: "Look, they need to keep our president happy...because our president is the key to protecting their country."
What's embarrassing is that the "protection fees" America demands aren't even included in this Taiwan-US negotiation list. The US military procurement list exceeds $300 billion, and the Lai administration is offering $1.25 trillion over eight years in a special defense budget—neither expediting delivery of $500-600 billion in undelivered weapons nor guaranteeing timely delivery of items in the special budget.
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The $500 billion investment and credit guarantees represent 57% of GDP, exceeding 80% of foreign exchange reserves. By comparison, Japan's commitment represents 13% of its GDP, South Korea's 19%. In economic terms, Taiwan bears far greater pressure than Japan or South Korea. This "Taiwan-US Reciprocal Trade Agreement," worth approximately NT$15 trillion to America, hardly qualifies as "reciprocal," but it may represent a critical inflection point for major impacts or transformations in Taiwan's industrial structure. Standing at this turbulent crossroads, Cheng has no reason to smile.
